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ABSTRACT
GLOBAL IZ AT I ON AND THE PARADOX OF INCORPORATION 
AND MARG INAL 12 AT ION: AN EXPLORATORY NOTE
ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA.
Charles R. Lartey 
Old Dominion University, 2 001 
Director: Dr. Simon Serfaty
Utilizing a structured, focused analysis based on a case 
study of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), this research challenges 
the orthodox notion that the new international context of 
development that is instigated by the imperatives of 
globalization, and defined by the ideological framework of 
neoliberalism has universal, redemptive effects.
First, the literature is reviewed to show that this new 
context of development differs, ideologically, from the post- 
World War II development paradigms. Second, the demands of the 
new development framework are exposed with the examination of 
the links between globalization and neoliberalism. Third, with 
specific examples from different countries within the sub- 
region, the path, and the psychological processes through 
which SSA was (is) conditioned to the political economy of 
globalization are identified.
Then, on the basis of a specified theoretical model, the 
study examines whether SSA has been attaining the benefits 
presumed to be associated with subscription to the neoliberal 
policy demands of the new global market discipline. As a 
litmus test of competing interpretative accounts, our 
theoretical function reveals that globalization and its
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
associated neoliberal policy framework, in the context of SSA, 
precipitate a peculiar paradoxical relationship of 
incorporation and marginalization.
The adoption and implementation of neoliberal policies 
concurrently incorporate and marginalize SSA within the 
emerging political economy of globalization. The policy 
implications of this paradox are examined in the wider context 
of development and poverty alleviation concerns of the sub- 
region .
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
As an all descriptive index, and as a convenient epithet, 
never in the academic discourse on international political 
economy has a phrase ever been used, overused, abused, 
disputed, contested, glorified and overglorified than the word 
"globalization."1 However, like a meteorite in space that is 
in constant motion, it is very difficult to grasp the 
underlying essence of globalization within a precise 
definitional fiat.
Beyond its over extended usage and its contested meaning 
however, the ideological framework of globalization has been 
employed to demarcate the new context of development in the 
emerging post-Cold War system. Therefore, as an all embracing 
catch-phrase that circumscribes the framework of the emerging 
political economy of development, globalization has elevated
This dissertation is written along the stylistic requirements 
of The Chicago Manual of Style, 14ed. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1993).
Globalization, as an analytic concept, has been utilized to the 
study of the various aspects of the society. However, the domain of our 
study, and the specific research questions posed for examination will be 
limited to issues relating to the new context of development associated 
with globalization. For a comprehensive review of the sociology of 
globalization, see Malcom Waters, Modern Sociological Theory (London: 
Sage Publishers, 1994) . For the cultural implications of globalization, 
see M. Featherstone, ed. , Global Culture (London: Sage Publishers,
1990) .
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2the underlying tenets of neo liberal ism2 to the status of an 
international theology.
To maximize the opportunities, and minimize the 
constraints of a globalizing world economy, conventional 
wisdom considers the dictums of neoliberal economic 
prescriptions as immutable laws that must be adopted by both 
the developed, and the developing countries. In this case, the 
ideational framework of globalization helps to frame issues, 
and define what constitutes development.
By extrapolation, the ideational framework of 
globalization also defines the appropriate policy tools for 
the alleviation of poverty. Simply put, globalization presents 
a new political economy3 of development. As we will see in 
Chapters III and IV, the main agent provocateurs of this new 
context of development are the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
2The meaning, the underlying assumptions, and the central tenets 
of neoliberalism will be exposed in the subsequent Chapters of our 
dissertation. It will however suffice to indicate at this point that 
neoliberalism, as an ideological counterpart of globalization, is 
predicated upon the role of unfettered market forces in the allocation 
of productive factors, and the distribution of incentives. See Thomas J. 
Biersteker, "The ’Triumph' of Liberal Economic Ideas in the Developing 
World," in Barbara Stallings, ed. , Global Change, Regional Response: The 
New International Context of Development (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), pp. 174-198.
3In its simplistic meaning, political economy is a term used to 
express how politics and economics interact to determine the manner by 
which societies assign tasks of the allocation of productive factors, 
and distribution of incentives to market forces and state controls. 
Market forces and state controls therefore constitute the two anti-podal 
ends of political economy. For a comprehensive review of the classical 
meaning of political economy, see M. Staniland, What Is Political 
Economy? A Study of Social Theory and Underdevelopment (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985) .
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3In spice of its powerful ideological connotations on the 
very essence of development, there are some lingering 
theoretical and practical controversies over the standard 
depiction of globalization and its effects. Some writers view 
the emerging trend as a global trap that is intended to weaken 
the collective power of labor against capital.4 Others 
consider it as a post-industrial form of slavery that is 
dressed in the camouflage of deterministic market forces.5 
Still, others view it as a process with underlying mechanisms 
that enhance a genteel process of postmodern colonialism.6
Parallel to the differential, and at times hyperbolic 
view's on globalization is the observation among a disparate 
group of commentators that the effects of the emerging process 
are uneven.7 indeed, there are winners and losers in the 
emerging trend. In this case, contrary to conventional 
opinion, the "ecclesiastical" admonitions of globalization 
have no universalizing redemptive effects. This is so because, 
some regions of the world are not well positioned to be able
4See Hans-Peter Martin and H. Schumann, The Global Trap: 
Globalization and the Assault on Democracy & Prosperity (London: Zed 
Books, 1997).
^See S. Rail, "Which Mexico Is It? Globalization is the New Form 
of Slavery Dressed in the Camouflage of a So-called Market Economy, " 
America, Vol. 177, No. 8 (September 27, 1997), pp. 21-24.
6See S.S. Silbey, “Let Them Eat Cake: Globalization, Postmodern 
Colonialism, and the Possibilities of Justice, " Law & Society Review, 
Vol. 31, No. 2 (June 1997) , pp. 207-235.
7See Hans-Henrik Holm and G. Sorensen, eds . , Whose World Order? 
Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 199 5) . In this edited volume, a group of writers analyze the 
effects of globalization from different regional perspectives and 
conclude that there are winners and losers in the emerging trend.
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4to maximize the opportunities, and. minimize the constraints
associated with the emerging global system.
With specific reference to Sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter
referred to as SSA) , there is a condescending resentment among
some observers that globalization holds no prospect for the
sub-region. The reigning notion is that SSA has been
incorporated into the ideological framework of globalization.
At the same time, the sub-region has been marginalized from
the conventional benefits associated with the emerging system.
Kidane Mengisteab, for instance, contends that,
it is a paradox that African, economies are the most dependent on 
the global economy for their growth and they are the most 
marginalized in the global system. Ironically, the policies that 
have been implemented to promote integration with the global 
economy have reinforced marginalization.s
The assertion here is that, by design, SSA has been co-opted
into the ideational framework of the emerging global system.
By default, however, the sub-region has been marginalized in
the same system. That is to say, in specific reference to SSA,
globalization seems to precipitate a constricting paradox of
incorporation and marginalization.
In a related examination of this obfuscating contention,
Manfred Bienefeld isolates and examines the application of
neoliberal policies under globalization and concludes that,
the process portends "serious consequences for large parts of
sKidane Mengisteab, Globalization and Autocentricity In Africa's 
Development in the 21st Century (Trenton, N J : Africa World Press, Inc., 
1996), p. 17.
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5the world."9 In his view, the neoliberal policies associated 
with globalization enhance the domination of less developed 
countries by the advanced industrial countries. According to 
the author, it is within such a prism of domination that the 
paradox of incorporation and marginalization manifests itself, 
especially, in the context of SSA.
Characteristic of other studies that make intermittent 
references to the paradox of incorporation and 
marginalization, the two studies indicated above do not 
specify a theoretical function that links marginalization with 
incorporation. As it will be demonstrated in this study, the 
specification of such a theoretical function is important in 
order to clarify the competing accounts on the marginalization 
of SSA.
As it will be detailed in Chapter V, there are those who 
believe that SSA has been marginalized because the sub-region 
has not gone far enough with the implementation of neoliberal 
policies. Others claim that the sub-region has been 
marginalized because of the very implementation of neoliberal 
policies. Without doubt, unless these competing claims are 
clarified on the basis of a specified theoretical function, it 
will amount to a truncated exercise in futility to 
prognosticate the policy implications of marginalization on 
development processes in SSA.
It is to examine the authenticity of the paradox of 
incorporation and marginalization on the basis of a specified
9M. Bienefeld, "The New World Order: Echoes of a New Imperialism., “ 
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1994), p. 31.
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6theoretical function, that the topic of this dissertation 
project was adopted. Rather than a detached theoretical 
exercise in itself, the instrumental values of the examination 
of this paradox are two-fold.
First, it will enable us to draw some relevant policy 
implications of the emerging political economy of 
globalization on development, and poverty alleviating efforts 
of SSA. Second, the delineation of the policy implications of 
marginalization will offer us the chance, in our concluding 
Chapter, to assess the authenticity of the World Bank's recent 
report that Africa could claim the 21st Century through the 
deepening of neoliberal reforms.10
OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS OF STUDY
There are two interrelated objectives. The main objective 
is to examine whether the neoliberal policies associated with 
globalization constitute the implementation of Structural 
Adjustment Programs (hereafter referred to as SAPs) as 
recommended by the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and to analyze, on the basis of a specified 
theoretical function, whether the policies concurrently 
incorporate and marginalize SSA in the emerging global system.
A related objective is to examine the policy implications 
of the paradox of incorporation and marginalization for 
development priorities, and poverty alleviation concerns of 
the sub-region. The examination of our second objective is to
10See the World Bank, Can Africa. Claim The 21st- Century? 
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2000a).
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enable us to evaluate the World Bank's guarded optimism that 
Africa could claim this Century. The caveat here is that, the 
only acceptable yardstick for determining the authenticity of
the World Bank's claim is the possibility of a development
process that bears on poverty alleviation.
Research Questions
In order to streamline the examination of the objectives 
set in our study, the following four specific questions will 
be isolated and addressed under different Chapters.
Q 1 . To what extent do neoliberal policies constitute the 
ideological counterpart of globalization?
Q2 . in what way does the adoption of neoliberal policies
incorporate SSA into the ideological framework of
globalization?
Q3 . To what extent does the paradox of incorporation and
marginalization manifests itself in the context of SSA? 
Q 4 . What, if any, are the implications of the paradox of 
incorporation and marginalization on development 
priorities, and poverty alleviation concerns of the 
sub-region?
While the key concepts of our research questions such as 
incorporation, neoliberal policies, and marginalization await 
a more detailed definition in the subsequent Chapters of our 
study, it will however suffice at this point to provide some 
skeletal explanations.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8As it will be detailed further in Chapter IV, 
incorporation is used to imply the subscription to the 
neoliberal ideology that underpins the globalization process. 
With incorporation operationalized in this manner, our study 
will emphasize the neoliberal policy framework of 
globalization, rather than the contested characteristics of 
the emerging process. As it will be examined further in 
Chapters IV and V, the policy flair of neoliberalism revolves 
around the promotion of market forces, the adoption of 
liberalization measures, and the institution of deregulatory 
schemes .
Marginalization, on the other hand, will be 
operationalized to indicate the incorporation of SSA into the 
ideational framework of globalization without the attainment 
of the conventional benefits associated with the adoption, and 
implementation of neoliberal policies. As an index of the 
economic regression of SSA, the degree and dimensions of the 
marginalization of SSA will be indicated by some specific data 
on trade, foreign direct investment, and other macroeconomic 
aggregates.
NOTES ON METHODOLOGY
As an exploratory endeavor, the purpose of the central 
research questions posed for examination in our study is to 
enable us, using SSA as a case study, and within the framework 
of neoliberalism, to develop an explanatory theory that links 
marginalization with incorporation. Our study is therefore a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9"plausibility probe” toward, the development of a policy­
relevant theoretical function,11 ratther than a more rigorous 
testing of stated hypotheses.
In this case, a "structured, focused" analysis that is 
based on a "disciplined-configurati^ve" mode of inquiry emerges 
as the appropriate methodological aipproach for our study.12 As 
rightly pointed out by Alexander L. George, this mode of 
analysis is a qualitative-inductive- procedure of theory 
development that is predicated upom the "methodology of 
explanation."13
According to Harry Eckstein, and as elaborated by 
Alexander L. George, designing a pl_ausibility probe as a 
building block for theory development involves, essentially, 
three phases. In Phase 1, a theoretical function is specified 
within the existing explanatory framework. Phase 2 involves 
the undertaking of a case study.14 In Phase 3, the results of
1JHarry Eckstein, distinguishes between a plausibility probe as a 
preliminary stage of theoretical inquiry from rigorous testing of 
hypotheses on the basis of statistical-correlational studies. See H. 
Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in F.I. 
Greenstein and N.W. Polsby, eds. , Handhocok of Political Science 
(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975), VII, pp _ 79-138.
12 "Structured" because the method employs a set of general 
questions to guide data collection and analysis. "focused" in the sense 
that the analysis deals selectively with only certain aspects of the 
phenomenon under investigation. A "disci£>lined-configurative" mode of 
analysis is a qualitative-inductive procedure that is based on causal 
imputation, rather than a quantitative-deductive approach that is based 
on causal inference in statistical-correHational studies. For a 
comprehensive review of this mode of inquiry, see Alexander L . George, 
"Case Studies and Theory Development: T h e  Method of Structured, Focused 
Comparison, " in Paul G. Lauren, ed. , DipHomacy: New Approaches in 
History, Theory and Policy (New York: T h e  Free Press, 1979) , pp. 43-68.
13Ibid., p . 46.
14According to A.L. George, case studies are central to 
qualitative-inductive procedures of theoiry development. In his view,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the case study are drawn upon "in order to assess, 
reformulate, or elaborate the initial theory stated in Phase 
"15
Specification of a Theoretical Function
As cursorily alluded to, there is no formal theoretical 
function that explains the paradox of incorporation and 
marginalization in the context of SSA. As a result of the lack 
of a precise theoretical specification, there are competing 
accounts on the marginalization of the sub-region. The 
resultant effect is that, it is conceptually difficult to 
assess the policy implications of marginalization on 
development and poverty alleviating objectives of the sub- 
region .
To help bridge this conceptual deficit, we intend to 
specify a theoretical model that extracts marginalization (M) 
from a functional relationship between incorporation (IC) and 
the gains (g) of integration (IT) . Our guiding theoretical 
function takes the form of the following equation:
M  - IC - g(IT)
Simply put, we would like to examine whether in the context of 
SSA, marginalization (M) equals incorporation (IC) without the 
gains of integration (g[IT]).
“case study is used as a means of stimulating the imagination in order 
to discern important new general problems, identify possible theoretical 
solutions, and formulate potentially generalizable relations that were 
not previously apparent." See ibid., p. 51, (italics in original).
15Ibid., p . 54.
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Central to this functional relationship is the need to 
make a conceptual distinction between incorporation (IC) and 
integration (IT), and to specify that the gains (g) associated 
with integration (IT) do not necessarily come with 
incorporation into the ideational framework of globalization.
After this conceptual distinction is elaborated upon in 
Chapter V, the gains of integration g(IT) will be equated to 
the conventional benefits associated with the adoption and 
implementation of neoliberal policies. In this case, 
neoliberalism, as an ideological counterpart of globalization, 
provide the explanatory background for the specification of 
our theoretical function. It also provides the framework for 
the search of the paradox of incorporation and marginalization 
in the context of SSA.
Case Study on SSA
The main parameters of our theoretical function will be 
illuminated, and subsequently verified on the basis of a case 
study on SSA, with specific examples from different countries 
in the sub-region, in this direction, the first task will be 
to establish the links between globalization, neoliberalism, 
and recommended policies under SAPs. Chapter III examines 
these links. The next step will be to indicate how the 
implementation of these policies incorporates SSA into the 
ideational framework of the emerging system. Chapter IV 
examines the path of SSA's incorporation into the ideological 
framework of globalization. In effect, the two Chapters
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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establish, the incorporation (IC) component of our theoretical 
function.
The third step will be to isolate the conventional 
benefits associated with neoliberalism, and to indicate 
whether the gains of integration are being realized in the 
context of SSA. The gains of integration are the measurable 
economic outcomes that, in the logic of neoclassical 
economics, come along with the implementation of neoliberal 
policies .
Some of these measurable economic outcomes include: gains 
associated with international trade, increasing foreign direct 
investment, diversification of exports, efficient management 
of external debts, and growth that bears on poverty 
alleviation. In the context of SSA, macroeconomic indicators 
pertaining to these measurable economic outcomes will be 
collated from data prepared by the World Bank, the IMF, and 
the United Nations.
The data is published in several volumes including 
African Development Indicators, World Development Indicators, 
Global Development Finance, International Trade Statistics, 
and others. With the description and interpretation of data on 
the measurable economic outcomes of neoliberal policies 
pertaining to SSA, the first part of Chapter v intends to 
establish the g(IT) parameter of our theoretical function.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Verification of the Theoretical Function and Implications
With the incorporation (IC) of SSA established, and with 
the gains of integration g(IT) identified, we would have 
isolated all the relevant parameters for the final 
verification of our specified theoretical function. As it will 
be demonstrated in the second part of Chapter V, the 
verification of our theoretical function will enable us to 
account for the competing explanations on the marginalization 
of SSA.
What must be noted here is that, the authentication of 
our specified theoretical function will not be an end in 
itself. It will only serve to eguip us with the explanatory 
leverage in the examination of the implications of the paradox 
of incorporation and marginalization on the development, and 
poverty alleviation concerns of SSA. The policy implications 
of our study are the main theme in our concluding Chapter 
(VI) .
LIMITATIONS OF METHODOLOGY
As an exploratory probe that is predicated upon the 
methodology of explanation, our study suffers from some 
obvious limitations peculiar to this kind of approach. In the 
first place, our study will be limited to the examination, and 
the drawing of theoretical inference on already accumulated 
macroeconomic data on SSA. Operating within a circumscribed 
data set, it is quite obvious that the nature of the existing 
data will have a preponderant influence on the verification of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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our specified, theoretical model, and on conclusions drawn from 
our study.
Second, as rightly pointed out be A.L. George, the 
"implications drawn from the case studies for theory 
development are provisional," in the sense that, "they depend 
upon the plausibility of the explanations for the outcomes" in 
specific contexts.16 Examination of existing data, and the 
contextuality of case studies combine to limit the 
generalizability of our research findings.
What must be noted here, however, is that, the underlying 
purpose of our study is not so much to develop an 
authoritative, theoretical verdict applicable in all contexts. 
Rather, the underlying purpose is to specify a theoretical 
function that will enable us to explain, and settle the 
competing explanations of the paradox of incorporation and 
marginalization in the context of SSA.
The development of a contextual theoretical function does 
not only help in drawing relevant policy implications, it will 
also permit a more rigorous testing of specified hypotheses in 
subsequent studies. In other words, the acknowledged 
limitations common to all qualitative, plausibility probes do 
not necessarily detract from the relevance of the objectives 
of this dissertation.
I6Ibid., p . 58.
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OUTLINE OF SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS
Our objectives, and. research questions are framed within 
the globalization-induced political economy of development 
that is predicated upon the hegemonic ideology of 
neoliberalism. Therefore, in order to set the background for 
our subsequent analysis, the literature is reviewed in Chapter 
II to show that the imperatives of globalization undermine the 
ideology of post-WW II development paradigms. As it will be 
demonstrated in this Chapter, the new political economy of 
globalization, in the context of SSA, entails a conspicuous 
paradox that is worthy of examination.
Chapter III sets the theoretical framework of our study 
with the exploration of the relationship between globalization 
and neoliberalism. Here, the essential characteristics of 
globalization will be salvaged from the raging debate on the 
emerging process. Then, the philosophical traditions, the 
theoretical precepts, and the underlying assumptions of 
neoliberalism will be identified. After that, the 
characteristics of globalization will be superimposed on the 
policy demands of neoliberalism in order to examine the fit 
between the two concepts. The analysis in this Chapter is 
intended to answer our first research question.
Chapter IV examines the dynamics that shaped the 
incorporation of SSA into the ideological framework, and 
policy imperatives of neoliberalism. In this examination, the 
conventional wisdom of incorporation, the means of 
incorporation, and the enforcement of the process of
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incorporation will be considered. In essence, this Chapter 
intends to answer our second research question.
Having identified neoliberalism as the ideological 
counterpart of globalization that defines the new context of 
development (Chapter III), and having established the 
incorporation of SSA into the new framework of development 
(Chapter IV), we shall re-visit our theoretical function in 
Chapter V to examine the marginalization of the sub-region.
By reflecting on some macroeconomic data pertaining to SSA, 
our theoretical function will be used as a litmus test to 
verify the competing accounts on the paradox of incorporation 
and marginalization. The underlying intention of this analysis 
is to answer our third research question.
The objectives of the concluding Chapter (VI) are three­
fold. The first is to draw together the main strands of the 
arguments presented in the previous Chapters. The second is to 
explore the policy implications of marginalization on 
development and poverty alleviating concerns of the sub- 
region. On the basis of the policy implications, the third 
objective will be the re-examination of the World Bank’s 
guarded optimism that Africa can claim the 21st Century.
RELEVANCE OF STUDY
The importance of the objectives, and the central 
research questions posed for examination in our study cannot 
be understated. With the demise of Soviet communism by design, 
and the "triumph of capitalism" by default, there is an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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emerging nomothetic presumptuous claim of universalism 
associated, with the globalization-induced, and neoliberalism- 
defined framework of international development- A consistent 
mantra of the emerging universalism is that, economic 
openness, liberalization, and marketization have positive 
effects in all regions at all times.
The objectives, and the research questions of our study 
seek to demonstrate that this universalis tic assumption 
glosses over some pertinent issues that are instrumental to 
the development efforts, and poverty alleviation concerns of 
SSA. It cannot be denied that globalization and its neoliberal 
framework offer both opportunities and challenges.
Nevertheless, the ability of a region to take advantages of 
the opportunities while overcoming the challenges depends upon 
some determinative factors.
As it will be demonstrated in this study, some 
historically imposed, and other attenuating factors detract 
from SSA's ability to maximize the opportunities offered by 
the new context of development. It is instructive to note 
that, globalization, as an emerging process, is yet to exhaust 
itself but will continue to shape the developmental 
possibilities of the sub-region. In this case, the methodical 
examination of the questions posed in this study will be of 
substantial value to SSA as outlined below
First, our study will be of pedagogical value to SSA with 
the provision of some discriminative insights on "do's and 
don'ts” in the emerging universalizing ideology of
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neoliberalism. Second, with the exposure of the limitations of 
neoliberalism in the context of SSA, our study intends to open 
new vistas that will lead to the rejuvenation of scholarly 
interest in the developmental problems of SSA within the prism 
of the emerging political economy of globalization.
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
As noted in Chapter I, the central research questions of 
our dissertation find meaning within the developmental 
possibilities, and poverty alleviating concerns of SSA. As it 
is detailed later in subsequent Chapters, these efforts are 
currently being conducted within the globalication-induced 
political economy of development that is predicated upon the 
theoretical precepts of neoliberalism.1 In the circumstances 
of SSA, Jan K. Elack argues that post-WW II development 
efforts have always been influenced by the prevailing, and 
conventionally accepted theories and models.2 Colin Leys also 
bemoans "the extraordinary degree to which African reality 
has been overlaid by theory. " In his view7, the "motive is 
good, but the pitfalls are many."3
As indicated by a number of observers, the framework of 
SSA's development has a credible, historically imposed 
theoretical imprint. On this note, the examination of the 
implications of the current globalization framewrork on the 
development prospects of SSA necessarily demands a recourse
1 Barbara Stallings argues that the current international context 
of development is essentially shaped by neoliberalism. See, Stallings, 
"The New International Context of Development," in Barbara Stallings, 
ed. , Global Change, Regional Response.- The New International Context of 
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 349-387.
-Jan Knippers Black, Development in Theory and Practice: Paradigms 
and Paradoxes (Boulder: Westview Press, 19 99) .
3See Colin Leys, The Rise & Fall of Development Theory 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 107.
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cc previous attempts chat case the development process of the 
sub-region within theoretical paradigms. A systematic review 
of past efforts in this direction will in no doubt offer a 
crucial background for the comparative examination of the 
major implications of our study on che development process in 
the sub-region.
In this regard, the literature is reviewed to show that 
globalisation signifies the anachronism of post-WW II 
development paradigms. The imperatives of globalisation, and 
the demands of neoliberalism combine to define a new political 
economy of development that, in the view of Colin Leys, marks 
"the rise and fall of development theory.”4 As it will be 
demonstrated in che final section of the review, the current 
paradigmatic shift, in the context of SSA., entails a 
conspicuous paradox that is yet to be fully examined.
TRADITIONAL DEVELOPMENT PAHADIGMS AND SSA.
That the new- political economy of globalisation signifies 
the rise and fall of traditional development paradigms is not 
far fetched. Before globalisation became an issue, and 
neoliberalism emerged as its accompanying ideological 
framework of development, it was the contention of Claude 
Ake,5 and the thesis of Colin Leys6 that development
4Ibid., pp. 3-44.
-Claude Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa (Washington, DC: 
The Brookings Institute, 1996) .
6Leys, The Rise and Fall of Development Theory.
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initiatives in SSA have always been shaped, and constrained by 
externally delineated assumptions.
Emerging largely as a pcst-WW II orthodoxy, the 
traditional paradigms of development, that we re essentially 
structured within the modernization and the dependency 
perspectives, were state-centric. From the early 1950s to the 
late 197 0s, states in SSA were correspondingly instrumental in 
the development process. After the early 1980s, and with the 
new demands of globalization, the state-centric approach to 
development begun to crumble under the weight of the policy 
imperatives of neoliberalism. In this new framework, states in 
SSA were (are) expected to play subsidiary roles to the self- 
regulating processes of market forces.
On this note, the conception that globalization portends 
the end of development theory can only be collaborated on the 
basis of a two-stage approach. First, the traditional 
paradigms will be reviewed in the context of SSA. Second, the 
underlying doctrines will then be isolated and compared with 
the new ideological precepts of globalization. Among other 
things, a derivative of this approach will also illuminate the 
main assertion of John Brohman as expounded in his Popular 
Development.7 Brohman contends that, with a history of 
development that is essentially composed of an ever-changing 
external recipe, SSA has not only been sensitive but, also 
vulnerable to the demands of development theories that are
7John Brohman, Popular Development.- Rethinking the Theory & 
Practice of Development (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996).
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mostly contrived, rationalized, and justified within the 
ethnocentric assumptions of other societies.8
Development Theory as a Pose-l'.T-v II Tradition
Development theory emerged from the ashes of WW II. It 
was contrived in the IS5Os as a practical exigency to deal 
with how the decolonizing regions "might be transformed and 
made more productive."9 After the War, analysts and policy­
makers, especially in the United States, began to focus 
exclusively on the causes of, and barriers to, growth and 
development in the decolonized regions of the South. Also, 
within the decolonizing councries in A.frica, there was the 
need for strategies (or quick-fixes) to attain the much needed 
economic and social development that would give meaning to 
their newly won political independence. Therefore, development 
theory, as a postwar tradition, and in its application to SSA, 
has a recent history.
It was a child born of two parents: decolonization and 
the Cold War, and shaped during its conception by a 
correlation of factors. Peter Preston in his Development 
Theory10 identifies four major factors that conditioned the 
initial shape of post-WW II development discourse. First, the
8 As a result of the untenable nature of ethnocentric assumptions, 
John Brohman calls for the rejection of grand theories in favor of the 
indigenization of the development process. See ibid., pp. 324-352.
9Colin Leys, The Rise & Fall of Development Theory, p. 5.
,0Peter W. Preston, Development Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1996)
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available work cf John Maynard Keynes11 was very influential. . 
Appropriating from the lessons of tne Great Depression of the 
193 0s, his theories of growth and welfare were predicated upon 
the interventionist roles of the state. Dubbed as the 
"Keynesian revolution," the underlying import was to improvise 
a middle course between complete capitulation to market 
forces, and total subjugation to the authoritarianism of the 
state. That middle path, in the view of Keynes, was to be 
courted through the regulatory functions cf the state.
Second, the emergence of the United States as a hegemonic 
power after WW II veered the initial shape of development 
theory within the Cold War political agenda of the US. In its 
Cold War contest with the now defunct Soviet Union, 
development theory, that was patterned on the experience of 
western societies and specifically targeted to the 
decolonizing countries, became a propitious tool in the 
projection of American global power.1- Preston even 
conjectures that the establishment of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in 1944 was an attempt 
to provide regulatory' institutions that will enforce a pattern
1'Writing during the Great Depression period of the 1930s, Keynes 
theorized that economic disequilibrium and mass unemployment were 
related to the self-destructive processes of uncontrolled market forces. 
In response, he identified a strategic, regulative role of the state in 
the economy. See John M. Keynes, General Theory o£ Employment, Interest 
end Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 193 6) .
'-For a comprehensive reviev; of postwar development efforts and 
American global objectives, see E. Conteh-Morgan, American Foreign Aid 
end Global Power Projection: The Geopolitics of Resource Allocation 
(Hants, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990).
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cf development; favorable to che Cold v’ar, scracegic 
calculations of Che Uniced States.1?
Third, che success of the Marshall Aid Plan in che 
economic reconstruction of war-corn Western Europe 
precipitated the idea that external diffusion of capital and 
technical assistance is indispensable in the process of 
development. Indeed, the success of the Plan gave a booster to 
the idea that, with the availability of financial and 
technical resources, development could result from deliberate, 
and intentional intervention in an economic system. To some 
extent, the circumstances of the Plan provided a vicarious 
blue-print for the subsequent application of development 
theory in the context of SSA.
Finally, the shape of post-WW II development theory, in 
the view of Preston, tended to yield to "the demands of 
nationalist developmentalism which was the ideology of the 
emergent nations."14 Rationalizing that political freedom 
would be meaningless unless it is linked up to some degree of 
economic self-sufficiency, political leaders in SSA were under 
pressure to fulfill the promises made during the struggle for 
independence. Therefore, to establish their legitimacy, post- 
independent states in SSA were compelled to assume the 
custodianship of a development process that would improve the 
welfare of the people. In this regard, the aspiration for 
nationalist developmentalism was a waiting call for a
13See Prescon, Development Theory, p. 157.
14Ibid., Development Theory', p. 154.
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development theory that recognises the instrumental roles of 
the state.
The intersection of these factors shaped the nature of 
the developmental paradigm, and the very meaning associated 
with the term "development." The concern of development theory 
was to explain how the newly emerging countries could "catch 
up" with the already industrialized countries of the West. 
Development thus became synonymous to "modernization" or, 
better still, "Americanization." In its strategic connotation, 
the attendant responsibility of resuscitating war-torn Western 
Europe, and the need to mitigate the spread of communist 
ideals into the newly decolonized states meant the Marshall 
Plan for Europe, and modernization theory for the decolonizing 
world.1- In the furtherance of these two basic objectives, 
"America's foreign policy at the end of World War Two 
necessitated the ability and desire to employ loans, credits 
and investments everywhere to create a world economic order to 
its own desires.”16
In retrospect, development theory, in the circumstances 
of the decolonized countries of the South, was a post-WW II 
tradition that took shape within the Cold War contest between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. If development theory
l-It is in this respect that the mainstream, development theory, 
especially in its political rationale, was considered as the 
"ideological child of [Communist] containment." See Peter W. Preston, 
Making Sense of Development: An Introduction to Classical and 
Contemporary■ Theories of Development and Their Application to Southeast 
Asia (London: Routledge, 1986), p. xv.
16See Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of Mar: US Foreign Policy 1943- 
45 (New York: Vintage, 1968), p. 624.
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was a Cold via.r tradition, then, the new political economy of 
globalization, within 'which our research questions are 
situated, is a post-Cold War phenomenon. Continuity and 
change, rather than an abrupt break characterizes the 
interface between the previous paradigms of development and 
the current paradigm of globalization-. In this wise, it would 
amount to a truncated exercise in futility to illuminate on 
the importance of our study without a review of the issues and 
pertinent questions central to the previous development 
paradigms.
MODERNIZATION THEORY AND SSA: THE LIMITS OF CONVERGENCE
Modernization theory (hereafter referred to as MT) was 
the first structured theory of development that emerged after 
WW II. As a development theory, it was fundamentally based on 
the dynamics of economic growth, and "the structural- 
functionalist analysis of industrial society."17 The economic 
growth theory of modernization rests on "the necessary 
conditions of equilibrium between aggregate savings and 
investment in a dynamic economy."IS The appropriate mix of 
savings and investment defines a pattern of growth that 
approximates the path of progression trailed by the advanced 
industrial countries.
17Preston, Development Theory, p. 171.
lsSee Hywell Jones, An Introduction to Modern Theories of Economic 
Growth (London: Nelson Publishers, 1975), p’. 44. Jones provides a 
simplistic but detailed analysis of economic growth theory that explains 
the processes of modernization.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 7
MT is also based on che scructural-funccionalisc dynamics 
of an equilibration process in which che constitutive 
institutions of an economic system work in harmony to ensure 
the sustainability, and viability of an integrated system that 
assumes a particular conception of society. In this case, the 
dynamics of economic growth theory, and the implications of 
the structural-functionalist analysis suggest that all 
societies will (must) converge toward a common destination of 
modernity that is characterized by a higher level of 
industrialization. Simply put, MT is a comprehensive systemic 
transformation in which societies change fundamentally from an 
approximation of the traditional model to an approximation of 
the modern model.19
As a "blue-print" of development, and in its application 
to SSA, MT is epitomized by che works of W.ir/. Roscow.20 He 
theorized on the pentamecric stages of development universal 
to all societies. Operating on the assumption of a linear 
conception of economic history, Rostow claims that
19What distinguishes a traditional society from a m o d e m  society 
is based on some dichotomous sociological variables as found in the 
works of Talcott Parson. For instance, see Taicott Parson, The Structure 
of Social Action, (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1949), first published in 
1937.
20See W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). The title of 
Rostow's book is suggestive of the Cold War implications of 
modernization theory. As rightly pointed out by John L. Gaddis, "Rostow 
had become convinced that the future struggle between communism and 
capitalism would take the form of contests to demonstrate the relevance 
of each ideology to the development process in the Third World. “ See J. 
Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar 
American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1982), p. 208. Rostov; later expanded his main thesis in another volume. 
See W.W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth, (New York: W.W. Norton 
Sc Co. , Inc. , 19 62) .
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it is possible cc id.en.cify all sociecies, in their economic 
dimensions, as lying within one cf five stages: the traditional 
society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive 
to maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption.21
Rostow's thesis characterizes a unidirectional conception of
development in relation to specifically demarcated stages in
which each stage materializes, runs its course and never
recurs. According to Rostow, each stage is characterized by a
particular composition of investment and a leading sector that
propels the economy into the next stage. Of the five stages,
the "take-off" is the most decisive. In his view,
the take-off is distinguished from earlier industrial surges by
the fact that prior and concurrent developments make the
application cf modern industrial techniques a self-sustained
rather than an abortive process. 22
With a spiralling effect on the modernization of agriculture
as a result of the expansion of new industries, the society is
ushered into the stage of "drive to maturity." In this stage,
Rostow intimates that about 20 percent of the national income
must be reinvested so that productivity gain surpasses the
rate of population growth.23
The society graduates into the final stage of "mass
consumption" when income rises sufficiently to transmute goods
such as automobiles and television from luxuries into
necessities. Thus stage completes tne path of progress from
-'Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, p. 4.
22Roscow, The Process of Economic Growth, p. 317.
23See Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth.
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tradition, to modernity, with the model of the modem, 
plausibly in "the image of the USA writ large.”24 In this 
case, anticipated convergence to the image of the 
industrialized West completes the path of modernization.
Rationalizing within the ontological presumptions of 
Rostov/’s path-dependent theory was (is) the notion that SSA 
was (is) backward and undeveloped because there were (are) 
inherent traditional barriers and other endogenous factors 
that impede growth and development conceived as modernization. 
That is to say, SSA was (is) a self-contained region whose 
internal ramifications have not been tempered by the 
universalizing principles of Western capitalist ideals in the 
organization of production and society. Underdevelopment was 
(is) therefore Intrinsic to SSA.
The implication here is that, the current industrialized 
countries were once undeveloped. They were able to achieve 
their present level of industrial advancement through the 
appropriate mix of investment capital, and the perfection of 
other institutions. John K. Galbraith caricatures the 
parsimonious undertones of MT and conjectures that, SSA "need 
only to recreate in some rough form what the more developed 
countries already have. Development, in his view, degenerates 
into "the faithful imitation of the developed."2-
24Preston, Development Theory, p. 168.
2-John K. Galbraith, Economic Development (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1964), p. 3. According to Galbraith, this view of 
development is neither proper nor useful because it only connotes an 
aspect of development not the substance of development. See Galbraith, 
pp. 3-4.
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As a pach-dependenc procedure, development simply 
transmutes into a process of modernication through the 
external diffusion of capital, technology and knowledge. This 
view of development therefore set the stage for increasing 
aid, technical assistance, investment policies, and other 
programs from the advanced countries to SSA..
For the efficient utilization of these external inflows 
toward the identification and promotion of the leading sectors 
of the economy, the transition model of W. Arthur Lewis26 
constitutes a backdated, explanatory appendix to Rostow's 
theory. The central proposition of this model relates to the 
process of economic growth and expansion in a dual economy 
that is characterized by a capitalist modern nucleus, and a 
non-capitalist traditional sector. According to Lewis, the 
modern sector uses reproducible capital and employs wage labor 
for profit making, while the traditional sector is the 
subsistence part of the economy that does not hire labor for 
profits.
The basic interconnecting link between the two sectors is 
the unlimited supply of labor from the traditional sector to 
the modern sector at a fixed wage rate. With a perfectly 
elastic supply of labor from the reservoir of unskilled labor 
pool, and in combination with investible capital and technical 
assistance, the industrial sector emerges as the leading
26Lewis's analysis is based on the existence of a dualistic 
economy composed of a traditional sector and a modern enclave, and the 
processes by which the m o d e m  sector expands to displace the traditional 
sector through industrial expansion. See K. Arthur Lewis, "Economic 
Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor, “ Manchester School of 
Economics and Social Studies, Vol. 22 (May 1954), pp. 139-191.
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growth pole. Therefore, acting both as a magnet and fulcrum of 
development, the modern, industrial sector draws labor from 
the traditional sector until the surplus labor in that sector 
has all been absorbed, and agriculture is modernized.
The implication of Lewis’s model is that, in the 
progressive transformation from tradition to modernity, 
industry, acting as a growth pole, develops first before the 
modernization of agriculture. In other words, industrial 
development pulls agriculture from its traditional state. 
Agriculture then develops as a result of the positive spill­
over effects of industrialization.27
Restated, MT considers development as growth in which 
industrialization constitutes both the means and end of this 
growth process. While Rostow’s model provides the unilinear 
rhythm of stages from tradition to modernity, Arthur Lewis’s 
dual-sector approach explains the sectoral dynamics that 
propel undeveloped economies into the promised land of 
development similar to the advanced industrial societies. An 
industrial society, which in the purview of MT is the apogee 
of progress, will be characterized by an integrated self- 
sustaining economy reflecting the mirror image of the already 
industrialized societies of the West.
27That, in the course of development, industry develops first 
before the modernization of agriculture does not hold true in all 
circumstances. For instance, in pre-War Japan, industrial development 
was to a greater extent predicated upon the resources and revenue from 
the agricultural sector. See K. Ohkawa and M. Shinohara, eds., Patterns 
of Japanese Economic Development: A Quantitative Appraisal (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1579) . In South Korea on the other hand, industry 
and agriculture developed concurrently. See L. Burmeister, "State 
Industrialization and Agricultural Policy in Korea," Development and 
Change, Vo1. 22 (199 0), p p . 197-2 2 3.
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The Application of MT
The apparent simplicity of the MT, and the expressed 
financial and ideological support by the United States within 
the prism of its own Cold War calculations, precipitated an 
unfounded optimism. Among the decolonizing countries of SSA.,
MT seemed to offer a convenient short-cut to progress and 
modernity. Within the United Nations, MT provides the 
framework within which the advanced countries could underwrite 
the developmental efforts of the less developed countries of 
the South.
With the active participation of the newly emerging 
countries of SSA, the United Nations declared its First 
Development Decade from 1S5G-197 0 with an annual minimum of 5 
percent growth of national income.-8 The Second Development 
Decade from 1970-1930 raised the target to 6 percent, and in 
both decades, "ambitious targets of industrialization were 
also set."29 With industrialization as the hallmark of 
modernization, and with the advanced industrial countries as 
the target of excellence, countries such as Ghana, Kenya, 
Tanzania, and the then Ivory Coast, embarked on ambitious but, 
largely unexamined industrial projects.
Writing on Industrialization in West Africa, J.O.C. 
Onyemeiukwe20 argues that, from che early 1960s to the late
28See United Nations, Year Book of the United Nations (New York:
The United Nations, 1961), p. 229.
29Leys, The Rise & Fall of Development Theory, p. 103.
20See J.O.C. Onyemelukwe, Industrialization in West Africa (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1984).
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197 0s, most councries in Africa adopted what is commonly 
referred co as import-substicucing industrialization (ISI).31 
It was a strategy to promote local industries through the 
application of selective fiscal and monetary instruments. This 
strategy was also accentuated by other forms of state 
intervention in production, distribution and exchange. With 
the abundance of raw material resources, and with the lack of 
an appreciable level of consumer goods, the ISI strategy took 
the form of the processing of raw materials and the production 
of consumer goods.
The idea of modernization through industrialization was 
very attractive but, the results were very disappointing. This 
assertion could be illustrated with specific examples in the 
sub-region. Immediately after Ghana’s independence in 1957, 
President Kwame Nkrumah launched a major drive for 
industrialization. From the late 1950s to the early 1950s, W. 
Arthur Lewis, the architect of the dual-sector approach, was a 
revered economic adviser to the President on the subject of 
industrialization. Ghana’s initial industrial drive was 
subsequently based on a report by Arthur Lewis,32 with 
recommendations that factories be established to manufacture 
goods that were being imported.
31 For a comprehensive review of import-substituting 
industrialization and its application to the Third World, see C.H. 
Kirkpatrick and F.I. Nixson, eds., The Industrialization of Less 
Developed Countries (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983).
32This recommendation was embodied in a report that was written in 
1953 by W. Arthur Lewis, titled "Report on Industrialization and the 
Gold Coast.” Before independence, Ghana was previously called the Gold 
Coast. The report was v/ritten during the British colonial administration 
but became operative after Ghana’s independence.
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Ghana's industrial drive took che form of direct state 
participation. From 1962 to 1966, the share of the output of 
enterprises wholly or, partially owned by the state increased 
by 70 percent, accounting for almost 3 0 percent of gross 
manufacturing output.-3 A wide range of industries were 
established with the largest including saw mills and timber 
processing plants, cocoa processing plants, cement 
manufacture, oil refinery, and others. Most of these 
enterprises turned out to be unviable because they were highly 
capital intensive and therefore, marked by gross 
underutilization of industrial capacity. For instance, as a 
result of what might be termed as "industrial overreach,"
Ghana built a mango canning factory with a productive capacity 
estimated to be greater than the world’s demand for canned 
mangoes at that time!
As a result of Ghana’s adoption of unexamined industrial 
projects, the positive impact of ISI on the welfare of the 
people was negligible. For instance, though, manufacturing 
output as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) rose 
from 4 percent in the period 1950-58 to 12 percent between 
1962-65, the net impact on employment was negative.34 With an 
increasing lack of foreign exchange needed to import the 
required inputs, Ghana’s industrial output declined by an 
average of 1.2 percent annually during the 1970s.3-
33See Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action: A Study of 
Economic Policies in Ghana (London.: Heinemann, 1978) , p. 204.
34Ibid., p. 202.
3-Ibid. , p . 3 .
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On these accounts, Ghana’s post-independent industrial 
development reached its peak during the mid 1950s and 
experienced precipitous decline during the early 1970s. B.U. 
Ekuerhare reached a similar conclusion in his study of the 
Nigerian textile industry from 1964 to 1973.36 While Ghana and 
Nigeria experienced a discernible rise and fall in their 
industrial efforts, other countries in SSA dinged tenaciously 
to a parasitic industrial development that did not deliver the 
goods of modernization. For instance, the Ivory Coast and 
Kenya achieved a certain level of industrialization that was 
precariously dependent on external capital and technology. As 
a result, their industries remained as foreign enclaves with 
little forward and backward linkages to the other sectors of 
the economy.37
The L-iml cs of Convergence
Both anecdotally, and empirically, it became very clear 
by the early 1970s that the reliance on industrialization in 
most SSA countries was not showing signs toward integrated, 
industrial economies as predicted within the internal 
validating assumptions of MT. Contrary to Rostow’s assertion, 
industry was yet to emerge as the leading growth pole. In
36See B.U. Ekuerhare, "The Nigerian Textile Industry: A Social 
Cost-Benefit Appraisal," in C.H. Kirkpatrick and F.I. Nixson, eds., The 
Industrialization of Less Developed Countries, pp. 138-155.
37Some writers even argue that the underdevelopment of Kenya is 
somehow related co the country's unexamined bid to catch up with the 
industrialized countries through the promotion of unviable industrial 
projects. See Colin Leys, Underdevelopment of Kenya: The Political 
Economy of Neocolonialism (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1975) .
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1970, the share cf manufacturing as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) was still 6.1 percent in Nigeria, 6.9 
percent in Ghana, and 11.4 percent in Kenya. And contrary to 
the wisdom of Arthur Lewis's dual-sector theory, labor was 
still trapped in the traditional sector. Again in 1970, the 
share of manufacturing as a percentage of the total labor 
force was still 0.4 percent in Nigeria, 1.6 percent in Ghana, 
and 1.7 percent in Kenya.38
Lynn K. Mytelka characterizes such gaps between 
expectations and results as "the unfulfilled promise of 
African industrialisation."39 Indeed, as rightly observed by 
Claude Ake, modernization through unexamined industrialization 
was (is) not a panacea to the disarticulated economies of SSA 
because,
the rigidity of the international division of labor has not 
allowed African economies to break out of the role of primary 
producers, for reasons which include lack of access to technology, 
the comparative advantage of the industrialized nations in 
manufacturing, and the constraints of the domestic market.40
In other words, the external validity (relevance) of MT within
the historical and structural crevices of SSA was very
specious. This is so because, the theoretical wisdom of the
developmental experience of the industrialized countries was
extracted, and subsequently extrapolated as universal truisms
38These figures were culled from Claude Ake, A Political Economy 
of Africa (New York: Longman Inc., 1981), Table 5.3, p. 91.
39See Lynn K. Mytelka, "The Unfulfilled Promise of African 
Industrialization," A.frican Studies Review, Vol. 32, No. 3 (1989), pp.
77-137.
40Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa, p. 92.
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chat were deemed applicable to the Third World. On a more 
practical level, modernization (or development) does not 
necessarily mean reconstruction that could be effected through 
the external diffusion of capital as it occurred under the 
Marshall Plan in postwar Europe.
As a result, the United Nations might have been too 
optimistic with its targets set during the two Development 
Decades from 1960 to 19S0. For, by 1978, and with annual per 
capita incomes below US$ 3 60, more than SO percent of the 
countries in SSA were categorized as low-income developing 
countries. Furthermore, the sub-regions’ average rate of 
growth per capita of 0.9 percent during the two decades was 
the lowest of all regions of the Third World.41
By the mid-1970s, the initial optimism of anticipated 
convergence to modernity had metamorphosed into an 
unanticipated polarization between the sub-region and the 
advanced industrialized countries. During the late 1960s and 
the early 197 0s, frustrations and disappointments associated 
with the unfulfilled promises of modernization became very 
pervasive. This compelled some countries in SSA. to experiment 
with other alternative paths of development that were 
structured within the perspectives of dependency theory.
DEPENDENCY THEORY AND SSA: THE FAILURE OF AN EXPERIMENT
Dependency theory (hereafter referred to as DT) emerged 
largely as an intellectual criticism of, and moral revulsion
41 See the World Bank, World Development Report, 1980 (Washington, 
DC: The World Bank, 1980), p. 85.
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to the universaiistic pretensions of MT, rather than as a 
precise, and realizable theory with redemptive developmental 
implications. In its origin as a distinct intellectual 
discourse, DT is associated with the initial structuralist 
works of Raul Prebisch.42 Within the framework of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (EC LA.) , Raul 
Prebisch sought to understand the lack of development in Latin 
America.
The ECLA investigation was not conducted within the 
vortex of the reigning, formal models of conventional, 
orthodox economics but, by examining "the actual historically 
generated pattern of real economic activity. "43 The results of 
the study indicated that, the lack of development in Latin 
America was (is) not due to endogenous deficiencies within the 
region. It was (is) the result of the unfavorable 
circumstantial position of Latin America within the 
international economic system. The structuralist analysis, as 
epitomized by the ECLA study, instigated formal modeling 
within the dependencia perspective.
A path-breaking analysis in this direction is found in 
the works of Andre Gunder Frank,44 who gave DT a paradigmatic
42As the Secretary-General of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA.) , Raul Prebisch was instrumental in 
the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) in 1964. For a review of one of his works under consideration, 
see Raul Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and its 
Principal Problems (New York: United Nations Publication, 1950).
43Preston, Development Theory, p. 183.
44The metropolis-satellite paradigm is expounded mostly in the 
following works of A. Gunder Frank: A. Gunder Frank, Capitalism and 
Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review, 1967), and
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model in the form of metropolis-satellite relations. According 
to A. Gunder Frank, while the metropolis (advanced countries 
of the West) in the center develops, the satellites at the 
periphery underdevelop because there is a continuing flow of 
economic resources from the latter to the former. As 
comprehensively argued by Arghiri Emmanuel,45 the flow of 
resources to the metropolitan countries occurs through the 
medium of unequal exchange; a characteristic feature of the 
international trading system. Predicated upon the 
unidirectional flow of economic surplus, development and 
underdevelopment, according to A.G. Frank, are two sides of 
the same coin. In other words, the causes of underdevelopment 
in the satellite countries are functionally related to their 
incorporation into the world capitalist system.
Implicit in the expository analysis of A.G. Frank is a 
distinction between undevelopment and underdevelopment. 
Undevelopment characterizes an original state of economic 
configuration. As an early stage of a pristine, unpenetrated 
economic evolution, undevelopment could be equated to Rostow's 
traditional society. Underdevelopment on the other hand is a 
creation. It is not intrinsic to the Third World. It reflects 
the systematic exploitation of the peripheral countries by the 
advanced core countries. Underdevelopment is therefore a
A. Gunder Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution? (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).
45See Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange: A Study of the 
Imperialism of Trade (New York: Monthly Review' Press, 1972). For a 
representative sample of a recent application of the unequal exchange 
analysis, see M. Barratt Brown, Fair Trade: Reform and Realities in the 
International Trading System (London: Zed Books, 1993) .
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feature of maldevelopment that results from a specific pattern
o f aeve1opmen t .
There are various strands within the dependency
perspective. Notable among them are the dependency analysis of
Celso Furtado, and Johan Galtung's structural imperialism.46
It is pertinent to note here that even a concise definition of
the concept of dependency emerged from the revisionist work of
Dos Santos- As he puts it;
By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain 
countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of 
another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of 
interdependence between two or more economies, and bet ween these 
and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some 
countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self- 
sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do
this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either
a positive or a negative effect in immediate development.47
By this definition, the central claim of DT is that, the
circumstances of the underdeveloped countries were (are) to a
significant degree determined by the global structures within
which the metropolis-satellite relationship takes shape.
Granting that the assertions of the DT are true, then, MT that
is predicated upon the historical experience of Western
societies that were undeveloped but not necessarily
46For a comprehensive review of the respective revisionist 
perspectives, see C. Furtado, Development and Underdevelopment (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1964). Johan Galtung, “A 
Structural Theory of Imperialism, " Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 2 
(1971), pp. 81-116.
47Cited in Magnus Blomstrom and B. Hettne, Development Theory in 
Transition, The Dependency Debate & Beyond: Third World Responses 
(London: Zed Books, 1984), p. 64.
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underdeveloped, would be of little practical importance to the 
circumstances of SSA. The crucial question at this point is: 
Does the DT project an applicable, methodological framework 
that bears on the processes of development?
With prescriptions as derivative of diagnosis, the 
solutions for development shared by all dependency theorists 
range from a process of de-linking to, weakening the grip of 
the international capitalist system through the pursuit of 
nationalist developmental goals. As formalized by Samir Amin, 
de-linking is one
pursuit of a system of rational criteria for economic options 
founded on a law of value on a national basis with popular 
relevance independent of such criteria of economic rationality 
as flow from the dominance of the capitalist law of value 
operating on a world scale.48
Arguing that de-linking is not synonymous with autarky, Samir
Amin envisages a national policy of development that is
removed from the dictates, and the logic of the transformation
of the world capitalist system. Earlier on, the radical
Chilean economist, Osvaldo Sunkel had, in 1969, defined a
"national policy of development" as
a force of national affirmation, an aspiration to self- 
determination and sovereignty, a desire to participate in the 
benefits and creation of modern and universal culture and 
science, the desire to attain liberty, democracy, equality of 
opportunity and well-being, which the industrialized countries 
enjoy to a greater or lesser extent .4y
4SSamir Amin, DelinkingTowards a Polycentric World (London: Zed 
Books, 1985), p. 62.
49Cited in M. Blomstrom and B. Hettne, Development Theory in 
Transition, p. 59.
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Put together, the DT clamors for a development process that is 
set within the framework of clearly defined national 
objectives, with preponderant emphasis on self-reliance, and 
with a high degree of autonomy in the making of crucial 
development decisions. In other words, development, in the 
dependencia perspective, is a self-defining process of 
national emancipation. In this process, domestic policy that 
emphasises economic nationalism is the rule rather than an 
exception.
What must be noted here is that, the prescriptive 
analysis of DT does not totally reject the idea of 
industrialization which is the centerpiece of M T . While 
subscribing to the development enhancing implications of 
industrialization, the idea of spontaneous, and unexamined 
import-substituting industrialization (ISI) was rejected. As 
rightly pointed out by C.P. Oman and G. Wignaraja, "neither a 
laissez-faire strategy based solely on comparative advantage 
nor one of spontaneous, purely market-led industrialization 
was viewed as a viable route to development."50 Instead, DT 
advocates state-mediated investment planning "as a necessary 
complement to private initiative."-1 In a state-mediated 
process of industrialization, the state would be in a position 
to plan, and coordinate industrial activities to foster 
greater social return on investment.
50C.P. Oman and G. Wignaraja, The Postwar Evolution of Development 
Thinking (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), p. 142.
51 Ibid., p. 143
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If labels are useful snapshots for the understanding of 
amorphously defined concepts, then, the prescription of the DT 
inadvertently borders on some form of "socialism" that would 
permit national economies to embark on an endogenously 
determined process of self-sustaining development. In the 
unstated premise of DT, the salvation for the peripheral 
countries cannot be found within the interstices of the 
international capitalist system.
The Application of DT: An Evaluation
From the mid 1960s to the early 1970s, the intellectual 
and moral wind of dependency analysis had already begun to 
undermine MT. As a result, DT became the pedagogy of the 
peripheral countries. In such a process of self-instruction, 
the realization that underdevelopment was (is) related to the 
dominant-subordination pattern of the international system was 
an eye opener to a number of Third World countries. As a 
result, in the mid 197 0s, a group of less developed countries 
within the UN system led the demand for a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO). Realistic in its motivation, and 
moderate in ics requirement, this group called for 
fundamencal changes in the world market system.
While the demand for a NIEO was still on hold, some 
countries in SSA impatiently experimented with the underlying 
tenets of DT. For instance, Nigeria's Second National 
Development Plan, 1970-74 embodied "a clear strategy for
reducing economic dependence, ” with the admonition that a
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"truly independent nation cannot allow its objectives and 
priorities to be distorted or frustrated by the manipulation 
of powerful foreign investors."-2 In spite of its high 
sounding nationalistic overtures, Claude Ake argues that the 
Plan was limited to the mere indigenization of capitalism, 
while "the structural link of the economy to the metropole"-3 
was nevertheless left intact.
With regard to the practicalization of the developmental 
assumptions underlying the DT, the case of Tanzania was very 
spectacular. In 1S67, che ruling Tanganyika (Tanzania) African 
National Union (TANU), under the able leadership of J.
Nyerere, instituted a dramatic change in its economic 
philosophy. The Arusha Declaration of 1957 delineated a 
precise strategy for the simultaneous achievement of self- 
reliance, socialism and development. Rationalizing that 
modernization, with its doctrinaire reliance on an external 
frame of reference leads neither to development nor to self- 
reliance, the Declaration demanded a new development 
perspective based "on the land, the people and on good 
leadership . '°4
In the promotion of self-reliance in agriculture, a 
populist rural development strategy was initiated. This was 
structured around the Ujamaa village concept. These villages 
were essentially large scale farming communities that promoted
52Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa, p. 114.
-3Ibid., p - 116.
54Ibid.,
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the use of machinery and large-scale farming methods. In order 
to exploit the benefits of economies of scale, the government 
recommended that all scattered rural communities move to such 
recognized Ujamaa villages- Through persuasion, inducement, 
and in most instances compulsion, the response was very 
spectacular. By 1977, at least SO percent of the total 
population have moved to the collective fanning communities .-5
In spite of its redemptive implications, and its 
ideological connotations, the Ujamaa collectivization idea was 
defeatist in terms of the promotion of self-reliance in 
agriculture. First, the preponderant emphasis on the 
mechanized production of cash crops rather than food crops led 
to "substantial food imports."-6 With production still geared 
towards the promotion of exportable cash crops, it is the 
contention of I.G. Shivji that the Tanzanian rural folks were 
not adequately equipped to meet the fundamental requirements 
of their social, and material development.57 Ironically in 
this case, the Tanzanian rural community, by the dint of the 
Ujamma experiment, degenerated into a captured peasantry in 
service to the openly denounced international market.
On the industrial front, the basic strategy adopted under 
Tanzania's socialism was the nationalization of foreign
-’-See Wosene Yefru, "The African Challenge to Philosophical 
Paradigm: The Need for a Paradigm Shift in the Social, Economic, and 
Political Development in Africa," Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 30. No. 
3 (January 2000), p. 3 67.
56Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa, p. 117.
57See I.G. Shivji, Class Struggle in Tanzania (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1976) .
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industrial assets and the creation of parastatal enterprises. 
The Tanzanian National Development Corporation that was 
established in 1965 became the fulcrum of the government’s new 
industrial initiatives. From 1966 to 1973, the number of 
parastatals rose from 43 to 112.-8 The spectacular growth in 
the number of such parastatals did not mean an increasing 
domestication of ownership and control of industrial 
production. This is so because the external financing of these 
firms increased from 20 percent in 1970-71 to, 59 per cent in 
1973-74 .59
In the final analysis, nationalisation merely led to the 
localization of foreign firms without any substantial, 
structural changes in Tanzania’s bid for economic 
independence. The parastatals on the other hand became heavily 
dependent on foreign funds with debilitating consequences on 
Tanzania’s balance of payment position. By the end of the 
197 0s, contradictions underlying Tanzania's lackluster 
socialist campaign have culminated in financial distress. The 
need to resort to external assistance had become a painful 
reality. Tanzania's external public debt increased from US$
243 million in 1970 to US$ 1,095 million in 1973.60 With its 
economic debt, the vigor of the radical experiment gradually 
lost its appeal as an alternative paradigm of development.
5SC . Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa, p. 78.
59Ibid.
60World Bank, World Development Report 1980, p. 138.
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In Zambia, President Kenneth Kaunda, in his 1968
Mulungushi Declaration, also sought to apply the principles of
DT to an eclectic brew of socialism called the philosophy of
humanism. The major policy demands of the Declaration included
indigenization, nationalization, and the basic needs approach
to development. In recognition of the fact that Zambia's
economy was (is) preponderantly based on the production and
export of copper, the government, in a knee-jerk response,
nationalized all copper mining operations and placed them
under Zambia’s Industrial and Mining Corporation. Zambia's
blatant display of economic nationalism did not however set
the country on the path toward genuine economic independence.
Paralleling Tanzania's experiment, by the end of the 1370s,
external shocks in the form of declining copper prices had
"pushed the country to a course of increasing indebtedness and
dependence on the World Bank and the IMF."61
Amorphously, some countries even combined the radicalism
of DT with the conservatism of MT. A spectacular case in point
is embodied in Kenya's experiment from 1960 to the late
1970s.62 As stated in its Development Plan for the first
period 1964 to 1970,
The Government of Kenya is dedicated to the creation of a 
democratic African socialist Kenya: democratic because it will 
be a free country in which there will be no place for 
discrimination by race, tribe, belief or otherwise; African
61C . Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa, p. 20.
62See Wosene Yefru, "The African Challenge to Philosophical 
Paradigm," p. 3 63.
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because che nation must grow from indigenous roots, adapting 
the best from other cultural systems; socialist because all people 
have the right to be free from economic exploitation and social 
inequality. The principal aim. of African socialism is to improve 
the welfare and living standards of this and succeeding 
generations.63
The explicit nature of Kenya’s objectives in this direction 
was understandable. Kenya did not only intend to insulate 
itself from the vagaries of the international system but also, 
to redress the monopoly and control of the domestic economy by 
foreign business expatriates; a legacy inherited from its 
colonial past. It is therefore not surprising that the guest 
for African participation was made the centerpiece of Kenya’s 
amorphous experiment.
With the commanding heights of its economy still in the 
hands of foreign business expatriates, the redistributive 
implications associated with the demand for African 
participation proved limited. As Wosene Yefru argues, the only 
beneficiaries were a small section of urban-based middle class 
that was located within the highly, capital intensive 
industries .64 By way of compensation, the government adopted a 
land settlement scheme to transfer some of the large-scale 
farms owned by the expatriate farmers to small-scale rural 
Kenyan farmers. However, this scheme did not solve the income 
inequalities that were prevalent in the Kenyan farming 
community.65 The government could not back its land settlement
63Cited in ibid., p. 363
64See W. Yefru, "The African Challenge Co Philosophical Paradigm."
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scheme with a comprehensive rural development policy. The 
overall positive impact was therefore very minimal.
Colin Leys in his Underdevelopment in Kenya,66 argues 
that the Kenyan experiment started on a wrong footing. In his 
view, it was very difficult for the Kenyan government to 
embark on populist, nationalistic policies when the expatriate 
capitalist entrepreneurs operated to the imperatives of 
foreign capital, and not to the prerogatives of the Kenyan 
state. Simply put, the Kenyan state did not have total control 
over the means that would have enabled it to temper its 
socialist ideals with the realism of redistributive justice 
through resource reallocation. With the failure of the 
dependency appendix to an unexamined ISI, Kenya, by the early 
ISSOs, had already resigned itself to the fate of a classical 
form of dependent development.
Two lessons are discernible from the application of the 
tenets of DT in the context of SSA. First, the paradigm offers 
little practical guidance in dealing with crucial factors in 
the international system beyond de-linking and the pursuit of 
other endogenously determined nationalist development 
policies. As partially demonstrated in the cases of Tanzania 
and Zambia, this approach leaves the external debilitating 
factors intact. Second, as shown in the case of Kenya, in 
practice, the ideals of DT demands an appreciable level of 
control over the allocation of resources, and distribution of
65 Ibid.
66Coliii Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, op. cit.
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incentives. Without such control, the state would not be in a 
position to direct resources towards the objectives of self- 
reliant development.
Quite apart from some practical and theoretical 
bottlenecks, Wosene Yefru intimates that DT is in both spirit 
and concent, a Eurocentric paradigm that illegitimately 
appropriates from the works of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin.f’7 
In his view, the application of the Eurocentric paradigm in 
the circumstances of SSA is an unfortunate historical accident 
that did not spare the sub-region from the hegemony of 
European politico-economic constructs.
In spite of the apparent failure of the dependency 
experiment, Colin Leys rests on a pacifying note that such 
experiments must not be judged solely in terms of their 
results. As he puts it, the experiments muse also be viewed in 
the light of the associated implication that "ordinary people" 
in SSA "do have collective historical choices which they may 
try to exercise if they will.”68 That is to say, it is the 
freedom of choice, and a sense of autonomy, rather than the 
consequences of the choice that is important in such 
experiments.
On a more crucial note, the dissatisfaction with MT, and 
the subsequent experimentation with the dependency alternative 
that turns the tenets of modernization on its head, set in 
motion a frustrating pattern of re-examination within the
®7See W. Yefru, "The African Challenge to Philosophical Paradigm, " 
p. 359.
6SColin Leys, The Rise & Fall of Development Theory, p. 131.
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development community. This led to the emergence of a 
reformist response to development, with the alleviation of 
poverty as its main focus.
THE REFORMIST RESPONSE AND POVERTY ALLEVIA.TION
In recognition of the fact that the inconclusive approach 
of MT made the experimentation with other "non-western" 
alternatives attractive, a reformist movement arose within the 
development community during the early 1970s. The initial 
euphoria that greeted the launching of post-WW II development 
theory has, by the late 1960s, degenerated into generalized 
hysteria. Studies on poverty, inequality, and unemployment 
indicated that the benefits of growth were yet to reach the 
majority of people in Third World countries.69
In a mood of reflection, development analysts begun to 
question the very premises and assumptions of the reigning 
development paradigms that worship mere economic growth. This 
self-introspection process took a philosophical turn with a 
speech delivered by Dudley Seers in 1969. In that speech, he 
s tated:
The quescions to ask about a country's development are therefore: 
What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to
69A notable example of such studies is, D. T u m h a m  and I. Jaeger, 
The Employment Problem in Less Developed Countries.- A Review of Evidence 
(Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1971). This study brought particular 
attention to the problem of unemployment in developing countries. Gunnar 
Myrdal on the other hand dramatized the problem of poverty in one of his 
books. See Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of 
Nations (New York: Pantheon, 19 68) .
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unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three 
cf these have become less severe, then beyond doubt this has been 
a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two 
of these central problems have been growing -worse, and especially 
if all three have, it 'would be strange to call the result 
’development, ’ even if per capita income had soared.70
The thought-provoking questions posed by Dudley Seers opened a
new vista in development thinking. Issues relating to
reductions in poverty, unemployment, and inequality emerged as
irreducible qualities and the standard measurement of the
appropriateness of all development programs.
In this new wave of reformist thinking, a coterie of
development economists, including Richard Jolly, Hans Singer,
and Hollis Chenery, began to highlight employment-oriented
strategies, basic need approaches, and redistribution with
growth strategies in their writings. As observed by Oman and
Wignaraja, the underlying concern of this movement was the
alleviation of poverty.71 It is in this respect that Colin
Leys refers to the reformist response as "poverty oriented,
or, "basic needs approach to development."72 It was an attempt
to put a "human face" to the post-WW II, growth-inspired
development paradigm.
70This quotation is part of a lecture entitled, "What are we 
Trying to Measure?” that was delivered by Dudley Seers at the 11th World 
Conference of the Society for International Development, New Dehli 
(November, 19 69) . This speech has been reproduced in some form in 
several volumes. For instance, see Dudley Seers, "What are we Trying to 
Measure," Journal of Development Studies (1972), pp. 21-25.
71See C.P. Oman and G. Wignaraja, The Postwar Evolution of 
Development Thinking.
72C. Leys, The Rise and Fall of Development Theory, 112.
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The chief popularizers of this reformist approach were
the International Labor Organisation (ILO), through its World
Employment Programme (WEP) , and the World Bank, under the
presidency of Robert McNamara. The ILO patterned its new
approach in response to the underlying flaw of the
conventional paradigm of development. This flaw is concisely
summarized by L. Emmerji:
This conventional model was therefore based on the assumption 
that growth, with emphasis on the m o d e m  sector, was in itself a 
solution to development because, so the assumption went, the 
fruits of this growth would automatically and within an 
acceptable period of time, spread to the less privileged 
sectors of the population. This assumption proved to be wrong.73
As an antidote to the failure of the trickle-down effects of
economic growth, the ILO adopted an approach that involves
direct attack on poverty through the generation of employment
opportunities for the poor.
Through its WEP, the ILO, in the 1970s, embarked on a
series of country missions to study the employment situations,
and help formulate appropriate employment-oriented strategies
in Third World countries. The ILO was of the opinion that the
key to qualitative development was to switch emphasis from
mere growth of Gross National Product (GNP) to emphasis on
employment generation, especially in the informal sector.
For instance, in its mission to Kenya in 1972, the ILO
"disaggregated the problem of poverty to focus primarily on
73Ciced in Oman and Wignaraja, The Postwar Evolution of 
Development Thinking-, p. 100.
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che 'working poor’."74 Since mosc of the working poor are 
located in the informal sectors of the Kenyan economy, the ILO 
encouraged an active government policy to tackle poverty and 
inequality in those sectors. Specific policies recommended by 
the ILO include; increasing the productivity of small farmers, 
and mobilizing the people for self-reliant development.
Through these efforts, the ILO reasoned that the failure of 
the trickle down effect could be rectified through government 
policies that directly bear on the poor, and the marginalized.
Concurrent with the ILO’s efforts on the direct 
alleviation of poverty was a major policy re-examination 
within the World Bank. Living up to its name as a bank for 
reconstruction first, and for development second, the World 
Bank had, since its inception, concentrated on financing basic 
infrastructural projects in Third World regions, including 
SSA. The reformist wind of change caught up with Robert 
McNamara when he became the President of the World Bank in 
1968 .
As a previous Secretary of Defense75 schooled in the 
ethics of duty with honor, McNamara "ordered" an internal 
assessment of the World Bank’s activities vis-a-vis the 
developing world for the past years. The results were very 
disappointing: high rates of growth co-exist with poverty and
74Ibid., p . 101.
75Robert McNamara was the Secretary of Defense under the 
Presidential administrations of J.F. Kennedy and L.B. Johnson from 1961- 
19 68. This was the period during which the United States was deeply 
involved in the Vietnam War. See J.Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of 
Containment.
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inequalicy in the developing councries.76 As Mahbub ul Huq 
pucs ic, che World Bank realized co ics uccer dismay chac che 
trickle-down mechanism has noc resulced in che discribucion of 
che benefics of growth co che majority of che people in che 
developing world.7"7 Incensed by the revelations of che 
assessment, Robert McNamara committed che World Bank to doing 
more about poverty alleviation.
A 1975 World Bank study entitled Assault on World 
Poverty78 delineated the Bank's approach to poverty 
alleviation. This approach was predicated upon rural 
development, expansion of agricultural credits, improvement of 
land reform, and the provision of education, and basic health 
needs. To a greater extent, the results of the study reflected 
the new policy orientation of McNamara. For in 1973, he gave 
his famous speech in Nairobi, Kenya in which he stated among 
other things that, it is the intention of the Bank "to place 
far greater emphasis on policies and projects which will begin 
to attack the problems of absolute poverty..."79 He therefore 
prodded governments in developing countries to re-orient their 
development policies.
76For a comprehensive summary of the results of this internal 
assessment, see D. Morawetz, Twenty-five Years of Economic Development, 
1950-75 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1977).
77See M. Mahbub ul Haq, The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third 
World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 61-74.
7sWorld Bank The Assault on World Poverty (Washington, DC: The 
World Bank, 197 5).
79Cited in Oman and Wignaraja, The Postwar Evolution of 
Development Thinking, pp. 102-103.
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Re-orienting development policies, as the Bank later 
emphasized in its 1575 study, centers on redistribution with 
growth. As an incrementalist approach, this "mieant that with 
each increment of growth, the extra income [was] distributed 
to the poor, so as to gradually increase their- share of 
national income." 550 This was to ensure that the benefits of 
growth proportionally lead to the satisfaction of basic human 
needs.
With the international reach of the World- Bank, and in 
recognition of its instrumental role in the development 
community, the satisfaction of basic needs andl the alleviation 
of poverty emerged to the forefront of the development 
discourse. Most importantly, the international donor 
community, following the trails of the World B^ank, did not 
hesitate to advance loans and credits to finans.ce projects that 
bear directly on poverty alleviation.
In retrospect, the new orientation of the World Bank also 
helped to place poverty alleviation, and the provision of 
basic needs on top of the development agenda i_n most countries 
in SSA. This was equally true in countries thctt were either 
still patronizing the ideals of MT (as in Cote d ’Ivoire), 
still experimenting with the tenets of DT (as in Tanzania and 
Zambia) , or still operating within the amorphous interstices 
of MT and DT (as in Kenya) . The implication here is that, 
pursuing a purposeful policy of poverty alievi_ation was deemed 
compatible with different ideological strands.
S0Ibid., p. 104.
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Indeed, pursuing a policy of industrialization under the 
perspectives of MT does not necessarily conflict with the 
basic needs approach, and the direct alleviation of poverty. 
Indeed, there is a high degree of complementarity since, 
industrialization, if properly approached, increases the means 
available for meeting the basic needs of the poor. A strategy 
of rural industrialization that is labor intensive will 
appreciably be more pro-poor than capital-intensive projects 
with high external components that, as partially shown in the 
case of Kenya, remain as foreign enclaves within the domestic 
economy.
On the other hand, with its nationalistic pretensions, DT 
considers the improved welfare of the poor as an asset that 
must be courted for the struggle against powerful 
international forces, and ocher reactionary domestic 
constituencies. With the over-glorification of the 
"revolutionary" appeal of the masses, it is not surprising 
that Nyerere's Tanzania, and Kaunda’s Zambia considered 
improvements in the lives of the ordinary people as the 
centerpiece of their socialist experiments.
POST-WW II DEVELOPMENT IDEOLOGY
MT emphasizes economic growth through industrialization. 
DT seeks independent, autonomous development through the 
pursuit of nationalist developmental goals. The reformist 
appendix to the traditional paradigms demands direct attack on 
poverty through a combination of redistributive strategies.
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and ocher basic need approaches. In spice of che face chac che
MT, Che DT, and che refomisc approach differ in cheir
objeccives, chey share common, discernible ideological
presumpcions. Developmenc, regardless of che disparace
objeccives envisaged, had a purposive end chac was deemed
aceainable chrough deliberace efforcs. As Cowen and Shencon
admic, developmenc was an intentional undercaking, noe an
immanent expeccaCion.81
In view of che face chac developmenc, as an incencional
aceivicy, results from decisions and choices, "developmenc was
a matcer of policy; policy was Che business of govemmencs, ”82
In chis respecc, che scace, as a legicimace index of popular
sovereigncy, and as a reposicory of che colleccive will of Che
people, was very inscrumencal in che cradicional development
paradigms. The idea of development was therefore inextricably
tied Co scate sovereignty. On this note, Geoffrey Kay is right
with his observation that
National sovereignty can have no real meaning unless it is joined
to the idea of development as progress towards a social and
economic equality from which no nation is debarred for natural 
reasons. National sovereignty and development defined in this 
way adhere to each other as closely as the principle of equal 
rights adheres to that of the freedom of the individual.83
81 See M.P. Cowen and R.W. Shenton, Development Doctrines (London: 
Routledge, 1996), pp. 173-253. Cowen and Shenton demonstrate that 
development, as a transitive verb, was a result of deliberate policies 
by the government. In their view, development was not an intransitive 
verb that resulted without deliberate act of government policies.
8-J.P. Lev/is, "Government and National Economic Development," 
Daedalus, Vol. 118, No. 1 (Winter 1989), p. 70.
83Geoffrey Kay, Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist 
Analysis (London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 1-2.
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The reasons why developmenc was equated with nacional 
sovereignty through the instrumentality of the state are not 
far fetched.
First, it rwas an attempt to fulfill partially, the 
obligatory contract between the government and the governed.
As the most dominant organisation within the society with 
legitimate control over the appropriation of resources, 
"citizens expected governments to be able to deal with 
problems perceived to be serious and believed to be 
soluble."84 Second, before globalization became an issue, and 
neoliberalism the issue (an assertion that will be detailed in 
Chapter III), "socially efficient markets were not thought to 
be primordial institutions; they were considered creatures of 
governments." A.s a flexible, manipulative instrument under the 
sovereign prerogatives of the state, it was the responsibility 
of the government to "co-opt" market forces tow?ard the 
attainment of clearly set development objectives.
Third, the reigning notion was that the state, rather 
than the market is conveniently positioned to deal with the 
vulnerable, and the economically disadvantaged within an 
acceptable prism of social justice. As previously alluded to, 
this view became the centerpiece of the reformist response, 
especially, to the failed paradigm of modernization. In this 
case, states were expected to work on those benefits that
84 J. P. Lev/is, "Government and National Economic Development,"
p. 71.
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could not be obtained from growth-induced processes of 
development.
Finally, post-WW II development theories were initially 
meant for the decolonizing countries of the South. These 
countries were equipped with rudimentary forms of market 
institutions, and an underdeveloped private sector. Against 
the background of such deficiencies, the state naturally 
emerged as the only institution capable of pursuing a 
purposeful development process. It was in respect of these 
factors that the post-WW II development paradigms were 
ideologically state-centric.
It is the contention of Colin Leys that, the feasibility 
of a state-centric approach to development was based on the 
notion that the state has control over the means of 
development.85 This control was exercised through a purposeful 
and direct manipulation of macroeconomic policy instruments to 
achieve planned targets. This exercise was normally conducted 
within the framework of Development Plans, in which productive 
resources are directed to selected sectors of the economy. In 
this process, Ankie Hoogvelt argues that, "states had 
recognized responsibility for domestic economic progress and 
capital accumulation."86 Indeed, it was an era in which the 
prerogatives of development were "embedded" in the nation­
state.
8-See C. Leys, The Rise & Fall of Development Theory.
86Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Postcolonial World: The 
New Political Economy of Development (Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1997), p. 135.
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In a stace-cencric ideological framework of development, 
the fate of the poor and the vulnerable were not left to the 
vicissitude of unregulated market forces. In addition, poverty 
alleviation was not peripherizea as a pacifying derivative of 
putative growth rates. As already noted, McNamara’s 
"revolution" at the World Bank during the 1970s elevated 
poverty alleviation to the fore of the development discourse . 
In this newly found "wisdom," states were empowered to 
intervene directly on behalf of the poor.
Without doubt, the ability of the state to perform these 
crucial roles was "associated with a degree of autonomy of the 
state bureaucratic apparatus."87 In this regard, Preston 
cannot be mistaken on his observation that the traditional 
paradigms of development were ideologically predicated upon 
"the policy interventionist role of the state.”88 With the 
state as the prime mover of development, the idea of progress 
was deemed realizable through the autonomous decision-making 
of sovereign nation-states.
Globalization, by reducing the role of the state in 
crucial economic matters as a result of the restructured 
relationship between states and markets, has not only 
undermined the theory of the developmental state, but also, 
altered the very meaning of development. It is in this respect 
that Colin Leys surmises that the neoliberal policy correlate 
of globalization renders traditional paradigms of development
87Ibid., p . 205.
88P.W. Preston, Development Theory, p. 319.
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anachronistic.89 Anachronistic in the sense that, the 
intentional processes underlying traditional development 
paradigms, and the interventionist roles of the state have 
been undermined by the neoliberal policy demands associated 
with globalization.
First, the new political economy of globalization, in the 
developmental circumstances of SSA, presents new issues that 
deviate from the previous paradigms within whose framework the 
sub-region has been operating until the early 1980s. Second, 
there are some debilitating facts, and other attenuating 
circumstances that detract from the redemptive implications of 
this new7 development orthodoxy. As a result, in the 
developmental context of SSA, there are some disturbing 
questions that are yet to be clarified within this new 
paradigmatic shift. As the next section demonstrates, it was 
in response to such unanswered questions that the main theme 
of our study was adopted.
GLOEAL-IZATION, SSA, AND THE NEW CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT
As an iconoclastic concept in its meaning, and as an 
interdisciplinary tool in its application, the essence of 
globalization has generated a considerable degree of 
controversy.90 In spite of disagreements over its basic
s9See C. Leys, The Rise & Fell of Development Theory\ pp. 3-44.
90For a representative review of the controversy surrounding the 
meaning and evidence on globalization, see P. Hirst and G. Thompson, 
Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the 
Possibilities of Governance (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1996).
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characteristics, and discord on evidence in its support, there 
is the emerging consensus that, globalization, as a new 
context of development, rides on the hegemonic ideology of 
neoliberalism.91 Dubbed as "Washington Consensus"92 (others 
claims Washington Confusion"),93 specific policy requirements 
under neoliberalism define the new framework of development.
The Issues of Development
As it will be expanded further in Chapter III, 
neoliberalism could best be understood through the conceptual 
optics of neoclassical economics that holds in high esteem, 
the equilibration processes of unfettered market forces.94
91 Chapter III provides a detailed examination of globalization and 
its associated ideological framework of neoliberalism under the 
discussion of our theoretical framework. It will suffice to indicate 
here that, a number of writers have established the link between 
globalization and neoliberalism under varying contexts. For instance, 
see Naom Chomsky, Profit Over People.- Neoliberalism and Global Order 
(New York: Seven Stories, 1999), B.R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: How 
Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World (New York: Randomhouse, 
1995), and Gary Teeple, Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform 
(Toronto: Garamond Press, 1995) .
92This is a phrase coined by John Williamson to indicate the 
aggregation of specific neoliberal policies that are preferred, 
professed, and proselytized by the World Bank and the IMF, institucions 
that are headquartered in Washington, DC. See J. Williamson, "Democracy 
and the 'Washington Consensus'," World Development, Vol. 21, No. 8 
(1993) , pp. 1329-1336 .
93In recognition of the fact that a considerable degree of policy 
disagreements exist among economic pundits within the World Bank and the 
IMF, Moises Naim, the editor of Foreign Policy prefers the term 
“Washington Confusion" to "Washington Consensus.” See M. Naim, 
"Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion?" Foreign Policy, (Spring 
2000), pp. 87-103.
94For a comprehensive review of classical liberalism, see Sally 
Razeen, Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order: Studies 
in Theory and International History (London: Routledge, 1998). For its 
application in the new context of development, see Gary Teeple, 
Globalization and Decline of Social Reform, especially. Chapter V.
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Rationalizing '.vichin che oncology of neoclassical economics, 
Che cheology of che new neoiiberal framework is predicated 
upon che regulacory funccions of markec forces, racher chan on 
che incervencionisc accivicies of che state.9- Unlike che 
previous, cradicional paradigms of developmenc, scaces now 
play subsidiary roles Co che primacy of markec forces.
Specific neoliberal policy demands chac are intended co 
enhance che incermediacion of markec forces in che concexc of 
SSA, conscicuce che policy conditionalities underlying 
Stabilization and Adjustment Programs (SA.Ps). As a product of 
the World Bank's96 diagnosis of, and prescriptions to the 
developmental crisis in SSA, SAPs emerged in the early 1980s 
as the procedural definition of the very development process 
in the sub-region. The adoption, and implementation of SA.Ps 
cast the developmental processes of SSA into the theoretical 
terrain of neoliberalism. This new template comes along with 
assumptions and demands that differ from the ideological 
presumptions of the post-WW II traditional paradigms.
With the promotion of exports and economic growth through 
neoliberal reforms as attainable targets, specific policies 
under SAPs range from privatization, through trade and
95Some writers entertain the idea that, the ascendancy of market 
forces is imperceptibly leading to the decline of the state. In their 
view, the state, as a Westerphalian derivative, is under a serious 
threat from, the new role of market forces in the current era of 
globalization. See Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The 
Diffusion of Power in. the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996).
96World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Agenda for Action (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1981).
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financial liberalization, to deregulation, and the demand for 
the reduced role of the state in direct economic activities.97 
Extrapolating from che conventional wisdom of neoclassical 
economics, it has been che doctrinaire position of the World 
Bank that, the adoption of these policies will have positive 
multiplier effects on growth, foreign direct investment, 
diversification of exports, and the appropriate management of 
the external debt.9S
The contentious issue here is that, SSA stands to benefit 
developmentally if the sub-region follows the current tide and 
adopts neoliberal policies that synchronize with the demands 
of global neoclassicism. Reeling under heavy external debts, 
confronted with declining terms of trade, threatened by 
declining economic growth,99 and therefore faced with an
97For a complete list of the original neoliberal policy demands 
under SAPs, see Moses Naim, “Washington Consensus or Washington 
Confusion," p. 89.
9SThe World Bank has defended its position on the multiplier 
effects of neoliberalism in several of its volumes. For instance, see 
the World Bank, World Development Report (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead 
(Washington, DC: The WTorld Bank, 1994a), and Trends in Developing 
Economies (New York: The World Bank, 1994b).
"Parfit and Riley claim that the precarious indebted position of 
SSA made the sub-region vulnerable to the redemptive incantations of the 
new development orthodoxy. See T. Parfitt and S. Riley, "The 
International Politics of African Debt," Political Studies, Vol. 35 
(1997), pp. 1-17. Nyang'oro on the other hand argues that declining 
terms of trade threatened the development of the sub-region. See J. 
Nyang’oro, The State and Capitalist Development in Africa: Declining 
Political Economies (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989). Osuji also 
contends that declining economic growth was a characteristic feature of 
Africa’s economic crisis in the early 1980s. See L.O. Osuji, "Structural 
Adjustment and Persistence of Economic Crisis in Africa," in Felix M. 
Edoho, ed.. Globalization and the New World Order: Promises, Problems, 
and Prospects for Africa in the Twenty-First Century (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Publishers, 1997), pp. 83-93.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6 6
imminent socio-economic convulsion in the early 1980s, most 
governments in SSA were powerless to resist the temptation of 
Structural Adjustment Lo ans (SALs) that were laced with 
neoliberal policy conditionalities. It is therefore not 
surprising that financially strapped and debt-ridden countries 
in SSA subscribed to the neoliberal context of development as 
a matter of national survival. To make a point but at the risk 
of exaggeration, the adoption and implementation of SAPs 
became an involuntary reflex with existential implications for 
SSA.
The Facts on Developments
According to Claude Ake, 100 and Manfred Bienefeld, 101 
subscription to the currrent orthodoxy of neoliberalism 
signifies the incorporat ion of SSA into the ideological 
framework and the policy imperatives of globalisation.
Granting this assertion to be true (an assertion that will 
later be clarified in Cfaapters IV and V) , two questions have 
to be asked at this juncture; Does the incorporation of SSA 
come along with the conventional gains presumed to be 
associated with a region's integration with the globalising 
world economy? How does the new context of development that is 
associated with globalisration impact on development
100c. Ake, Democracy am d  Development in Africa.
101M . Bienefeld, "The Etfew World Order: Echoes of a New 
Imperialism," pp. 31-48.
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aspirations and poverty alleviating concerns of the sub- 
region?
Available facts pertaining to these questions do not only 
paint a gloomy picture, but also bring to the fore some 
disturbing trends, and theoretically challenging questions 
that are yet to be fully examined. The reigning notion is that 
neoliberalism, through the intermediation of SAPs, is yet to 
deliver its promise in the developmental context of SSA.102 
After nearly two decades of experimentation with the 
underlying tenets of neoliberalism, the Algiers Declaration 
issued at the end of the 3 5th Summit of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) in 1999 isolated globalization as a 
serious threat to the development prospects of Africa.103
A threat in the sense that, though, there has been 
considerable improvement in trade (exports and imports) as a 
ratio of GDP, other critical indicators show declining trends. 
Per capita GNP, a useful measure of average welfare, decreased 
from US$ 639 in 1980 to US$ 503 in 1997.104 Terms of Trade, 
with 1987 as a base year of 100, deteriorated from 13 9.1 in 
1980 to 96.6 in 1937.l0- The value of SSA's total commodity 
trade as a percentage of total world trade declined from 4.3
102There is a daunting amount of literature on the unfulfilled 
promises of neoliberalism in the context of SSA. For a volume that 
summarizes the current debate on this issue, see Felix M. Edoho, ed., 
op. cit.
103See, Xinhua. News Agency, July 15 (1999) .
l04World Bank, African Development Indicators, 1998/99 (Washington, 
DC: The World Bank, 1998), p. 35.
105Ibid., p. 89.
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in 1986 co l.S in 1995.106 The cocal debc scock of SSA chat 
scooa at USS 84.1 billion in 1930 rose to 23 5.4 billion in
1996, an increase equivalent to more than 300 percent of total
exports.107 According to Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, 
in 1999, 44 percent of all Africans (51 percent of the ratio
in SSA) live in absolute poverty.108
In the face of such debilitating indicators, the much 
touted claim that globalization provides a non-discriminative 
template that is conducive co the development aspirations of 
all countries is untenable in the context of SSA. What must be 
noted here is that, beneath such universalistic, redemptive 
idealism is the painful reality that the new context of 
development discriminates between winners and losers. In this 
case, as a reflection of these worsening trends, SSA seems to
be on a slippery slope towards the losing side of the game of
globalization.
Quite apart from the gloomy picture painted by the 
declining trends that are cited above, it is in the view of 
Claude Ake109 that development (not putative GDP growth rates), 
and poverty alleviation that are crucial to SSA have been 
relegated to the fringes of the current political economy of 
globalization. With its demand for state disengagement, and
106Uniced Nations, International Trade Statistics Yearbook, Vol. 2 
(New York: UN Publishing Division, 1995), p. 105.
107World Bank, Global Development Finance, Vol. 1: Analysis and 
Summary Tables (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1997a) , p. 202.
10SSee, Africa News Service November 16 (1999) .
109C. Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa.
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che institution of the primacy of markets, the theory of the 
developmental state has been undermined, and subsequently de­
ideologized. Development (whatever is left of it) has been 
reduced to reactions and responses to the challenges and 
opportunities of global market forces. Therefore, instead of 
pursuing a purposeful, planned development process (as it did 
under the traditional paradigms), SSA is now overwhelmed with 
the management and containment of crises associated with its 
incorporation into the logic of globalism.
With development reduced to crisis management, poverty 
alleviation, in the developmental context of SSA, has been 
peripherized. Peripherization of poverty alleviation is 
inherent to the logic of neoliberalism. This logic considers 
poverty as an unanticipated aberrant that must be dealt with 
by specifically designed programs detached from the processes 
of capital accumulation and economic growth.110 in this case, 
unlike in the traditional paradigms, especially with the 
reformist response, poverty alleviation cannot be made the 
centerpiece of the current neoliberal framework of development 
in SSA.
In retrospect, declining trends of critical economic 
indicators, the devaluation in the substance of development, 
and the peripherization of poverty alleviation capture the 
essence of SSA's marginalization within the emerging political 
economy of globalization. If we are to operate within the
110For a comprehensive review of how neoliberalism peripherizes 
poverty alleviation, see C.M. Vilas, "Neoliberal Social Policy: Managing 
Poverty (Somehow) , “ NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 29, No. 6 (May- 
June 1996), pp. 16-26.
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presumptions of the new context of development, and agree for 
a moment that subscription to neoliberal policies comes along 
with the conventional benefits of integration, then, the 
marginalization of SSA constitutes an unanticipated paradox 
that demands a painstaking examination.
A PARADOX WORTHY OF EXAMINATION
Purposefully or serendipitously, and either based on 
faulty assumptions or false premises, the issue of SSA' s 
incorporation and marginalization has been touched upon in the 
literature. M. Bienefeld111 and C. Ake112 for instance relate 
the adoption of neoliberal policies to the marginalization of 
SSA within the emerging global system. In spite of their 
painstaking efforts in linking globalization to 
marginalization, their analyses do not delve into a 
theoretical specification that underpins the paradox of 
incorporation and marginalization.
On the other hand, P. Collier,113 F. Ng and A. Yeats,114 
and Yeats et al.115 explain the marginalization of SSA within
"'See M. Bienefeld, “The New World Order: Echoes of a New 
Imperialism. “
1 1 -See C. Ake, Development and Democracy in Africa.
113See P. Collier, “The Marginalization of Africa,” International 
Labor Review, Vol. 134. Nos. 4-5 (1995), pp. 541-557.
1 l4See F. Ng and A. Yeats, “Open Economies Work Better! Did 
A.frica's Protectionist Policies Cause its Marginalization in World 
Trade?" World Development, Vol. 25, No. 6 (1997), pp. 889-904.
li2See A. Yeats, J. Amjadi, U. Reincke and F. Ng, “What Caused Sub-
Saharan Africa's Marginalization in World Trade?" Finance & Development,
(December 1996), pp. 38-41.
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che orthodoxy of neoclassical economics. Echoing the 
traditional position of the World Bank, and arguing strictly 
(or blindly) within the logic of neoiiberalism, these writers 
claim that SSA has been marginalized because the sub-region 
has not gone far enough with liberalization and marketization. 
In their view, the only way SSA could obviate its 
marginalization is to deepen its incorporation into the 
emerging economic order through the continuing experimentation 
with neoliberal policies.
By conflating incorporation with integration, these 
orthodox sympathizers were oblivious to the fact that the 
former does not necessarily come along with the benefits 
associated with the latter. In other words, there is no 
automatic connection between incorporation into the global 
market discipline and the benefits accruable from this 
process. As a result of this oversight, their recommendation 
is not only theoretically deficient but also, practically 
obfuscating.
In the context of SSA therefore, incorporation and 
marginalization have either been presented as a positive 
functional relationship whereby marginalization deepens as the 
level of incorporation rises or, as an inverse relationship in 
which case marginalization declines with the depth of 
incorporation. Conceptually, these opposing accounts confound 
the issue as to how incorporation and marginalization, within 
the interstices of globalization and neoiiberalism, impact on 
development; and poverty alleviation concerns of SSA. In other
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words, there could be no meaningful assessment of the impact 
of globalization unless the competing accounts are reconciled.
One obvious way to reconcile such contradictory accounts 
will be to examine the paradox of incorporation and 
marginalization under the guidance of a theoretically 
specified model. As indicated in Chapter I, this theoretical 
model adopts a conceptual distinction between incorporation 
and integration. A conceptual distinction in this direction 
will enable us to demystify the reigning notion that the 
benefits of integration are automatic associates of 
incorporation without other attenuating or, extenuating 
intervening variables. As of now, such an undertaking does not 
exist in the literature.
Incorporation, integration, and marginalization are 
concepts that are deeply embedded within the new context of 
development. In this regard, the next, logical step in our 
undertaking is to set the theoretical framework of our study 
by delineating the assumptions, philosophical traditions, and 
policy demands of neoiiberalism, and to determine how the 
underlying tenets fit with the concept of globalization.
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In chapter II, post-WW developmenc paradigms, and how 
their underlying ideological assumptions shaped the 
developmental processes of SSA were presented. The traditional 
development paradigms including the modernization theory, the 
dependency theory, and the reformist response were 
ideologically state-centric. With development predicated upon 
the interventionist role of the state, markets were entreated 
to the performance of some subsidiary functions.
With its insistence on the primacy of market forces, and 
its request for the subsidiary role of the state, the 
prerogatives of globalisation and its associated hegemonic 
framework of neoiiberalism, as previously alluded to, signify 
the rise and fall of traditional development paradigms. The 
new* context of development, within which our research 
questions are framed, is essentially defined by the 
imperatives of globalization, and the theoretical precepts of 
neoiiberalism. in this case, globalization and neoiiberalism 
provide the relevant theoretical background for the 
examination of the questions posed in our study.
This Chapter, in effect, sets the theoretical framework 
of our study. Here, the various debates about globalization 
will be examined in an attempt to delineate its 
characteristics, and main ideological correlate, 
neoiiberalism. After that, neoiiberalism will be examined in
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che context of ics philosophical and cheorecical cradicions, 
ics underlying assumptions, and its policy demands.
In order to examine our first research question 
concerning the extent to which neoliberal policies constitute 
the ideological counterpart of globalization, the third 
Section examines the fit between globalization and 
neoiiberalism. This assessment will also enable us to 
delineate the main features of the new context of development.
GLOBALIZATION: THE RAGING DEBATE
Globalization is a concept that is shrouded in a thick 
fog of controversial debates. To pierce through this outer 
shell in order to get to the substance of globalization is by 
itself a daunting enterprise chat is beyond the scope of our 
study. Rather, a cursory- survey of the globalization debate 
in the context of our research is presented. This enables us 
to isolate the main characteristics of globalization, and 
identify its underlying ideological framework.
For the sake of analytical clarity, the debate will be 
examined under three separate but interrelated themes. The 
themes are framed in the form of questions: (i) Is
globalization a mere rhetorical nomenclature that does not 
describe any new distinctive phenomena or, is globalization a 
term chat describes the reality of a new emerging order?
(ii) Is globalization an inevitable process that proceeds on 
its own accord or, is globalization a contingent process that 
is courted into existence by special interests operating from
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within an identifiable ideological framework? (iii) Is 
globalization imperialistic?
Globalization: Rhetoric vs. Reality
For some time after the furor of globalization had
reached its crescendo, and has even emerged as che buzzword
for the description of the post-Cold War world order,1 some
observers still believe that the term explains nothing new.
For instance, Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson argue that. 
Globalization in its radical sense should be taken to mean 
the development of a new economic structure, and not just 
conjunctural change toward greater international trade and 
investment within an existing set of economic relations... 
Increasing salience of foreign trade and considerable and 
growing international flows of capital are not per se 
evidence of a new and distinct phenomenon called 
’globalization’:..., they were features of the international 
economy before 1914.-
It is pertinent to note that, increasing international trade
and investment, and growing international flows of capital are
mere indices that reflect an economistic, reductionist view of
globalization.3 This version, as it will be demonstrated in
^See Hans-Henrik Holm and G. Sorensen, eds., Whose World Order: 
Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War.
-P. Hirst and G. Thompson, Globalization in Question: The 
International Economy- and the Possibilities of Governance, p. 7, italics 
in original.
3Though there are various versions of globalization, this 
economistic, reductionist view' is preferred by the multilateral 
institutions. For instance, see the World Bank, Global Economic 
Prospects and the Developing Countries (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), and the UNDP, Human Development Report, 1997 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997).
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this section, does not capture the entirety of the emerging 
process.
Nevertheless, P. Hirst and G. Thompson put globalization
on trial due to the distinction often made between a
globalized economy, and an incer-nacional eczonomy. The former
is a system in which "distinct national economies are subsumed
and rearticulated into the system by international processes
and transactions." The latter, on the other hand, is a system
in which processes that are determined at t h e  level of national 
economies still dominate and international phenomena are outcomes 
that emerge from the distinct and differential performance of the 
national economies.4
On the basis of this distinction, the authorrs claim that the
emerging world order does not represent a g lobalized economy
because, distinct national economies still predominate in the
increasing flow of trade, capital and investment.
By implication, if the emerging process is globalized in
nature, then, distinct national economies sbiould have been
neutralized in the welter of international processes and
transactions. And by extension, if national economies were
neutralized, then, there would be no possibility of
international governance on the bases of st ate-instituted
multilateral systems. That multilateral governance is still
possible, in the view of P. Hirst and G. Th_ompson, indicates
that the present world order is mere of an zLnter-nadonal
economy rather than a globalized economy.
4P. Hirst and G. Thompson, Globalization in Question, p. 10.
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Pricing alone in a different context, G. Thompson takes 
inspiration from the classic definition of globalisation as 
offered by the European Commission to buttress his idea that 
the emerging process is not new. According to the European 
Commission,
Globalisation can be defined as the process by which markets and 
production in different countries are becoming increasingly 
interdependent due to the dynamics of trade in goods and services 
and flows of capital and technology. It is not a new phenomenon 
but the continuation of developments that have been in train for 
some considerable time.-
Reflecting on this view of globalization, G. Thompson claims
that globalization is "just another word for the further
internationalization of economic activity, in terms of greater
integration and interdependence.”6 In this case, globalization
is a mere rhetorical nomenclature, a conjured word that
explains nothing new. Like an emperor without an empire,
globalization is a fictitious concept without any credible
substantive bases.
"What’s New? What's Not? (And So What?)," is the
provocative title under which Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S.
Nye Jr.7 sought to examine the authenticity of the
globalization creed. As the chief advocates of the concept of
complex interdependence,8 the authors argue that, the
-Cited in G. Thompson, "Introduction: Situating Globalization," 
International Social Science Journal, No. 160 (June 1999) , p. 139.
6Ibid.
7See R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye Jr., "Globalization: What's New?
What's Not? (And So What?)," Foreign Policy, (Spring 2000), pp. 104-119.
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"characterization of incerdependence more chan 2 0 years ago 
now applies co globalizacion ac che curn of Che millennium, " 
and chac, "chis vague phrase (globalizacion) expresses a 
poorly underscood buc widespread feeling chac che very nacure 
of world policies is changing."9 Afcer a careful delineation 
of che eharacceriscics of incerdependence and globalizacion, 
che auchors gravicace co che conclusion chac che Cwo cerms 
mean Che same Ching. In cheir view, globalizacion is noChing 
new. IC is a superfluous nomenclacure chac vindicaces che 
increasing relevance of complex incerdependence among nacion- 
scaces.
Kennech N. Walcz, who conscrucced his cheory of 
scruccural realism on che basis of che conCinuing predominance 
of nacion-scaces,10 also decries Che over-used meaning of che 
word globalizacion. Writing on "Globalizacion and Governance," 
K.N. Walcz admonishes chac, "many globalizers underescimace 
Che excenc co which Che new looks like Che old."11 Wich his 
noscalgia for che conCinuing ubiquiCy of che Wescerphalian 
scace-syscem, K.N. Walcz is very concempcuous of che idea chac 
globalizacion is a new realicy chac undermines che 
convencional wisdom chac che scace remains Che irreducible 
unic of che incernacional sysCem.
sSee R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye Jr., Power and. Interdependence: 
World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).
^Keohane and Nye Jr., "Globalization," p. 104.
10For his theory on structural realism, see Kenneth N. Waltz,
Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979) .
''Kenneth N. Waltz, "Globalization and Governance," Political 
Science and Politics, Vol. 32, No. 4 (December 1999), p. 695.
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That the new looks like the old, in his view, relates to 
the lingering predominance of states in the emerging process. 
Paraphrasing Emile Durkheim, K.N. Waltz concludes that, 
globalization is nothing more than increasing interdependence; 
a reflection of "the mere mutualism" of states.12 In an 
earlier article, Linda Weiss has also argued that the reigning 
globalist orthodoxy is an exaggeration, and that, the 
associated notion of the declining importance of the state is 
a myth.13 In her view, the contemporary international flows of 
capital, goods, investment and technology are not without 
historical precedent, and that, these processes did not, and 
will not undermine the supremacy of the state.
The assertion that globalization is a mere rhetorical 
verbiage that explains nothing new is based on three 
discernible factors. First, the increasing flows of trade, 
investment, and capital are nothing new; they are vestiges of 
the past. Second, as it was in the past, distinct national 
economies still form the bases of such flows. Third, contrary 
to popular notion, the emerging process does not reduce the 
predominance, and the decision-making autonomy of nation­
states .
Of course, it cannot be denied that foreign trade and 
capital flow have characterized the international system even- 
before 1914. However, to extrapolate from the enduring nature
12Ibid., p. 697.
,3See Linda Weiss, "Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless 
State," The New Left Review, Vol. 225 (1997), pp. 3-27.
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of such flows co asserc chac che currenc changes do noc 
conscience a new era is co neglect some prominenc features of 
che emerging incemacional syscem associaced wich che 
globalizacion process. IC is inscruccive co noce chac large 
segmencs of che world did noc fully parcicipace in che pre- 
1914 incernacional syscem. Today, more economies in Asia,
Lacin America, and Africa have noc only opened Cheir fronCiers 
co crade and invescmenc, buc have also, in che form of a herd 
behavior, adopced markec friendly reforms.
Also, unlike in che previous era, Che volume of gross 
global financial cransaccions is much larger now. For 
instance, che volume of daily foreign exchange crade has 
increased from USS 15 billion in 1973 Co US$ 1.2 crillion in 
1995, whereas cross border sales and purchase of bonds and 
equicies by Uniced Scaces investors alone have increased from 
9 percenc of GDP in 1930 co 164 percenc in 1996.14 Of crucial 
differencial imporcance, free crade, capical flows, and 
foreign invescmenc during che earlier periods of Che cwenciech 
cencury were conducced largely chrough bilaceral arrangemencs.
Currencly, che promocion of chese accivicies is 
scruccured upon inscicucional foundacions operacing from 
wichin a specific, messianic ideology of free markets. The 
IMF, che World Bank, che Uniced Nations Conference on Trade 
and Developmenc (UNCTAD) , and more recently, che World Trade 
Organizacion (WTO) are all regulacory mulcilaceral
14See The Economist, Vol. 345, No. 8039 (October 18, 1997b), 
pp. 79-81.
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institutions that establish rules co uniformalize these 
accivicies on a global scale. This important global regulatory 
appendix thac confers a distinctive feature on the emerging 
process of globalization escapes through the analytic lenses 
of P. Hirst and G. Thompson.
The idea that national economies still dominate is a 
geographical fact that cannot be contested. However, che claim 
that distinct national economies still form the bases of the 
flow of capital, goods and investment is highly contestable.
As a result of the increasing flexibility in the organization 
of production, there has been an increase in interfirm and 
intrafirm strategic alliances spread around the globe to such 
an extent that products, and investment capital are constantly 
becoming de-nationalized.
The traditional "made in specific country" label of 
products is constantly becoming anachronistic in an era in 
which multinational corporations (MNCs) organize production 
systems on a global scale. It is in this respect that Riccardo 
Petrella argues that globalization is the novelty of our 
times, and in this changed terrain, MNCs, rather than distinct 
national economies, are the primary actors.15 That MNCs are 
constantly undermining the traditional predominance of 
distinct national economies in the international flow of 
goods, capital, and technology is not an overstatement. MNCs
15See Riccardo Petrella, "Globalization and Internationalization: 
The Dynamics of the Emerging World Order, “ in Robert Boyer and Daniel 
Drache, eds., States Against Markets: The Limits of Globalization 
(London: Routleage, 1996), pp. 62-83.
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accounted for between 25 percenc and 30 percenc of che GDP of 
che world’s markec economies in che mid-1980s, and also 
accouncec for roughly 70 percenc of che world's commodicy 
crade. By 198 8, che biggesc 3 00 MNCs accounced for abouc 70 
percenc of che cocal foreign direcC invescmenc stake.16
Ic is partially in respecc of che border-defying, and 
barrier-jumping activities of MNCs that James N. Rosenau 
characterizes globalizacion as a process chac "is changing 
humankind’s preoccupation with cerritoriality and the 
traditional arrangement of che state system.”17 As a process, 
rather chan as a stationary condition, a distinguishing 
feature of globalization is that, the underlying forces are 
not hindered or, prevented by territorial and jurisdictional 
barriers. In its broadened view therefore, globalization, as a 
boundary-broadening phenomenon, entails multiplicity of forces 
that compel hitherto distinct national economies co converge 
to a particular form of development. According co Malcolm 
Waters, there is a convergence toward capitalist development. 
He writes,
Globalization is...bound up intrinsically with, the pattern of 
capitalist development as it has ramified through political and 
cultural arenas. However, it does not imply that every corner 
of the planet must become Westernized and capitalist but rather 
that every set of social arrangements must establish its position
16These figures are cited in Gordon Laxer, “Social Solidarity, 
Democracy and Global Capitalism, “ The Canadian Review of Sociology and 
Anthropology, Vol. 32, No. 3 (August 1995), p. 291.
l7James N. Rosenau, “The Complexities and Contradictions of 
Globalization," Current History, Vol. 96, No. 613 (November 1997), p. 
361.
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in relation Co the capicalisr West. . ., ic must relacivize
itself.
In this process of relacivizacion, convergence, and 
"Westernization,”19 the underlying forces of globalization are 
imperceptibly undermining the autonomous decision-making power 
of sovereign states.
Susan Strange in her The Retreat of Che State10 offers a 
convincing theoretical foundation, and illuminating empirical 
evidence in support of her thesis that, the state is not only 
becoming defective but also, losing its sovereignty and 
autonomy to the underlying forces of globalization. In her 
view, the accelerating growth of technology has empowered 
markets to usurp the traditional functions of the state. This 
view buttresses James H. Mittleman’s assertion that, states 
are now reduced to playing courtesan roles to "global market 
forces . "21
The Economist, in its survey of the world economy arrived 
at similar conclusions.22 In its view, market forces are 
shrinking the autonomy of states, especially in the developing 
world, to such an extent that, governments have been rendered
ISMalcolm Waters, Globalization (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 3.
19According to Frederic Jameson, the Iranians prefer the term
"Ivestoxification" to "Westernization.” See F. Jameson, "Globalization
and Strategy," New Left Review (July-August 2000) , pp. 49-68.
-°See Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of
Power in the World Economy.
21James H. Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation 
and Resistance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 25.
22See The Economist, Vol. 344, No. 8035 (Sept1 20, 1997a), 
pp. 23-27.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84
powerless in che inscicueion of special programs on behalf of 
the poor, and. che vulnerable in che society. By reducing che 
social space of governments, globalizacion has on che ocher 
hand elevated market forces chac cannot be "socialized" on 
behalf of che poor and che needy.
Pecer F. Drucker, on che other hand, was very nostalgic 
with his assessment of che declining autonomy of states.23 On 
the premise that the control of money, credit and fiscal 
policy constitutes the main pillar of "sovereignty" as coined 
by Jean Bodin in 157 6, P.F. Drucker cites the case of the 
1994/95 Mexican Peso crisis to demonstrate that the global 
economy is now the ultimate arbiter of monetary and fiscal 
policies. As the 1997/98 East Asian financial turmoil also 
demonstrates, governments (democratic or, otherwise) are now 
losing control over the very issues that should have been 
under the sole prerogative of autonomous nation-states. On 
this note, the assertion (made by the nay-sayers to 
globalization) that states still exercise autonomy in crucial 
decisions is a blanket statement that glosses over some 
disturbing trends associated with the emerging process .
In the final analysis; if the current flows of goods and 
investment capital have special qualitative features that were 
not remarkable in pervious years; if distinct national 
economies do not constitute the only bases for such flows; and 
if states are becoming powerless in the face of uncontrollable
23See Peter F. Drucker, "The Global Economy and the Nation-State," 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 5 (September-October 1997), pp. 159-172.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8 5
market forces, then., the emerging process is a reality that 
captures a new distinctive phenomenon called globalization. To 
suggest otherwise is to conflate a process with an end state 
of events. Globalization is a process; a work-in-progress. It 
is nowhere near an end product that could be subjected to an 
existential test against the yardstick of some static, 
hypothesized end state of affairs. Conceptually, this was 
exactly what P. Hirst and G. Thompson did with their conjured 
image of what a globalized economy should be.
As a new and distinctive phenomenon, some writers view 
the emerging trend as a global trap that is intended to weaken 
the collective power of labor against capital.24 Others 
consider globalization as a post-industrial form of slavery, 
dressed in the camouflage of deterministic market forces 
whose,25 underlying processes need to be contained for the 
enhancement of global distributive justice.26 Still others 
view it as a neoliberal ideology masquerading in the guise of 
structural change.27
24See Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann, The Globa.! Trap: 
Globalization & the Assault on Democracy & Prosperity.
25See S. Rail, "Which. Mexico Is It? Globalization is the New Form 
of Slavery Dressed in the Camouflage of a so-called Market Economy. “
26Benjamin R. Barber variously refers to globalization as “savage 
capitalism” or, McWorld, and insists that the underlying forces 
undermine democracy and social justice. See B. R. Barber, Jihad vs. 
McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping’ the World (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1996).
27Gary Teeple argues that globalization is meaningless without its 
associated neoliberal hegemonic framework. See G. Teeple, Globalization 
and the Decline of Social Reform, especially. Chapters V and VI.
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Beyond such hyberbclic assessments r Simon Valaskakis has 
presented the reality of globalization i n a form of a 
theatrical prop.255 In his view, globalization is a new theatre 
with a new stage, new actors (falling and rising stars), and a 
new script. The new stage is the global market-place with a 
gestalt email tat that is greater than thie sum of the 
individual nation-states. The falling stzars are the nation­
state governments and the sub-national governments. The rising 
superstars are the MNCs, multilateral institutions 
(especially, che IMF, the World Bank an cl the WTO) , and other 
special interest groups. The new script is the growing income 
inequality within nations, and between tzhe rich and the poor 
countries.
With his admonition that, "an unexpectedly close synonym 
to contemporary globalization is privatization, ”29 Simon 
Valaskakis seems to imply that the theatre of globalisation is 
sponsored by private capital. As a reflection of the 
incoherent manner by which the actors deal with the script, S. 
Valaskakis resigns with a deep sense of pessimism that, there 
is "little left on the left," at the saisie time, "all is not 
right on the right."30 In other words, globalization has 
undermined the ideology of the Left that: accords primacy to 
the interventionist policies of the state. Ironically however.
2SSee Simon Valaskakis, "Globalization a s  Theatre," International 
Social Science Journal, No. 160 (June 1999) , pip. 153-164.
29Ibid., p. 154, italics in original.'
30Ibid., p . 162.
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the new neoliberal ideology of the P.ight that glorifies the 
pristine role of market forces cannot deal with the problems 
of poverty and inequalities either.
Disappointing as it might be to those who dismiss 
globalization on the basis of a hypothetical framework (as in 
the case of P. Hirst and G. Thompson), and distressful as it 
might be to those who have their scholastic tradition to 
defend (as in the cases of R.O. Keohane and J.S- Nye Jr., and 
K.N. Waltz) , globalization is a reality, not a mere rhetorical 
nomenclature. It is a distinctive phenomenon that is 
undermining hitherto cherished theories and paradigms on 
interstate relations, the nature of the international system, 
and the major actors on the world stage. To paraphrase Victor 
Hugo's belabored maxim, globalization, and all that it stands 
for, is a reality whose time has come.
Globalization: Inevitability vs. Contingency
Settling the debate on the reality-check of the emerging 
process does not end the controversy surrounding 
globalization. It rather raises the debate to another level 
with unintended epistemological implications. That is, in 
terms of its origin and perpetration, is globalization an 
inevitable process that proceeds on its own accord or, is it a 
contingent by-product of deliberate, and specifically 
instituted policies? The debate on inevitability vs. 
contingency borders on the issue as to whether globalization 
is irreversible or, reversible.
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The inevitability thesis presents globalization as an 
inexorable, natural result of market efficiency, and 
technological progress. It represents the final maturity of 
the "capitalist Enlightenment project of the past two 
centuries with its emphasis on universalism, scientism, 
rationality, private property rights, liberalism and 
individualism.”31 In other words, globalization is the final 
culmination of progressive development that emanates from 
self-propelling dynamism of technological development within 
the framework of systematic and consistent maturity of the 
inner logic of market forces. As an inexorable, natural 
process, the inevitability thesis inadvertently glosses over 
the dynamics of power, and vested interests associated with 
the emerging process. Among others, Francis Fukuyama,32 
Kenichi Ohmae,33 and Robert B. Reich,34 are the self-anointed 
disciples of the inevitability thesis.
In his The End of History', Francis Fukuyama argues that, 
the emerging process of globalization is solely determined by 
technological advancement and the self-propelling process of 
market forces, and that, the underlying liberal revolution
3'Gordon Laxer, "Social Solidarity, Democracy and Global 
Capitalism," p. 288.
32See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New 
York: Avon Books, 1993) .
33See Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World (New York: Collins 
Publishers, 1990), and K. Ohmae, The End of the Mation State: The Rise 
of Regional Economies (New York: Free Press, 1995) .
34See Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves 
for Twenty-First Century Capitalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1992).
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constitutes the climax of a universal, historical development. 
He writes.
The unfolding of technologically driven economic modernization 
creates strong incentives for developed countries to accept the 
basic terms of the universal capitalist economic culture, by 
permitting a substantial degree of economic competition and 
letting prices be determined by market mechanisms .3-
In other words, the emerging process of globalization, that is
driven by the forces of technology, is a universal, inexorable
development that could lead to the perfection of capitalism if
market forces would be allowed to proceed according to their
own inner logic. In specific reference to the associated
liberal revolution, F. Fukuyama argues that.
The growth of liberal democracy, together with its companion, 
economic liberalism, has been the most remarkable macropolitical 
phenomenon of the last four hundred years... the current liberal 
revolution...constitutes further evidence that there is a 
fundamental process at work that dictates a common evolutionary 
pattern for all human societies - in short, something like a 
Universal History of mankind in the direction of liberal 
democracy. -'6
The implication here is that, globalization is not only an 
inevitable process due to technologically deterministic 
development based on market forces but that, the associated 
liberal ideological framework is universalistic in its 
evolution. The collapse of the Soviet Union, and the 
subsequent de-legitimation of communism as an alternative
?-F. Fukuyama, The End of History, pp.' 96-97.
3r’Ibid., p. 48, italics in original.
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ideology gave Fukuyama’s thesis a transient hope of a workable 
praxis in progress. This hope, in the view of John Gray is a 
delusion because there is no indication that the world is 
moving towards a unified global capitalism.37
Kenichi Ohmae also argues in support of the inevitability 
thesis. In his The Boderless World, he insists that the world 
is shrinking as a result of greater international 
connectivity, that, the traditional distinctions between core 
and peripheral regions of the world are blurring, and that, 
there is an irreversible convergence into a one world 
economy.38
In his other volume, he advances the argument that in 
today's borderless world, the forces of globalization are 
rendering the traditional notion of the nation state 
anachronistic, and that, nation states matter only if they put 
global logic first and function as ports of entry to the 
global economy.39 According to K. Ohmae therefore, the 
increasing trend toward a borderless world economy, and the 
withering away of the nation state are inexorable processes 
that can neither be prevented nor deterred by conscious acts 
of deliberation. As technologically determined processes 
within the prism of market forces, they are irreversible.
37See John Gray, False Dawn: Delusions of Global Capitalism (New 
York: The New Press, 199 8).
38See K. Ohmae, The Borderless World.
39See K. Ohmae, The End of the Nation State.
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With a couch of passion and concern, Robert B. Reich also 
subscribes co the inevicabili ty argument .40 He supports the 
assumptions about the irreversibility of globalisation and 
about technological determinism. On the other hand, he 
expresses a deep sense of concern about the obnoxious effects 
associated with the disintegration of national economies, and 
the increasing gap between the poor and the rich. 
Notwithstanding such passionate gualifications, R.B. Reich 
uncharacteristically resigns to the logic of the automaticity 
argument with his departure that, the decline of national 
economic sovereignty is an irreversible result of exogenous, 
technological changes.
In short, the inevitability thesis presents globalization 
as an irreversible, natural, process. As an inexorable 
process, it precludes all other optimising alternatives. And 
as a "hands-off" process that proceeds on its own accord, 
globalisation does not depend on conscious acts of political 
agents. Globalisation cannot therefore be courted into 
perfection (or redress the associated imperfections) through 
the deliberate institution of specific policies, claim the 
inevitability thesis.
As a result of the underlying deterministic premises, 
(read, benevolent dictatorial tendencies) adherents of this 
view of globalization are very apocalyptic in their 
recommendations; nations that do not incorporate their 
economies to the imperatives of globalization will be doomed
40See R.B. Reich, The Work of Nations.
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forever. By implication, the inevitability thesis assumes that 
the emerging process has an in-built, self-automating recoil 
that rewards nations that subscribe to the globalization 
creed, and punishes by marginalizing those that do otherwise.
Anecdotally and empirically, the inevitable thesis, like 
a fair weather construction, has been ruffled by the opposing 
assertion that there is nothing inexorable about 
globalization. Manfred Bienefeld specifically takes the 
assumption of technological determinism to task. In his view, 
the "primary driving force behind the liberalization of the 
world's financial markets is political, not technological.”41 
He elaborates,
globalization is not a technological or historical necessity, but 
a politically driven process whose apparent irreversibility stems 
from the fact that its gains have been increasingly 
institutionalized and protected by new international rules and 
regulations that threaten deviants with instant, collective 
retaliation.4-
Impiied in this assertion is a claim that, globalization, far 
from been a technologically deterministic process, is a 
contingent by-product of deliberately instituted, monitored, 
and enforced rules and regulations. For instance, with MNCs as 
the main actors of the emerging global market place, the OECD 
issued a Declaration demanding that member countries accord a
41Manfred Bienefeld, "Is a Strong National Economy a Utopian Goal 
at the End of the Twentieth Century?" in Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache, 
eds., States Against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (London: 
Routledge, 1997), p. 420.
4-Ibid., p. 422.
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high degree of operational freedom to such foreign
enterprises. The Declaration reads in part that,
Member countries should..., accord to enterprises operating in 
their territories and owned or controlled directly or indirectly 
by nationals of another Member country... treatment under their 
laws, regulations and administrative practices, consistent with 
international law and no less favorable than that accorded in like 
situations to domestic enterprises.43
If technological determinism could be counted on to bring
about the desired attitudinal changes, then the institution of
such specific rules and regulations would have been
superfluous. That this is not the case is due to the fact
that, contrary to the inevitability thesis, technological
revolutions do not necessarily yield corresponding ideological
favorability toward the bolts and nuts of capitalism. That
positive attitudinal changes are normally enforced through
specific policies. In this case, the OECD Declaration went too
far in its request for the granting of "citizenship" and
"passports" to foreign owned enterprises.
Quite apart from the fact that technological developments
are guided by specifically instituted rules and regulations,
market forces are also socially engineered. Even before
globalization became the buzzword and market forces emerged as
its most laudable tone, Karl Polanyi had already observed
that, the "road to the free market was opened and kept open by
an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and
43The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), National Treatment for Foreign-Controlled Enterprises (Paris: 
Head of Publications Service, OECD, 1993), p. 14.
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controlled interventionism. ”44 As it was true at the time of 
Polanyi, as well as in the current era of globalization; free 
market does not grow naturally, it is brought about by 
specific policy interventions.
Through their imposition of neoiiberal-inspired economic 
reform measures on Third World countries, and their 
intervention in countries engulfed in financial turmoils 
(Mexico in 1SS4, and East Asia in 1997/98), the IMF and the 
World Bank are the current architects of the market 
engineering process. If globalization is predicated upon self- 
propelling processes of market forces, then there would be no 
need to impose market reforms on unsuspecting countries under 
the bait of financial inducements. And if market forces have 
its own in-built rectification logic, then that logic should 
have worked to address the financial turmoils in Mexico and 
East Asia without the emergency, policy interventions of the 
IMF and the World Bank.
Rather than an independent, self-eguilibrating 
institution, the market in this instance behaves like an 
overweaned child that needs constant attention in order to 
neutralize its self-mutilating, suicidal predispositions. It 
is in recognition of such market engineering processes that 
James Petras states categorically that, "contingency, not 
inevitability, is present in the origins, perpetuation and 
future destiny of the globalist project."45 In his view, the
44Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation.- The Political and
Economic Origins of our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944), p. 140.
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contingent, engineering processes of globalization are 
unavoidable because,
the practitioners of gicbalism., if not the ideologues, are 
aware of the conditional sustenance of their project, the 
precariousness of its sustainability, and the political limits 
of its continuation over time.4^
A review of the constellation of forces involved in the market
engineering process indicates that globalization is a
particularistic, ideological project that is sponsored by
international capital, backed by powerful western countries,
and imposed, monitored and enforced by the IMF, the world
Bank, the WTO, and other multilateral organizations.
Globalization is neither technologically determined nor,
results from the natural unfolding of market forces. To
suggest otherwise amounts to an illegitimate exculpation of
powerful vested interests who are the main deliberate
sponsors, and ultimate beneficiaries of the globalization
process. Mention could be made here of the advanced
industrialized countries, the major MNCs, and the other
multilateral institutions.
To also suggest that globalization is irreversible, and
that there is no alternative (TINA.) is a premature
triumphalist posture that is based on a "tunnel vision of
history."47 Beneath this posture is an attempt to demoralize
4:1James Petras, "Globalization: A Critical Analysis," Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, Vol. 29, Mo. 1 (1999), p. 20.
46 Ibid.
47Ibid., p . 19.
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all other plausible alternatives in order to present the 
underlying particularistic interests of the global project as 
universal truisms. It is partially in respect of such 
subliminal dictatorial tendencies of the emerging process; a 
process that does not portend equal benefits to all countries, 
that some observers, in a knee-jerk assessment, consider 
globalization as imperialistic.
Globalization: Is It Imperialistic?
Globalization has been considered as a new form of 
imperialism because, in the view of some observers,48 the 
emerging process continues to perpetuate the political economy 
of dominance and dependence. If globalization is a "new" form 
of imperialism, then, there must also have been an "old" form 
of imperialism49 with underlying dynamics and their effects 
similar to that of globalization.
According to Benjamin J. Cohen, the classical meaning of 
imperialism refers to "any relationship of effective 
domination or control, political or economic, direct or 
indirect, of one nation over another. "50 Used in this sense,
48Some of the observers who equate globalization with imperialism 
include: Manfred Bienefeld, "The New World Order: Echoes of a New 
Imperialism, " Rob Steven, "New World Order: A New Imperialism, " Journal 
of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 24, No. 3 (August 1994), pp. 271-297, A. 
Sivananda, "Glcbalism and the Left," Race and class, Vol. 40, Nos. 2-3 
(October 1998-March 1999), pp. 5-19, Priyatosh Maitra, The Globalization 
of Capitalism in Third World Countries (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 
1996), and James Petras, “Globalization: A Critical Analysis," pp. 3-37.
49For a comprehensive review of the classical meaning of 
imperialism, see Benjamin J. Cohen, The Question of Imperialism: The 
Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence (New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1973).
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nation-states were the main flag-bearers of the old form of 
imperialism. Imperialistic relationships were enforced through 
the establishment of formal colonial empires. With the 
attainment of independence by the colonized countries, the 
matrix of imperialism shifted from formal political 
relationships to "more complex forms of economic penetration 
and domination of markets, sources of supply, and 
investment. ,o1
That globalization is a new form of imperialism might be 
attributed to the fact that although the methods of 
imperialism have changed, its actual substance remains 
constant. Instead of the previous conquest and control by 
imperial states, imperial control is now exercised informally 
through the activities of multinational corporations (MNCs), 
whose operations in outlying regions have been eased by the 
market-broadening logic of neoliberalism.
In this case, the players might have changed but, the 
substance of imperialism, that is, economic penetration and 
subordination of less developed countries through trade and 
investment, has even been intensified. In other words, 
globalization perpetuates, and incensifies the dominant- 
subordination pattern of relationships that parallel those 
established during the hey-days of classical imperialism.
As an unabashed advocate of the imperialistic view of 
globalization, Manfred Bienefeld argues that the emerging
50Ibid., p. 16, icalics in original.
- 1Ibid., p . 11.
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process perpetuates the dominant-subordination pattern of 
relationships between the advanced core countries of the Nort 
and the peripheral countries of the South.-2 In his view, the 
emerging new world order that rides on the tenets of 
neoliberalism resuscitates "a more open and explicit form of 
imperialism" that portends "serious consequences for large 
parts of the developing world.
The underlying assertion here is that, instead of the 
formal establishment of colonial empires, neoliberal policies 
perform the same boundary-broadening functions for the smooth 
operation of international private capital; an operation that 
is still detrimental to the interests of the subjugated 
regions. This view is supported by Rob Steven54 with his 
assertion that, though, classical imperialism operated 
primarily in national terms, now it functions through the 
medium of giant MNCs. In his opinion, these corporations take 
advantage of the permissive terrain provided by the 
institution, and enforcement of neoliberal policies.
Appropriating from the underlying tenets of the 
underconsumption hypothesis,55 James Petras also argues that 
globalization is imperialistic because, the emerging process
52See M. Bienefeld, "The New World Order: Echoes of a. New 
Imperialism. "
5-'Ibid. , p . 31.
->4See Rob Steven, "New World Order: A New Imperialism."
5- The underconsumption hypothesis states that, there is an 
underlying tendency for the rate of profits to fall in capitalist 
production systems that could be offset by gaining access to external 
markets. See Benjamin J. Cohen, The Question of Imperialism, pp. 36-42.
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is largely in response to the over-accumulation crisis of 
capitalism. In his view, the "over-accumulation crisis refers 
to the massive growth of profits with the shrinking space for 
investment at acceptable rates of profit."56 The solution to 
the over-accumulation crisis, according to J. Petras, has been 
provided within the framework of globalisation.
This is so because, capitalist entrepreneurs are now able 
to expand their productive activities to overseas markets, and 
in the process, widen the field for the investment of surplus 
profits. It is not surprising therefore, that, MNCs are the 
main driving force of the increasing international flows of 
capital, goods, and technology. In this case, posits J.
Petras, the "imperial concept fits the realities much better 
than the assumptions that underlie the notion of 
globalization.”57 The imperial concept better reveals the 
unstated intentions of the main forces behind the 
globalization project.
If we are to extrapolate from J. Petras's analysis, then, 
A. Sivanandan would not be far from right with his appositive 
remark that, "if imperialism is the latest stage of 
capitalism, globalism is the latest stage of imperialism.”-8 
Contentious as this assertion might seem, one cannot neglect 
the fact that the emerging process is leading to the 
globalization of capitalism, yet, the benefits of this
56James Petras, "Globalization: A Critical Analysis," p. 25.
57Ibid., p . 7.
58A. Sivanandan, "Globalism and the Left," p. 5.
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expansion have not reached the majority of the poor in Third 
World countries .-l)
Epitomized by the position of the World Bank, the 
multilateral institutions reject the imperialistic 
vulgarization of globalization. For instance, in its 1995 
report on Global Economic Prospects and the Developing 
Countries, the World Bank was compelled to act defensively.
The Bank vehemently argues that the increasing incorporation 
of Third World countries into the logic of the emerging global 
market discipline is the most important opportunity for 
raising the welfare of both the developing and the developed 
countries .60
Incorporation in the view of the Bank involves the 
adoption of outward-oriented growth strategies (read, 
neoliberal policies) conducive to greater openness to the 
world economy. The implication here is that, there is nothing 
imperialistic about globalization since, with the adoption of 
the appropriate policies, all countries, poor or rich, stand 
to benefit.
A cursory review of the raging debate on globalization 
does not only touch on some of the essential characteristics 
of the emerging process but also, reveals one interesting 
development. If globalization is a reality, it is because,
-9Priyatosh Maitra uses the case of India to illustrate the fact 
that, in spite of all the capitalist trappings, the poor in India are 
yet to benefit from the expansion of capitalism. See P. Maitra, The 
Globalization of Capitalism in Third World Countries.
60See The World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing 
Countries.
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among other things, the current international flows of trade 
and investible capital are conducted on che basis of 
neoliberal rules set by multinational institutions.
On che other hand, if globalization is an inevitable 
process, it is because market forces (the centerpiece of 
neoliberalism) are self-perpetrating. If globalization is a 
contingent process, ic is because neoliberal policies are 
specifically instituted to direct, and at times constrain 
market forces.
If globalization is imperialistic, it is because the 
underlying neoliberal policies perpetuate the dominant- 
subordination pattern of relationships. If globalization is 
not imperialistic, it is because the associated neoliberal 
policies provide a framework conducive to the developmental 
aspirations of both the developed and the developing nations. 
The emerging scenario here indicates that neoliberalism seems 
to be caught within the cross-fires of the raging debate on 
globalization.
In other words, the glorification, the proselytization, 
the legitimation, and de-legitimation of globalization are 
conducted within the ideology of neoliberalism. In this case, 
neoliberalism, and all that it stands for, seems to be an 
incontrovertible counterpart of globalization. As examined in 
the next section, the fit between neoliberalism and 
globalization is very clear.
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NEOLIBERALISM: THE IDEOLOGICAL COUNTERPART OF GLOBALIZATION
As indicated in the summary of the preceding section, 
neoliberalism stands at the crossroads of the controversial 
debate on globalization. Both sides of the three major themes 
of the debate concerning globalization employ neoliberalism 
either as an offensive tool or, a defensive weapon. It is not 
surprising that globalization, as a process, and 
neoliberalism, as an ideological policy framework, have become 
two of the most commonly used terms in the description of the 
emerging international order. Indeed, the two terms have 
become the conventional lingua franca for the description of a 
new international context of development.
In spite of the fact that the emerging international 
political economy of globalization appears to be 
neoliberalism's preserve, we cannot however establish the link 
between globalization and neoliberalism unless the 
characteristic features of the latter are also isolated. Thus, 
this section examines the philosophical traditions, the 
theoretical precepts, the assumptions, and policy demands of 
neoliberalism. Section three will then be devoted to the 
examination of the necessary fit between globalization and 
neoliberalism.
Neoliberalism: Philosophical Traditions and Theoretical
Precepts
The philosophical traditions of neoliberal international 
theory are found particularly in the works of Adam Smith,61
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F.A. Hayek,6- Milton. Friedman,63 and others. As the prefix 
"neo" of neo-liberal ism partially indicates, neoliberalism, in 
its current version, is a re-incarnation (or resurrection, or 
better still, rejuvenation) of the political economy of 
classical liberalism. Classical liberalism, on the other hand, 
emerged as a reaction to the orthodoxy of mercantilism.64
Premised on the ubiquitous role of the state, and 
appropriating from the principle of Gescalc Qualitat than, the 
whole is greater than the sum of its parts, the doctrine of 
mercantilism was in spirit and content collectivist. While 
state interests determine all economic activities, 
maximization of public authority, argue the mercantilists, was 
necessary for the protection of individual freedoms. In a 
collectivist system in which wealth was a veritable index of 
state power, the mercantilists glorified state intervention in
6lAs che father of classical, liberal economics, the works of Adam 
Smich range from moral philosophy to economic philosophy. For a 
comprehensive review of his pioneering work on classical economics, see 
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, ed., by Edwin Caiman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1376 [1776]). Take note that this volume is divided into separate books 
with different Chapters.
6-For some of his works that bear on the philosophical traditions 
of classical liberalism, see F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 
(London: Routledge, 1960) , and F.A. Hayek Law, Legislation and Liberty: 
Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy, in three volumes. 
Vol. 1: Rules and Order; Vol. 2: The Mirage of Social Justice; Vol. 3: 
The Political Order of a Free People (London: Routledge, 1982)
63See Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1962) . Friedman and his wife have recently defended 
their position on che link between capitalism and human freedom. See 
Milton Friedman and Rose D. Friedman, Two Lucky People: Memoirs 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998) .
64For a summary review of some of the classical treatises on 
mercantilism, see George T. Crane and Abla Amawi, eds. , The Theoretical 
Evolution of International Policical Economy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), pp. 35-54.
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che economy, and also advocated for che imposition of
protectionist policies on foreign trade.
To re-state, the main focus of the mercantilist doctrine
was the protection of the national autonomy, rather than the
advancement of individual freedoms, and the encouragement of
private initiatives. As rightly pointed out by G.T. Crane and
A. Amawi, the acceptance of mercantilism "made sense
sociologically in that it evolved simultaneously with the rise
of the m o d e m  state. "65 In as much as mercantilism was a
product of its time, the underlying prescriptions of
interventionism, the praxis of protectionism, and the
subjugation of individual freedom to the collective will of
the state became the focus of systematic criticism. Adam Smith
was a pioneering figure in the deconstruction of the
mercantilist thesis.
Writing largely in response to the reigning orthodoxy of
mercantilism, Adam Smith sought to prove in his Wealth of
Nations that prosperity, and individual freedom could best be
maximized in a politico-economic system with less government
interference. Indeed, Adam Smith was philosophically
contemptuous of a collective authority that is exercised
through the instrumentality of the state. He writes:
The statesman, who should attempt to direct private people in 
what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only 
load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume an
65G.T. Crane and A. Amawi, “Introduction: Theories of 
International Political Economy, “ in George T. Crane and Abla 
Amawi,eds., The Theoretical Evolution of International Political 
Economy, p. 5.
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authority which, could safely be trusted not only to no single 
person, but to no council or senate whatever, and which would 
nov/here be so dangerous as in che hands of a man who had the 
folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise 
it.66
What is implied here is that, private individuals are well-
placed in making their own decisions rather than having
decisions made for them by some government agents who operate
from within their own self-imposed sense of infallibility.
Adam Smith even links the unshackling of economic activity
from the authority of the government with the protection of
natural liberty. He states that
All systems either of preference or of restraint, therefore, 
being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system 
of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord. Every 
man, as long as he does not violate the lav/s of justice, is 
left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his own way, 
and to bring forth his industry and capital into competition 
with those of any other man, or order of men.67
With this assertion, Adam Smith establishes a core,
philosophical component of classical liberalism; the equation
of economic freedom or laissez faire with natural liberty. In
this paradigm, individual liberty is a derivative of the
spontaneous order of the invisible hand of market forces. The
invisible hand is a metaphor for a coordinating mechanism that
is deemed spontaneous because, "it relies on self-generating
and self-organizing properties."68 According to Adam Smith,
66A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Ch. II, p. 478.
67Ibid., Book IV, Ch. IX, p. 208.
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the role of che government must be limited to che provision of 
the rudiments of law and order for the effective functioning 
of the self-perpetrating processes of market forces.
In order to expand the horizon of the self-equilibrating 
process of the market, Adam Smith advocates division of labor 
in production and exchange- In recognition of the fact that 
division of labor necessitates exchange but is limited by the 
extent of the market, a domestic liberal economy, and 
international free trade are the appropriate means to tease 
the best out of individuals and nations.
The implication here is that, if left unregulated, market 
forces will enhance the maximum realization of each 
individual’s potential. Market forces will also ensure the 
maximum utilization of society's capital stock for the 
betterment of the society. Turning the mercantilist thesis on 
its head, Adam Smith methodically demonstrated in his Wealth 
of Nations that, liberalization and free markets, rather than 
regulations and trade restrictions, constitute the responsive 
means to improve the liberty and economic freedom of the 
people.
In his Capitalism and Freedom, Milton Friedman also 
sought to philosophize the link between market forces and 
freedom.69 In his view, a freely functioning market economy 
facilitates economic and technological progress that in turn 
enhances social mobility and political freedom. In the
6SSally Razeen, Classical Liberalism and International Economic 
Order: Studies in Theory and Intellectual History, p. 22.
69See M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom.
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rationalization of Friedman therefore, the expansion of 
government beyond its minimal functions impairs efficient use 
of resources, impedes progress, restricts social mobility, and 
subsequently limits political freedom as well. As an 
octogenarian economist, Friedman incorrigibly holds to these 
views .70
Beyond Adam Smith and Milton Friedman, F.A Hayek extends 
the link between the spontaneous order of market forces and 
political freedom and individual liberty to its philosophical 
limits. What Adam Smith refers to as the invisible hand, F.A. 
Hayek calls it the catallaxy of the market.71 Catallaxy is the 
neologism that Hayek uses to describe the special kind of 
spontaneous order produced by the market through people acting 
within the rules of the laws of property, tort and contract. 
Positing that only limited government can be decent 
government,72 the state matters only in the provision of a 
framework within which catallaxy may develop.
F.A. Hayek is also very remarkable with his views on 
social justice and equity.73 According to Hayek, social 
justice is strictly procedural and can only refer to the 
proper enforcement of general rules of universal application
70See Milton and Rose Friedman, Two Lucky People: Memoirs.
71 For more on catallaxy, see F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and. 
Liberty, Vol. 1, pp. 37-39, Vol. 2, pp. 108-109.
7-For Hayek's view on the role of the government, see ibid.. Vol.
1: Rules and Order.
73For a comprehensive review of Hayek's views on social justice 
and equity, see Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. 2: The Mirage of 
Social Justice.
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without regard to its particular results. Therefore, the 
advancement of social justice, in the view of Hayek, is a 
mirage that is at best a nonsense, and at worst pernicious, 
and unjust. The advancement of social justice, argues Hayek, 
undermines the morality and the justice of the market place.
It thereby confiscates the wealth of the more successful, 
prolongs the dependency of the needy, entrenches the special 
powers of organized interests, and overrides freedom and 
democracy.
It is in respect of such philosophical extirpations that 
David Henderson claims that classical liberals in the stature 
of Adam Smith, Milton Friedman, and F.A. Hayek cannot be 
egalitarian.74 This is so because their philosophical premises 
are based on the self-equilibrating processes of market 
forces. However, market forces are under no compulsion to 
operate under the guidance of deterministic moral compass set 
within the priorities of the poor and the needy.
To re-capitulate, Adam smith, Milton Friedman, F.A.
Hayek, and others provide the philosophical well-spring of 
contemporary neoliberalism. They were convinced in their 
belief in progress and the realization of the inner potential 
of all human beings (and all nations) in an unrestricted 
operational framework. In this vein, the contemporary 
theoretical precepts of neoliberal political economy is 
predicated upon the role of unfettered market forces in the
74See David Henderson, The Changing- Fortunes of Economic 
Liberalism: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (London: The Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 1998), pp. 24-26.
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allocation of productive factors, and in the distribution of 
incentives.
The distributive lever in the market system is price, 
that "transmits information to both consumers and producers" 
and thus enables them "through demand and supply to determine 
what is exactly produced and in what quantity.”7- The market 
system in this direction thus constitutes "the social 
allocation of goods and services by means of the price 
mechanism."76 In its wider perspective, the international 
sequel of the free market system is an open world economy in 
which capital, technology, products, and to a lesser degree, 
labor flow across boundaries in a pattern dictated by 
comparative advantage.
As already indicated, the genesis of comparative 
advantage is a derivative of the work of Adam Smith. In his 
Wealth of Nations, he examined the advantages associated with 
large scale productive activities that are made possible by 
specialization and division of labor. Adam Smith reasoned 
that, with external markets as outlets for the dispensation of 
excess products, even smaller countries could specialize and 
gain from international trade. Adam Smith's analysis was 
however silent on the mechanism that determines what type of 
goods a country could specialize in order to participate in 
international trade.
75R.D. Mckinlay and R. Little, Global Problems and World Order 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), p. 29.
7GGary Teeple, Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform,
p. 79 .
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with his labor theory of value, David Ricardo77 is 
credited as the first economist to isolate the importance of 
relative costs as the basis of specialization that facilitates 
international trade. According to Ricardo, there will be no 
specialization among countries, and hence, no international 
trade if there are no differences in relative production 
(labor) costs between nations. The existence of differential 
costs enables a country to specialize in the production and 
export of the commodity whose comparative cost of production 
is lower than it is in the other country.
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (K-S-O) trio78 also added 
another twist in the explanation of how comparative advantage 
promotes international trade. The H-O-S theory hypothesizes 
that, a nation would tend to export the products that use the 
nations' abundant factor intensively. Abundance in this case 
is based on relative factor endowments or, on relative prices 
of factors of production. An underlying caveat of the H-O-S 
theory is that, there is the tendency for relative factor 
prices to equalize on a common set of values world wide due to 
international trade. In this instance, international free 
trade that is facilitated by differential relative advantages 
among nations substitutes for the international mobility of 
factors.
77For a recent edition of his theory, see David Ricardo, The 
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981 [1817]).
78For a summary review of the H-S-O theory, see R.E. Caves, J.A. 
Frankel, and R .V!. Jones, World Trade Payments: An Introduction (Reading, 
MA: Addison-Wesley Longman, Inc., 1990).
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There are even some pacifying implications within the 
theoretical precepts of free trade that are made possible by 
the removal of restrictions and other forms of protectionist 
measures- According to Adam Smith, the removal of 
restrictions, and the advancement of free trade precipitate 
transparency and justice in governance.79 Also, in his Plan 
for Universal and Perpetual Peace, Jeremy Bentham argues that 
active trade relations among nations will discourage wars.80 
The author reasons that wars will be disruptive to perceived 
gains that are associated with free trade.
In a more recent work, R. Rosecrance in his The Rise of 
the Trading- State re-echoes the pacifist tradition of 
neoliberalism.81 He defends international commerce as the main 
vehicle towards the attainment of peaceful relations among 
states. Rosecrance buttresses his argument with a claim that 
the "trading state" is imperceptibly displacing the "military 
state” because, the competition for global markets in the 
spirit of free trade is replacing the traditional territorial 
conquest.
The emerging scenario indicates that, the philosophical 
traditions, and the theoretical precepts of neoliberalism 
provide the sinews of a political-economic system with a
79For a review of the pacifying implications of free trade as 
expounded by Adam. Smith, see A. Smith, The Wealth of Nation, Book IV,
Ch. VIII.
80See Jeremy Bentham, Plan for Universal and Perpetual Peace 
(Cambridge: Grotius Society Publications, 1927) .
81 See R. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State (New York:
Basic Books, 1986) .
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strong pacifist appeal. This appeal could be exploited to 
counteract the potential evils in a world driven, and 
constrained by the tentacles of "big governments, ” and the 
ill-effects of protectionism. Granting these assertions to be 
true, then, the proselytization of neoliberal policies, as the 
advocates would admit, is not only morally justifiable but 
also, socially productive, economically prudent, and 
politically liberating.
1Teoliberalism: Assumptions and Policy Demands
Though, Adam Smith and others provided the philosophical 
foundations of neoliberalism, the major analytical components 
of neoliberal policies are however embedded within the 
interstices of neoclassical economics.8- In this wise, the 
policy demands of neoliberalism are predicated upon some 
assumptions that find meaning within the ontology of 
neoclassicism. As a result of their pervasive peculiarities, 
and their ubiquitous implications, these assumptions are 
easily discernible. The assumptions range from issues that 
relate to the psychology of the economic individual, to 
factors that border on trade and international 
competitiveness.
At the heart of neoclassical economics is the utility 
maximizing individual. As a utility maximizer, the individual
82The essential concept of neoclassical economics is market 
equilibrium, that is established through the interplay of supply and 
demand. For a concise review of the political economy of neoclassicism, 
see James A. Caporaso and David P. Levine Theories of Political Economy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Ch. 4.
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is basically a choosing agent who decides from a number of 
competing choices and alternatives with che intention of 
achieving the highest level of satisfaction. The assumption 
here is that, the individual is capable of making a rational 
choice. In order to uphold the concept of rational choice,
"the neoclassical theories also assume that acts of 
consumption of different goods all provide a common result: 
the satisfaction or utility of the consumer."83 The utility 
maximizing behavior, and the essence of rational choice is 
also predicated upon the ubiquitous assumption of homo 
economicus.
The homo economicus postulate, acting as a standard lever
of efficiency, defines "the 'best' choices, [thus] those that
maximize an individual’s ends given the limited means
available."84 In the ontological presumptions of neoclassical
economics, homo economicus is a universal rule of economic
rationality that operates to maximize utility in all places,
and at all times. As rightly observed by T.J. Barnes, homo
economicus defines the methodological agenda of neoclassical
theory. That agenda is
based, upon reducing the complexity of economic events at any 
time or place to the universal trait of rational choice 
making; a trait that, because of its deterministic nature, is 
easily represented in a formal model.83
83Ibid., p. 80.
84John Brohman, "Economism and Critical Silences in Development 
Studies: A Theoretical Critique of Neoliberalism, “ Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1995), p. 298.
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The implication here is that, "non-market relations and
institutions are universal, unchanging, and have no
significant impact on economic activities."86 As a result,
argue the neoclassical theorists, there is an identifiable,
universal domain of economic rationality that could be
interpreted through equilibrium equations and formal models on
the assumptions of individualistic exchange relations.
In such an ahistorical, contextually-unembedded, static,
methodological framework, socio-historically rooted people are
reduced to "atomistic individuals who are bound together only
through market forces."87 In its far-reaching attribute, this
reductionist perspective enhances a positivist mode of
enquiry. This mode of enquiry relies on the knowledge that
there is an objective world of events that could be analysed
by objective methods of research. It is in this respect that
John Brohman argues in a different context that,
neoclassical economics exemplified the rise of positivism across 
the social sciences with its employment of the 'scientific method' 
of hypothesis testing, its ontological focus on empirical facts 
and events, its derivation of law-like generalizations, and its 
promise of predictable results based in the replicability of 
its models.88
In this case, the assumption of methodological individualism 
provides the irreducible pedestal upon which the theoretical
s5Cited in ibid.
86Ibid., p. 297.
87Ibid.
88John Brohman, Popular Development: Rethinking' the Theory & 
Practice of Development, p. 31.
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edifice, and the associated policy postulates of neoclassical 
economics are constructed.
The universaiistic overtones of rationalistic behavior of 
individual economic agents give credence to other forms of 
aggregated assumptions. These include the notion that markets 
are similar, that reactions to market signals by all sectors 
of the economy will be similar in all countries at all times, 
and that, open competition and utility maximizing behavior are 
coterminous. In other words, there is a tendency toward market 
equilibrium in all countries.
In recognition of the fact that market forces are 
expected to operate with the same logic even in variegated 
contexts, and in different circumstances, neoclassical theory 
assumes a monoeconomic perspective of development. In this 
view of development, neoclassical theory, and by extension, 
neoliberal policies, are equally applicable in both the 
developed countries, and the developing nations. That is to 
say, development is an ahistorical, unilinear process that 
could be perfected with the application of the appropriate 
tools of neoclassicism. Development then becomes a mere 
function of abstract economic principles operating in a socio- 
historical vacuum.
The hub of a neoclassical approach to development is the 
neoclassical theory on international trade and the concept of 
open (international) competition. As already indicated, 
international trade theory revolves around the concept of 
comparative advantage or, relative differential costs of
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produceion that exist between, and among nations. With
different relative costs, each country tends to specialise in
the production and exportation of goods that have
comparatively low production costs. As observed by Charles P.
Oman and G. Wignaraja, the concept of comparative advantage is
structured upon some key assumptions:
production functions differ among goods but are the same in all 
countries for each good; different goods have different factor 
intensities; there are no barriers to trade; there is no 
international factor mobility; all factor and goods market are 
perfectly competitive.. .S9
The underlying import of these assumptions seems to conjure up
a semblance of a neutral, international template that would be
supportive of a non-discriminatory process of free trade, and
an unbiased form of open competition. Paralleling the utility
maximizing behavior of the methodological individual, is the
extrapolation that free trade and the assumption of perfect
competition will also lead to the efficient utilization of
resources, and the maximization of the value of world output.
The neoliberal policy correlate of a globalizing world
economy that is based on the philosophy of classical
liberalism, and is predicated upon the assumptions of
neoclassicism translates into the "demand for a radically
deregulated global economy."90 As explained within the logic
of neoliberalism, excessive government regulation stiffles
S9C.P. Oman and G. Wignaraja, The Postwar Evolution of Development 
Thinking,, pp. 71-72.
90M. Bienefeld, "The Nev; World Order," p. 32.
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competition and as a result, distorts the efficient allocation 
of productive resources. The essence of deregulation therefore 
is to break-up the monopolistic power of public industries, 
and to reduce the regulatory functions of the state in the 
economy.
The demands for deregulation, and the withdrawal of the 
state from direct productive activities naturally come along 
with the request for privatization.91 It is the unstated 
premise of neoliberalism that, the private sector can perform 
better what the state performs poorly. The conventional wisdom 
is that, the rent-seeking behavior of states transmutes into 
misallocation of productive resources. Privatization of state 
enterprises is therefore intended to promote increased 
efficiency, introduce competition, and encourage foreign 
investment.
Private-sector entrepreneurial initiative on the other 
hand demands the promotion of private property rights. The 
institution of the primacy of private property rights is very 
important because, weak and undefined laws on private property 
negatively affect the utility maximizing behavior of the 
"rational," economic individual. As already alluded to, 
rational choices made by private individuals form the 
irreducible block for the construction of the neoclassical 
paradigm. On this note, Gary Teeple is right in his 
observation that, underlying the neoliberal agenda "is the
91 For a comprehensive review of the pros and cons of 
privatization, see William Megginson, "Privatization," Foreign Policy, 
(Spring 2000), pp. 14-27.
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principle of private property and the policy of advancing 
private property rights . ”9-
A market-informed, deregulated economy with a private 
sector-led organization of production and distribution of 
incentives provides the pedagogical framework for the 
acquiescence to other neoliberal policy demands. Central to 
this framework is the demand for trade liberalization.93 It is 
a process by which a country moves toward a neutral trade 
system with the removal of all trade distortions, including 
import tariffs, export subsidies, and other forms of 
protectionist measures.
To re-state, trade liberalization, in the logic of 
neoliberalism, is the only way a country could improve its 
access to the international market. As an elixir to the 
maximization of the benefits associated with comparative cost 
advantages, and as the gateway for the promotion of exports, 
trade liberalization is one of the crystal policies of 
neoliberalism.
Directly associated with trade liberalization is the 
demand for financial liberalization. The case for financial 
liberalization is built up on strong theoretical foundations 
within the framework of neoclassical economics.94 Within the
9-Gary Teeple, Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform,
p. 76.
93For a summary review of the link between trade liberalization
and economic growth, see Sebastian Edwards, "Openness, Trade 
Liberalization, and Growth in Developing Countries, “ Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 31, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 1358-1393.
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theoretical wisdom of neoclassicism is the assertion that 
financial repression obstructs economic growth because of its 
debilitating effects on the development of efficient 
technology systems. This assertion is based on the assumption 
that, economic growth requires investments to be made in 
modern technologies, and that, foreign direct investment is 
directly related to the level of open financial systems.
In this regard, the neoliberal policy demand for 
financial liberalization is to promote savings and investment, 
by enhancing capital mobility. As explained within the logic 
of neoliberalism, financial liberalization has important
benefits because, it creates opportunities for countries to
gain from the increasing internationalization of finance. It 
is therefore in the interest of nations to open up their 
financial systems in order to tap into the largesse of 
international capital flows.
Finally, the need for governments to restructure their 
expenditure is another veritable neoliberal policy demand. The 
conventional wisdom here is that burgeoning fiscal deficits, 
due to unexamined government expenditure, contribute to 
inflation, which in turn, could lead to capital flight. In the 
admonition of neoliberalism, prioritization of government
expenditure normally implies the reduction or, complete
elimination of subsidies on social services.
^’For a review of the theory of financial liberalization, see R.I. 
Mckinnon, Money and Capital in Economic Development (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institute, 1973), and E.S. Shaw, Financial Deepening in 
Economic Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).
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It is instructive to note that, subsidies on social 
services and other government targeted programs are normally 
instituted on behalf of the poor, and the vulnerable. The 
subliminal demand for the abrogation of such pro-poor policies 
through the streamlining of government spending, is in line 
with the philosophical caveat of classical liberalism. That 
is, as elaborated upon by F . A . Hayek, and Milton Friedman, 
social justice and other issues on equity must be reserved to 
the "moral compass" of market forces. In this case, subsidies 
and other social redistributive measures of the government 
adulterate the alleged compensatory justice of the market 
place .
As rightly observed by Peter Wilkin, these neoliberal 
policy demands are intended to "set the legitimate boundaries 
to the freest possible form of social organization, " in the 
sense that, they enhance "a perfectly functioning market 
system."95 The underlying presumption here is that, the 
extension of private power in a market-mediated politico- 
economic system is not only the best way to maximize the 
welfare of the people but also, the surest means to increase 
the wealth of distinct national economies.
While this assertions could be internally validated 
within the ontological presumptions of neoclassicism, and 
justifiable within the theoretical confines of neoliberalism.
95Peter Wilkin, "New Myths for the South: Globalization and the 
Conflict between Private Power and Freedom, " in Caroline Thomas and 
Peter Wilkin, eds., Globalization and Che South (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1997), p. 26.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 2 1
their external validity (as it will be demonstrated in 
Chapters V and VI) is contestable. However, as examined in the 
next section, what is less contestable is the logic between 
globalization and neoliberalism.
G LOE ALIZ AT I ON AND NEOLIBERALISM: EXAMINING THE FIT
What has been done so far in this Chapter is to provide 
the necessary background information to enable us examine the 
necessary fit between globalization and neoliberalism. The 
question here is : To what extent does neoliberal policies 
constitute the ideological counterpart of globalization? The 
examination of this question partially bears on the isolation 
of the main underlying demands of the new context of 
development.
Largely by design rather than by default, the resurgence 
of the classical ideals of liberalism (now with the "neo" 
prefix) was coterminous with the ascendancy of the globalist 
project. This period coincided in the late 197 0s, and the 
early 1980s with the conservative electoral victories in 
Britain (Margaret Thatcher in 197 9) and the United States 
(Ronald Reagan in 1980). Before this period, classical liberal 
ideals were in a state of ideological hibernation. The lessons 
of the Great Depression of the 1930s, Karl Polanyi’s 
demonization of unfettered market forces,96 and the post-WW II
96In his diagnostic assessment of the Great Depression, Karl 
Polanyi writes that, the "origins of the catastrophe lay in the Utopian 
endeavor of economic liberalism to set up a self-regulating market 
system." See K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, p. 140.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 2 2
Keynesian revolution97 sere factors that undermined the 
sanctimonious determinism of market forces. Among other 
things, these events helped to reduce the unexamined faith in 
classical liberalism.
Associatively, but not necessarily causatively, the 
industrialized countries, particularly the United States and 
Britain, slipped into industrial and economic recession during 
the quiescent moments of liberalism. In a characteristic post 
hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning, the global recession between 
the late 1970s and the early 1980s was, ipso facto, blamed on 
the folly of Keynesianism, and the bastardization of the 
pristine role of market forces. On the basis of this 
diagnostic assessment, the conservative electoral victories in 
the US and Britain made Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher 
ideological partners in the revamping of the underlying tenets 
of liberalism.
While Ronald Reagan preached the virtues of limited 
government with the intention of creating a wider operating 
space for market forces,98 Margaret Thatcher on the other hand 
worked on the agenda of "rolling back the frontiers of the 
state."99 Limited government, the institution of market
97The Keynesian revolution signifies the practicalization of 
Keynes's assumption that the state could intervene in the national 
economy to influence the levels of investment in order to regulate 
unemployment. See John M. Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money.
98See John Gray, False Dawn.
"cited in David Henderson, The Changing Fortunes of Economic 
Liberalism, p. 26.
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forces, and rolling back the state then became the initial 
defining characteristics of a born-again liberalism, that is, 
neoliberalism.
In the early 1980s, the ZMF and the World Bank, in their
economic reform recommendations to Third World countries, also
became converts to the new faith of neoliberalism. The
proselytization of neoliberalism then assumed the furor of an
international, ideological project. As insightfully observed
by Robert Cox,
ideological analysis is... a critic's weapon and one most 
effectively used against the prevailing orthodoxies, which when 
stripped of their putative universality, become seen as special 
pleading for historically transient but presently entrenched 
interests .100
Extrapolating from this observation, neoliberalism, in this 
case, constitutes a perfect i«deological counterpart of 
globalization. This is so because, the universalis tic claim of 
the underlying policies becomes a convenient cover for the 
penetration of international capital into distant lands, and 
for the re-vamping of recessi on-challenged capitalist 
production systems.
It is in this respect that Gordon Laxer believes that the 
hidden agenda of neoliberal policies is to remove "political 
barriers to transnationals’ mobility,"101 and in the process,
100Robert Cox, "Ideologies and the New International Economic 
Order: Some Reflections on some Recent Literature," International 
Organization, Vol. 33 (1979), p. 2.
,01Gordon Laxer, "Social Solidarity, Democracy and Global 
Capitalism," p. 293.
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enh.an.ee the prospects for the globalization of capitalism.
That is to say, at the international level, neoliberal 
policies support the ideology of global neoclassicism and thus 
provide the framework for the world-wide operation of private, 
international capital. The ability of neoliberalism to 
accomplish this feat is explained by the fact that, the 
nostalgic yearn of international capital to operate in a 
borderless, less restricted global market place is taken care 
of by some specific neoiiberal policy demands associated with 
globalization.
With its insistence on the operation of market forces, 
deregulation, privatization, and liberalization, neoliberal 
policies advocate "the destruction of all borders, barriers, 
and policies which might interfere with accumulation at the 
global space."102 As a non-negotiable policy instrument of 
neoliberalism that functions through the dynamics of the price 
mechanism, the institution of market forces is intended to 
promote the interests of private property by restricting the 
role of the state in the accumulative process. The expansion 
of market forces, in effect, reduces the operating space of 
the state.
With the role of the state restricted, market forces do 
not only offer the incentives for domestic, private 
entrepreneurial activities but also, offer the attraction to 
international investors who operate on the principle of
102M. Ould-Mey, "Global Adjustment: Implications for Peripheral 
States," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1994), p. 320.
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profits. It is instructive to take note here that, the 
efficiency of the profit lever in the direction of productive 
resources could be maximized within the framework of free 
markets. In this case, free markets provide both the "push" 
and the "pull" factors that broaden the horizon for the 
globalization of capitalist productive systems.
On the other hand, deregulation and privatization are 
both intended to increase the level of competitive efficiency 
in the economic system, and also to allow private 
entrepreneurs to be the main organizers of productive 
activities. Here again, the underlying import of these 
neoliberal policies feeds into a veritable assumption of the 
globalizing world economy. The assumption here is that, the 
private sector is more efficient than the state sector in 
direct economic activities.
Massive deregulations, and privatization of public 
corporations are now conducted within the framework of 
globalization-induced notion of economic efficiency. Prying 
beneath the facade of these requirements however indicates 
that, improving efficiency is an issue but, expanding the 
operating space for private capital is the real issue. As Gary 
Teeple puts it, these policies represent "the introduction of 
laissez-faire policies conducive to international capital, to 
competition at the international level, and to the leveling of 
conditions of national economies to standards of common
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denominator."103 That standard of economic denominator is the 
promotion of private entrepreneurship.
Trade and financial liberalization, as already noted, are 
two crystal policies of neoiiberalism. In recognition of the 
fact that the increasing flow of goods, capital, and 
technology is the cornerstone of the globalization process, 
liberalization performs an essential lubricating function. 
While the adoption of trade liberalization policies enhance 
imports and exports of goods, financial liberalization 
promotes the mobility of investible funds, and as a result, 
facilitate the transfer of technology.
The liberalization requirement, among other things, 
provides the framework for surmounting some of the previous 
restrictions that reduced the flow of goods, capital, and 
technology on a wider scale. In this case, the much touted 
globalization of trade and finance would have been a hollow 
glorification without the increasing adoption of trade and 
financial liberalization by a growing number of countries. 
Gravitation toward liberalization was (is) not an inevitable 
process. As the next Chapter (IV) demonstrates in the case of 
SSA, the adoption of neoliberal policies was enforced through 
specific conditionalities and the manipulation of financial 
disbursements.
The emerging scenario indicates that, specific neoliberal 
policies synchronize very well with the imperatives of
I03Gary Teeple, Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform,
p. 70.
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globalization, and the internationalization of capitalism. If 
we are to rely on the explanatory power of similes, then, 
nuclear deterrent was to the Cold War as the policy arsenal of 
neoliberalism is to globalization. While communism was 
"contained" in the former, there is an attempt in the latter 
to globalize capitalism through the ideological weapon of 
neoliberalism. As a result, neoliberal policies transmute into 
the ideological handmaiden of globalization. Therefore, going 
beyond its normative framework, the universalistic appeal of 
neoliberal policies serves to hide the conscious, ideological 
proselytization of the particularistic interests of a 
globalizing international, private capital.
Expanding the possibilities for the global accumulation 
of international capital confines unsuspecting countries 
within the universalizing crosscurrents of the neoliberal 
agenda. In this penetrating framework, "the functions of the 
state become re-organized to adjust domestic and social 
policies to fit the exigencies of the global market and global 
capitalist accumulation."104
In other words, the new context of development is a 
derivative of the re-generative requirements of a globalizing 
capital. In this regard, the underlying demands of this new 
context of development find meaning within the imperatives of 
globalization and its associated neoliberal hegemonic
104Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Postcolonial World- The 
New Political Economy of Development, p. 67.
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framework. This new framework is well put by John W. Sewell,
the President of the Overseas Development Council. He writes.
From a development perspective, the key challenge for decision 
makers is to design and adopt a set of policies that will ensure 
their countries can seine the opportunities created by- 
globalization, so that people- and particularly poor people-can 
benefit from integration into the globalized economy, while at the 
same time can be protected from the inevitable costs that flow 
from rapid economic, social and political change.105
As the quotation above indicates, the new context of
development involves the adoption of neoliberal policies that
will enable countries to tap into the opportunities offered by
globalization; opportunities that come along with some
inevitable costs. The next Chapter (IV) examines the processes
by which SSA was incorporated into the globalization-induced,
and neoliberalism-defined development framework.
105Dani Rodrik, The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: 
Making Openness Work (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 
1999), p. vii, italics added.
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C H APTER  I V
NEOLIBERALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF SSA: THE 
PATH OF INCORPORATION
In Chapter III, neoliberaiism was identified, as the main 
ideological handmaiden of globalization. It was also noted in 
the concluding section of the previous Chapter that, the 
imperatives of globalization, and the policy demands of 
neoliberalism, in a multiplicative manner, define the new 
political economy of development. As a logical follow up, this 
Chapter (IV) examines a specific question: How does the 
adoption of neoliberal policies incorporate SSA into the 
ideological framework of globalization?
The intention here is to examine how SSA came to identify 
its development efforts with the logic of the globalizing 
economy. Therefore, this Chapter will examine the convoluted, 
and at times, controversial path by which SSA was incorporated 
into the imperatives of globalization through the adoption 
(others claim imposition) , and implementation of neoliberal 
policies .
This Chapter demonstrates how the incorporation of SSA 
into the developmental context of neoliberalism is justified 
within the diagnostic assessment of, and policy prescriptions 
offered to address the economic crisis in the sub-region. This 
occurred between the late 1970s and the early 1980s. The 
justification of the "v.usdom" of incorporation, the definition 
of the means of incorporation, and the enforcement of the 
process of incorporation were all conducted within the 
framework of the developmental crisis in SSA.
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DIAGNOSIS AND PRESCRIPTION: JUSTIFYING THE WISDOM OF
INCORPORATION
Tills section examines how the underlying "wisdom" of the 
incorporation of SSA into the ideological framework of 
globalization was justified on the basis of issues relating to 
the developmental crisis in the sub-region. First, the nature 
of the crisis between the late 1970s and the early 1980s will 
be cursorily reviewed in an attempt to isolate its peculiar 
dimensions. After that, the two competing debates over 
developmental strategy in response to the crisis will be 
isolated and examined. The final part of this section 
examines how the logic of Stabilization and Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs) emerged from the ashes of the debate to 
justify the "wisdom" of SSA' s incorporation into the new 
development orthodoxy associated with globalization.
The Nature of the Crisis
In its 1990 assessment of the economic conditions in 
Africa, the World Bank concludes that "the economic outlook 
for A.frica is potentially devastating yet, there are no quick 
fixes, no simple blue prints."1 In spite of this gloomy 
picture, it is instructive to note however that the economic 
prospects for SSA were not congenitally bleak. Nevertheless, 
hopes and expectations at the time of independence gradually 
degenerated into fear and despair as a result of a complex
1 World Bank, World Development Report, 1990, p. 2.
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admixture between debilitating external, and constraining 
internal factors.
Subscribing to the post-independence development 
orthodoxy of the day, most countries in SSA embarked upon 
purposeful, comprehensive development programs. As reviewed in 
Chapter II, strenuous developmental efforts were conducted 
under the tenets of the modernization theory, the dependency 
alternative, and the reformist response with its special 
emphasis on poverty alleviation. To some appreciable extent, 
the post-independence, state-assisted development process paid 
off. The "average annual per capita growth rate between 1965 
and 1973 was 2.9 percent, which was not far below the overall 
figure for low-income countries of 3.3 percent."2
Beginning from the late 1970s, these developmental gains 
began to be undermined by the crash in primary commodity 
prices, adverse terms of trade, falling foreign investment, 
and rising external debts.3 These problems were further 
aggravated by the 1973-1974 and 1979-1980 oil crises that sent 
the economies of SSA into a sharp downward spiral. The 
compendium effect of such adverse developments was that, by 
the early 1980s, SSA was in a severe economic crisis.
2Michael Chege, “Sub-Saharan Africa: Underdevelopment’s Last 
Stand,” in Barbara Stallings, ed. , Global Change, Regional Response: The 
New International Context of Development (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), p. 312.
3See T. Parfitt and S. Riley, "The International Politics of 
African Debt," pp. 1-17.
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Table 4.1
SS.A-Some Macro-Economic Indicators, 1980- 1983
1980 1981 1982 1983
Average Annual Growth 
(Percentacre Points) 
Gross National Income 4.2 5.3 2.5 3 .4 (
Gross Domestic Product 3.8 2.2 1.4 0 .9 (
Contribution to GDP Growth 
(Percentacre Points) 
Agriculture 0.7 1
ino 1.1 1 .2 (
Indus try 1.6 0.4 0.2(-) 0 .8 (•
Gross Domestic Investment 4.5 2.4 4.2(-) 2 .4 (
(Percentacre of GDP) 
Current Account Balance 7.9{-) 1
o(NH 1inCO 1CO00H
Source: Adapted from the World Bank, World Development Tables, 1994, 
p p . 14-70.
As indicated in Table 4.1 above, there were deteriorating 
trends in some of the major macro-economic indicators in SSA 
from 1980 to 1983.
While the percentage average annual growth of Gross 
National Income (GNI) declined from 4.2 in 1980 to negative 
3.4 in 1983, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) decreased from 
3.8 to negative 0.9 during the same period. The contributions 
of agriculture, industry, and Gross Domestic Investment (GDI) 
to GDP declined in 1983 from their positive levels in 1980. 
Among other things, these downward trends account for the
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negative growth of the current account balance as a percentage 
of GDP. Deficits in the current account balance in turn 
impacted negatively on the total debt stock of the sub-region.
Table 4.2
SSA-Total Debt Stock (EDT), 1970 and 1980
1970 1980
(In Billions of USS)
Long-term Debt
Public and Publicly Guaranteed 5.7 53 .9
Private Non-Guaranteed 0.3 4.6
Use of IMF Credit 0.1 3.0
Short--term debt - 22 .6
Total Debt Stock (EDT) 6.1 84 .1
Source: Adapted from the World Bank, Global Development Finance, Vol. 1: 
Analysis and Summary Tables (Washing-ton, DC: The World Bank, 1997a),
p. 202.
A conspicuous manifestation of the growing economic crisis in 
SSA during the early 1980s was the sub-region's burgeoning 
total debt stock. As shown in TablLe 4.2 above, this increased 
from USS 6.1 billion in 1970 to USS 84.1 billion in 1980.
As a result of a low international credit rating, private 
lending to SSA was substantially lower than assistance from 
major public international institutions, especially the World 
Bank. This explains why the propozrtion of public guaranteed 
debt is greater than that of private non-guaranteed debts 
(Table 4.2). In terms of its absoILute size, the total debt
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scock of SSA was not substantial in comparison with Latin 
America during the crisis period of the 1980s.4
Table 4.3
SSA.-Debt Indicators, 1980 and 1989
1980 1989
(Percentacre Rat io)
EDT/XGS 91.7 238.9
EDT/GNP 30.6 69.3
TDS/XGS 9.8 18.0
INT/XGS 6.2 9.5
Kev
EDT/XGS = Total debt stock as a percentage of total exports.
EDT/GNP = Total debt stock as a percentage of GNP.
TDS/XGS = Total debt service as a percentage of total exports
service ratio).
INT/XGS = Total interest payment as percentage of total expor
(interest service ratio).
Source: Adapted from the World Bank, Globa.! Development Finance, Vol. 2: 
Country Tables (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1997b) , p. 38.
However, Table 4.3 above indicates that, the capacity for 
servicing the debt in terms of foreign exchange requirement 
and output forgone imposed a severe burden on the sub-region's 
economy. For instance, the total debt stock as a percentage of 
total exports of goods and services increased from 91.7
4See Dharam Ghai and Cynthia H. de Alcantara, "The Crisis of the 
1980s in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean: An Overview, " in
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percent in 1980 to 238.9 percent in 1989. This means that by 
1989, the total debt stock of SSA was more than twice the 
total proceeds from exports. Also, the debt service ratio
(TDS/XGS), and the interest service ratio (INT/XGS) increased
spectacularly from their 1980 levels (Table 4.3).
The selected macro-economic indicators above show that, 
by the beginning of the 1980s, SSA was in a severe economic 
crisis. While there were precipitous declines in GNI and GDP, 
there were negative growth rates in agriculture, industry, and 
gross domestic investment in proportion to GDP (Table 4.1).
The total debt stock increased dramatically (Table 4.2), and 
the cost of debt servicing and interest payments were exacting 
heavy tolls on the economic capacity of the sub-region (Table
4.3) . The need for a responsive strategy in the face of the
economic downturn captured the attention of both internal 
policy makers, and external financiers.
The Debate Over Strategy
During the annual meeting of the World Bank and the IMF 
in Belgrade in 1979, African governors asked the World Bank to 
prepare a "special program of action" in response to the 
African economic crisis.5 In the interim, a summit held by 
African Heads of States and Governments in April 1980 in 
Lagos, adopted a comprehensive development program popularly
Dharam Ghai, ed. , The IMF and the South: The Social Impact of Crisis and 
Adjustment (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1991), pp. 13-42.
5Carol Lancaster, "The World Bank in Africa Since 1980: The 
Politics of Structural Adjustment Lending,” in D. Kapur, J.P. Lewis, and 
R. Webb, eds . , The World Bank, Its First Half Century, Volume 2: 
Perspectives (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), p.
167 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
136
referred Co as c'ne Lagos Plan cf Action (LPA) .6 Still
rationalizing within the state-centric framework of
development, and quite oblivious to the emerging wind of
change, the LPA called for self-reliance, and self-sustaining
development that is predicated upon the interventionist roles
of the state. This prescription was based on the premise that
Africa [was] directly exploited during the colonial period and 
for the past two decades; this exploitation has been carried out 
through neo-colonialist external forces which seek to influence 
the economic policies and directions of African States.7
In both spirit and content, the diagnosis of the crisis, and
policy prescriptions offered by the LPA was a simple rehash of
the underlying tenets of dependency theory. That is, the
developmental crisis in Africa is an externally generated
pattern of maldevelopment. Therefore, the promotion of a
development process that insulates the region from the
vagaries of the international system is the only viable
solution.
Contemplation about the workability of the LPA document 
took an unanticipated defensive twist with the late 1981 
publication of a World Bank study on the crisis in Africa, 
entitled, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Agenda for Action.8 True to its promise to a request made by
6See The Organization of African Unity (OAU) , Lagos Plan of Action 
for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980-2000 (Geneva: International 
Institute for Labor Studies, 1982).
7Ibid., p . 3.
sSee the World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: An Agenda for Action.
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the African governors in 1979, the World Bank’s document, 
popularly referred to as the Berg Report,9 sought to formulate 
both the crisis and solution to the developmental predicament 
of SSA. The diagnostic assessment of the Berg report turned 
the analysis of the LPA document on its head. Reflecting on 
the diagnostic assessment of the Berg report in comparison 
with the LPA document, one African official remarked 
humorously that, "we asked for bread and they chucked a stone 
at us.”10 What the official failed to realize was that, one 
cannot ask for "bread" from a warehouse stuck with "stones."
For, in contrast to the LPA document, the Berg report 
approached the diagnosis of, and prescriptions to the economic 
crisis from a more robust and free competitive market 
oriented, comparative advantage-inspired, neoliberal world 
view. Operating within such an a priori conviction, the report 
argues that, internally generated constraints, "mismanagement" 
of the national economy in terms of overvalued exchange rates, 
and "excessive” intervention in the economy by national 
governments inhibits growth and development in SSA.11
Arguing within the ontological purity of neoclassicism, 
it was (is) the contention of the World Bank that these 
"distortions," acting as extraneous variables, undermine the
9The document was named after Elliot Berg who was the coordinator 
of the World Bank’s African Strategy Review Group that produced the 
Accelerated Development report.
l0Cited in Reginald H. Green, "The IMF and the World Bank in 
Africa: How Much Learning? “ in Thomas M. Callaghy and John Ravenhill. 
eds. , Hemmed In: Africa's Economic Decline (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), p. 56.
1'World Bank, Accelerated Development, p. 27.
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allocative efficiency of market forces.12 That is to say, 
contrary to the recommendations advanced by the LPA document, 
the solution to the African crisis is situated in the 
perfection of market forces rather than in the perpetuation of 
state-centric approaches to development. Unleashing markets 
within the framework of Structural Adjustment Programs 
(hereafter referred to as SAPs) then became the centerpiece of 
the policy prescriptions advocated by the Berg report.
In recognition of the fact that the diagnostic assessment 
of the Berg report differs from that of the LPA, a long 
wandering debate over strategy emerged between the World Bank 
and the African group within the United Nations. While the 
World Bank defended the underlying tenets of the Berg report 
in its subsequent publications,13 the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA) in 1989 counteracted with a 
release of a new document. Entitled the African Alternative 
Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio- 
Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) ,14 the document 
advocated an alternative strategy to SAPs.
12Ibid.
13In chronological order, some of the publications of the World 
Bank include: Sub-Saharan Africa: Progress Report on Debt Prospects and 
Progress (1983); Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A 
Joint Progress of Action (19S4); Africa's Adjustment and Growth in the 
1980s (1989a); Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth 
(1989b); and Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead 
(1994a).
14See the ECA, African Alternative Framework to Structural 
Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation 
(Addis Ababa: ECA, 1989) .
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Ridiculing the short-cerm, monetarisc approach of che 
World Bank, che AAF-SAP documenc adopced a long-cerm, 
comprehensive approach co che African crisis. Concemplacing 
Chac SAPs are concerned with short-cerm macroeconomic 
adjuscmencs co Che neglecc of long-cerm developmenc issues,
Che AAF-SAP argues for adjuscmenc wich deep-seaCed 
cransformacion. Specifically, Che documenc insisCs chac che 
markecisacion and liberalization premises of Che World Bank 
may be valid in well-scruccured economies. In Che view of che 
AAF-SAP, che premises of markecizacion and liberalizacion will 
not be necessarily valid in African economies characCerized by 
weak and disarciculace scrucCures unless Chey are combined 
wich scruccural cransformacion of che African economies.15 
Such scruccural cransformacion hinges on reducing dependence 
of African economies on unconcroliable excernal faccors 
through Che pursuic of endogenously decermined developmenc 
processes .16
While the AAF-SAP analysis merely rearticulaces Che 
underlying premises of Che LPA documenc, che World Bank was 
recalcicrant wich its insistence on the promotion of economic 
reforms in SSA that will eliminate distortions caused by 
excessive govemmenc incervention. As the World Bank further 
delineates in a different context, the removal of these 
distortions will help establish outward-oriented, market
1;3Ibid., pp. i-iii.
l6Ibid., pp. 30-31.
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mediated, flexible structures and incentives. This in a sense 
requires
unleashing markets so that competition can help improve the 
allocation of economic resources, . -.it also requires getting 
prices right and creating a climate that allows businesses to 
respond to those signals in ways that increase returns to 
investment. 17
With the unleashing of markets as the cornerstone of the World 
Bank's approach to the economic crisis in Africa, and with the 
insistence of ECA on endogenous, self-reliant, structural 
reforms, the debate over strategy became increasingly 
polarized, and irreconcilable.
W h y  Did SAPs Emerge Victorious?
Caught within the endless debate between the World Bank 
and the ECA were dispirited countries in SSA that were in need 
of a strategy that is backed by the necessary finance. While 
the LPA and the AAF-SAP agendas were not backed by the 
necessary financial means, the World Bank could however count 
on its financial largesse in the promotion of SAPs. SSA was 
therefore confronted with a dilemma. The frustrating dilemma 
that confronted leaders in SSA during the 1980s could be 
understood if we are to isolate financial backing as the main 
independent variable in the debate over strategy.
Leaders in the sub-region were compelled to either 
accept an exogenously determined, economic reform program with 
substantial financial backing or, continue to toy with an
17World Bank, Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, And the Road 
Ahead, p. 61.
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endogenous agenda Chat is financially hamstrung. There was 
therefore an inevitable trade-off between the procurement of 
external funding and the exercise of autonomy in decision­
making. The painful reality was that SSA could not have it 
both ways. Confronted with declining economies and an ever 
increasing debt burden, leaders in SSA were able to solve the 
dilemma even before the debate over strategy wound down. That 
is, "by 1989, 3 5 sub-Saharan countries had adopted structural
adjustment programmes ...”18
Quite apart from its financial appeal, SAPs emerged 
victorious because the program was in tune with the emerging 
conservative philosophy of the early 1980s.19 As previously 
alluded to in Chapter III, associated with the conservative 
electoral victories in the United States and Britain was a 
concealed ideology of "rolling back big government"20 by 
strengthening the invisible hands of market forces. A closer 
review of the World Bank's 1981 Berg report (and its 
subsequent publications) indicates that the diagnosis of, and 
prescriptions to SSA’s economic crisis was inadvertently 
colored by the new conservative thinking.
On the other hand, with the insistence on the increasing 
role of the state, the LPA and the AAF-SAP analyses were
18Richard Sandbrook, "Economic Crisis, Structural Adjustment and 
the State in Sub-Saharan Africa," in Dharam Ghai, ed. , The IMF and the 
South: The Social Impact of Crisis and Adjustment (London: Zed Books 
Ltd., 1991), p. 95.
l9See Walden Bello (with Shea Cunningham and Bill Rau) , Dark 
Victory: The United States, Structural Adjustment and Global Poverty 
(London: Pluto Press, 1994), especially Chapter 4.
20Ibid., p. 19.
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caught in a time-warp between the de-legitimating development 
ideology of the past, and the legitimating development 
ideology of the future. In this case, quite apart from the 
lack of financial backing, the LPA and the AAF-SA.P options did 
not emerge attractive because the underlying premises were 
rationalized within a lingering ideology of the past. On the 
other hand, quite apart from the financial attraction, SAPs 
emerged victorious because the underlying premises 
synchronized with the emerging consensus on neoliberalism; an 
ideological counterpart of globalization. In this case, SAPs 
emerged from the assessment of the economic crisis to provide 
the justification for the incorporation of SSA into the 
"wisdom" of the new development orthodoxy associated with 
globalization.
SAPs AND NEOLIBERAL POLICIES: DEFINING THE MEANS OF
INCORPORATION
The previous section has demonstrated how SAPs emerged 
victorious from the debate over strategy to justify the case 
for the identification of the development process in the sub- 
region with the ideological imperatives of the emerging 
development orthodoxy. To proceed with the examination of the 
question set in this Chapter, this section extends the 
examination of the meaning, and implications of SAPs. The 
intention here is to demonstrate that neoliberal policies 
underlying SAPs provide the means for the incorporation of SSA 
into the globalizing world economy.
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SAPs: Meaning- and Implications
To understand the meaning of SAPs in their application to 
SSA requires a cursory review of some international events 
that preceded the publication of the World Bank's 1981 
Accelerated Development. As rightly hinted by M. Ould-Mey,
SAPs as applied in Africa relate more to the global strategy 
of adjustment than to the developmental prerogatives of 
developing countries.21 The understanding of some of the major 
issues that impinge on the "global strategy of adjustment" 
will, in this case, illuminate the real meaning and 
implications of SAPs in the context of SSA.
As a result of a complex admixture of several factors, 
the world economy was in severe crisis by the end of the 
1970s, and the beginning of the 1980s. The oil price increases 
imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) in 1973, and in 1979/80 precipitated inflationary 
pressures especially in the oil-importing countries of the 
West.22 Attempts to control such inflationary pressures 
through deflationary measures led to large increases in 
unemployment and the depression of domestic demand. Growing 
unemployment, and declining domestic demand contributed to a 
growing world-wide economic recession. Meanwhile, the post-WW 
II Keynesian revolution that allowed countries to pursue
21 See M. Ould-Mey, "Global Adjustment: Implications for Peripheral 
States."
22See John F. Weeks, "Losers Pay Reparations, Or How The Third 
World Lost The Lending War,” in John F. Weeks, ed. , Debt Disaster?: 
Banks, Governmencs and Multilaterals Confront The Crisis (New York: New 
York University Press, 1389), pp. 41-63.
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nationalistic policies behind, protective walls undermines the
ability co tackle the world-wide recession from an
internationalist perspective.
In response to the economic crisis, the group of seven
industrialized countries (G-7) attempted to devise a global
strategy of coordination and cooperation. The Economic
Declaration of Rambouiilet issued during the first G-7 summit
in France in 1975 warned against "a return to protectionism,"
encouraged the industrialized countries "to pursue policies
which will permit the expansion of world trade.” The
Declaration also demanded the utilization of "the IMF and
other international fora in making urgent improvements in
international arrangements for the stabilization" of less
developed countries.23
The need to stabilize the world economy, especially that
of the developing countries, was also the main agenda during
the G-7 meeting in Puerto Rico in 1976.24 In line with the
stabilization objective, the G-7 summit in 1977
began to spell out the strategy of lending money in exchange for 
policy changes, and agreed in principle that additional resources 
be provided for the IMF and the World Bank to permit their 
lending to rise in real terms. Instructions were chen given to 
these institutions to work together and consult with other 
developed countries in exploring how the details of this strategy 
could be best articulated.—
23Quotations cited in M. Ould-Mey, "Global Adjustments:
Implications for Peripheral States," p. 322.
24Ibid.
25Ibid., p. 322.
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Responding co che inscruccions of che 1977 G-7 summic meeCing 
in London, che World Bank began ics annual publicacion of che 
World Developmenc Report series in 1973, wich subsequenc 
chemes cencered on che growing incerdependence among nacions, 
and che need for global solucions of adjuscmenc co che world­
wide economic recession. Indeed, che firsc Chapcer of che 1980 
reporc was encicled "Adjuscmenc and Growch in che 1980s. ”2r’ 
Wich adjuscmenc as che new buzzword, Che 1980 G-7 summic 
meecing in Venice moved co endorse chis new scracegy wich a 
Declaracion which, in pare, reads, "We welcome Che Bank’s 
innovacive lending scheme for scruccural adjuscmenc.”27
The forgoing hiscorical accouncs indicace chac che need 
for a global scracegy of adjuscmenc in response Co che 
economic recession chac begun in che lace 197 0s was an 
approach chac was inicially engineered by che indusCrialized 
councries. The World Bank and che IMF were (are) merely Che 
main agent provocateurs. As already noced, a group of African 
governors in 197 9 asked che World Bank co assess che crisis in 
Africa and Che Bank responded wich ics Berg reporc chac 
recommended Che adopcion and implemencacion of SAPs.
In chis case, Che governors were unknowingly requescing 
for an original version of a constitucional blueprinc chac 
lacer was revised inco a series of volumes used co juscify che 
concinuing incorporaCion of SSA inco che imperacives of a
-6See che World Bank, World Development Report, 1980.
27Cited in M. Ould-Mey, "Global Adjustment: Implications for 
Peripheral States," p. 322.
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globalized solution to the crisis of capitalist accumulation. 
On this note, it seems as if the nature of the African crisis, 
and the appropriate response was already formatted even before 
the governors made their request in 1979. And that 
prestructured format was SAPs.
Prestructured in the sense that, in its diagnostic 
assessments of the African crisis, the Bank normally glosses 
over crucial, external debilitating factors and considers them 
as inconsequential in their effects. For instance, in an 
ahistorical view of events, external constraining factors, 
such as declining terms of trade, are in the calculations of 
the World Bank "surmountable obstacles"28 in the sense that, 
the
external environment for Sub-Saharan Africa worsened only slightly 
between the early 1970s and the mid-1980s, because the increase in 
external transfers partly offset the income loss from 
deterioration in the terms of trade.29
What the WTorid Bank fails to consider in this assessment is
that, in SSA, losses in export earnings due to declining terms
of trade increased from US$ 0.4 billion in 1981 to US$ 4
billion in 1985.30 Quite apart from the direct effects of such
income deprivation, the so-called external transfers are not
philanthropic stipends. In reality, the external transfers are
28World Bank, Adjustment in Africa.• Reforms, Results, And the Road 
Ahead, p. 26.
29Ibid., p. 28.
30Cited in Karamo N.M. Sonko, "Debt in the Eye of the Storm: The 
African Crisis in a Global Context," Africa Today, (4th Quarter, 1990), 
pp. 18-19.
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dollar denominated loans (debts) chac concinue co accrue 
incerescs. The principal muse be amorcized, and che ineerescs 
muse be serviced.
Ic is inscruccive co cake noce here chac, during che 
"recycling" of pecrodollars becween 1973-1979, govemmencs in 
SSA, in cheir shoresighced calculacions, borrowed beyond cheir 
means. This was made possible because, awashed wich funds from 
Che oil exporcing councries, incemacional banks and ocher 
lending inscicucions lenc wichouc che slighcesc modicum of 
financial responsibilicy. Since che loans were dollar 
denominaced, Che increase in inheresc race in che Uniced 
SCaCes during che recession years becween Che lace 1970s and 
Che early 1980s meanc an increased cose in borrowing and debe 
servicing .31
IC is noc surprising that wich decerioracing cerms of 
Crade, che debc posicion of che sub-region (Tables 4.2 and
4.3) worsened dramahically becween che early 1970s and che 
mid-1980s. Debilicacing as ehey mighc be, Che World Bank 
considers excemal faccors such as che impaccs of worsening 
Cerms of crade as "surmouncable obscacles" in che 
developmencal crisis of SSA.
Wich excemal conscraining faccors presumed surmouncable, 
Che Bank's prescripcion for che developmenc of SSA assumes Che 
form of a scandard package of SAPs. As a model, SAPs are 
scruccured wichin Che orchodox view of neoclassical economics
31 For a comprehensive review of how the "recycling" of 
petrodollars and the recession in the US contributed to the growth of 
Third World debts, see John F. Weeks, “Losers Pay Reparations, or How 
the Third World Lost the Lending War."
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that places preponderant emphasis on the efficiency of free 
markets and private producers, and the benefits of 
international trade and competition. According to the 
perspective of neoclassicism, free markets and free trade are 
the best means for achieving perfect macroeconomic equilibrium 
in distorted economies. The implication here is that,
national economies should be adjusted so that they will 
automatically respond to the incentives and adapt to the 
imperatives of the global market in an attempt to homogenize 
the law of value worldwide.3-
In this case, SAPs were not specifically tailored to the
developmental needs of SSA. They were a derivative of the
world-wide economic recession in the 197 0s "which opened the
door to an essentially Western strategy of global adjustment
focused on dismantling nationalistic policies and opening new
markets in the South and the East.”33
Dismantling nationalistic policies while subscribing to
the law of the market circumscribe the incorporation of
hitherto autonomous regions into the logic of the emerging
global discipline. By implication, the associated policies of
SA.Ps are therefore intended to transform SSA into a
borderless, open economic territory. This is essential in
order to bring the sub-region within the operating space of
the re-articulating processes of global capitalism. Neoliberal
policies underlying SAPs, in effect, define the means for such
incorporation.
3-M. Ould-Mey, "Global Adjustment," p."319.
33Ibid., p. 321.
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Neoliberal Policies and Incorporation
The forgoing analysis indicates that, beneath the veneer 
of the Word Bank’s attempts to diagnose the development crisis 
in SSA (was) is a hidden agenda. In direct relation to the 
need for an international adjustment, the unstated agenda 
(was) is to prescribe solutions that will incorporate the sub- 
region within the imperatives of a globalizing world economy 
through the adoption and implementation of neoliberal policies 
underlying SAPs. That neoliberal policies, euphemistically 
dubbed as the "Washington Consensus,”34 define the means of 
incorporation is not far fetched.
As already noted in Chapter III, classical liberalism 
provides the philosophical and theoretical traditions of 
neoliberal policies. However, the underlying analytical 
concepts are deeply entrenched within neoclassical economics. 
Therefore, the original neoliberal policy consensus underlying 
SAPs find meaning within the ontological dynamics of 
neoclassicism. True to their theoretical tradition, and 
reflective of their conceptual background, the underlying 
import of these policies is to free prices and markets from 
the influence of the state.
In the specific context of SSA, there are several 
discernible neoliberal policy demands under a standard package
34John Williamson considers the underlying neoliberal policies of 
SAPs as “Washington Consensus" in view of the fact that the policies 
approximate the conventional -wisdom among the economically influential 
gurus within the US government and the international financial 
institutions. See John Williamson, "Democracy and the 'Washington 
Consensus' ."
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of scabilizacion and adjuscmenc. A closer look ac chese 
policies reveals how, direcclv or indireccly, cheir
implemencaCion serves as che means for che incorporaCion of 
SSA inco che emerging? global markec discipline. Conspicuous 
among chese policies is che demand for crade liberalizacion. 
This involves Che min_imizaCion (or removal) of all 
resCricCions chac imp*ede che free flow of imporcs and exporcs.
In recognicion c=f che face chac incemacional crade is 
reinforced by a permissive financial syscem, an associaced 
demand is Che need for financial liberalizacion. The ulcimaee 
objeccive of financia 1 liberalizacion is Che reduccion of all 
rescraincs on Che mob-iliCy of capical so chac inceresc races 
could be decermined b=y markec forces in che long run. Trade 
and financial liberalizacion are cherefore incended co inscill 
a non-discriminacory, global markec place co enhance che
incernacional flow of goods, capical, and cechnology. In chis
case, subscripcion Co an unexamined logic of liberalizacion
provides che means Ch_rough which che economies of SSA become 
exposed co che global. markec discipline.
In che wisdom otf neoclassical economics, governmenc 
regulacion in che corrporaCe field scifles compecicion, and 
innovacion. As an anczidoce, deregulacion, as a neoliberal 
policy requiremenc, is a vericable componenC of SAPs. Under 
deregulacion, governm-encs are expecced co "abolish regulaCions 
chac impede Che encry- of new firms or resCricc compecicion, 
and ensure chac all sregulacions are juscified by. . .prudencial
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supervision of financial institutions.”35 Simply put, 
governments should avoid excessive regulation of the corporate 
sector in order to create a substantial space to be regulated 
by market forces.
Deregulation of the economy is normally related to 
another neoliberal policy requirement associated with the 
privatization of public corporations. This normally involves 
the "transfer" of state-owned enterprises to the private 
sector through outright sale or, the offering of stock shares 
to the general public. While the main justifications for 
privatization "tend to be the increase in efficiency, 
productivity, or competition, ... it has not been shorn that 
privatization has effectively contributed to any of these 
factors . ”36
That this is the case is not far fetched. Consistent with 
the methodological individualism of classical liberalism that 
equates freedom with less government intervention, 
deregulation and privatization have become the major means for 
de-nationalizing the economy in order to enhance both domestic 
and international private economic initiatives. De­
nationalization of the economy through deregulation and 
privatization therefore exposes the productive assets of SSA 
to the calculations of capitalist accumulation at the global 
level. With the accomplishment: of such a basic incorporative
3-John Williamson, "Democracy and the ’Washington Consensus’," 
p. 1333.
36Gary Teeple, Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform 
(Toronto: Garamond Press, 1995), p. 91.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
152
function, increases in efficiency, productivity, or 
competition pale in significance.
Directly associated with deregulation and privatization 
is the demand for the promotion of foreign direct investment. 
With this demand, "barriers impeding the entry of foreign 
firms should be abolished; foreign and domestic firms should 
be allowed to compete on equal terms.”37 Specific policies in 
this direction include the adoption of liberal investment 
codes with guarantees for the repatriation of profits, and 
with provisions against the nationalization of foreign assets. 
These provisions are normally accentuated with the promotion 
of private property rights. Liberal investment codes and the 
promotion of private property rights provide a permissive, 
investment environment for the attraction of international 
capital. With the promotion of foreign direct investment 
through these measures, the investment opportunities of SSA 
are exposed to the mercy of global capital that operates 
strictly according to the profit principle, rather than to the 
developmental prerogatives of the sub-region.
Central to SAPs is the insistence on the adoption of 
"competitive exchange rate that will bolster exports by making 
them cheaper abroad. "3S In the specific context of SSA, this 
demand translates into the implementation of currency 
devaluation. Simply put, devaluation increases the price of
37John Williamson, “Democracy and the 'Washington Consensus’," 
p. 1333.
38Moises Naim, "Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion?" 
Foreign Policy, (Spring 2000), p. 89.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
153
imports, and decreases che price of exports. It is therefore
expected "to stimulate the expansion and diversification of
exports by raising their prices in terms of domestic currency,
and to expand their market share in the international market
by lowering their prices."39 With the exception of Ethiopia,
Liberia and Rwanda, all states in SSA had devalued by the end
of the 1980s.40
In recognition of the fact that the price elasticity of
demand for SSA's primary commodities is extremely low,
devaluation does not necessarily lead to increasing volume
(and value) of exports from the sub-region. On the contrary,
as empirically examined by K. Mengisteab,
Attempts by a large number of countries to increase the 
volume of their exports through devaluation has worsened over­
supply of primary commodities in the world market, culminating in 
the fall in their prices. Thus, contrary to increasing the volume 
and thus earnings of exports, devaluation results in the loss of 
export earnings...4l
It is partially in recognition of such defeatist results that
T.M. Callaghy and J. Ravenhill argue that devaluation is a
neoliberal strategy that intends to get SSA. "back to the
future" by "rehabilitating primary product export economies
and making them work properly..."42 In other words,
39Kidane Mengisteab, “Devaluation: The Response of Exports and 
Imports," in Kidane Mengisteab and B. Ikubolajeh Logan, eds., Beyond 
Economic Liberalization in Africa (London: Zed Books, 1995), 
p p . 106-107.
40Ibid., p . 106.
41Ibid., p. 117.
42T.M. Callaghy and J. Ravenhill, “How Hemmed In?: Lessons and 
Prospects of Africa's Responses to Decline," in T.M. Callaghy and John
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devaluation serves to deepen the incorporation of SSA into the 
new international division of labor (IDL) associated with the 
emerging global order by rejuvenating the primary product 
exporting functions of the sub-region.
Finally, the observance of fiscal discipline, and the 
prioritization of government expenditure are formidable 
neoliberal policy demands under SAPs. The former is to ensure 
that the government does not over-spend and finance the 
deficits through inflation-inducing measures. Inflation, 
according to the logic of neoliberalism, impacts negatively on 
both domestic and foreign investment initiatives. The latter, 
on the other hand, involves the elimination of subsidies on 
social services, the de-controlling of prices, and the shift 
in government expenditure from direct economic activities to 
the provision of basic infrastructural projects.
The ultimate objective of the observance of fiscal 
discipline is the procurement of a "non-threatening" 
macroeconomic environment for investment. The essence of the 
prioritization of public expenditure is to enable the 
government to reduce its expenditure on social and other 
economic services. Funds that become available are then used 
for the promotion of auxiliary, infrastructural projects that 
enhance the operation of markets and private business 
undertakings. Together, the underlying import of fiscal 
discipline and prioritization of public expenditure is to 
nurture the economies of SSA to be prospective units of the
Revenhill, eds. , Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 524.
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global economy that operates on the principles of market
efficiency, and are predicated upon the dynamics of private
and corporate activities.
To recapitulate, by narrowing the parameters of the
legitimate activities of the state, neoliberal policies
provide the means for the incorporation of SSA into the larger
ideological realm of globalization. The hidden agenda of the
neoliberal policies under SAPs is succinctly summarized by
Gary Teeple. He writes:
They are the policy side of the “new reality"; they represent 
the political requirements of capital internationalized, highly 
centralized and global in perspective. They also represent the 
last national policies to be promulgated, the final act of the 
independent nation-state, because with their acceptance the 
economic and political barriers to production and distribution 
around the world will have been minimized. With their adoption 
they will have in effect harmonized the national with the 
global economy.43
That is to say, neoliberal policies provide the procedural 
mechanism through which distinct national economies in SSA are 
neutralized by the common denominator of the global economy.
By providing the means for the incorporation of distinct 
national economies into the logic of capitalist accumulation, 
neoliberal policies, in effect, transmute the "capitalist 
world economy" into a "world capitalist economy."44
43Gary Teeple, Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform,
p. 75.
44Ibid., p . 63.
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STRUCTURAL- ADJUSTMENT LOANS (SALS) AND CONDITIONALITY: 
ENFORCING THE PROCESS OF INCORPORATION
As examined in the first section of this Chapter, the 
wisdom of incorporation is justified within the framework of 
the diagnostic assessment of the developmental crisis in SSA. 
The second section also argued that the means of incorporation 
are defined by the standard package of neoliberal policies 
underlying SAPs. As a follow up, this section intends to 
demonstrate that the process of incorporation is enforced 
through the conditionalities attached to the disbursement of 
funds associated with SAPs.
The funds accompanying SAPs are called Structural 
Adjustment Loans (hereafter referred to as SAL-s). The release 
of these funds are contingent upon the implementation of some 
specified neoliberal policies. To demonstrate how the process 
of incorporation is enforced through the conditionalities 
associated with the release of SALs, this section begins by 
analyzing the relationship between SAPs and SALs, and the 
convergence of functions between the World Bank and the IMF. 
After that, the varying meanings of conditionality, and the 
underlying psychological paradigm that makes the enforcement 
of incorporation possible will be examined.
SAPs and SALs: Convergence of Policy Becween The IMF and The
World Bank
The examination of the exact relationship between SAPs 
and SALs will not be complete without’ a cursory review of the
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changed pattern of relationship between the IMF and the World 
Bank. This is so because, the link between SAPs and SALs, 
among other things, signify the increasing convergence of 
functions between the two Bretton Woods institutions.45 This 
convergence has simplified the links between SAPs and SALs.
Appropriating from che lessons of the Great Depression, 
the IMF and the World Bank were established in 1944 to ensure 
a stable and prosperous post-WW II international system. 
According to the IMF's Articles of Agreement, the purpose of 
the Fund is
to give confidence to members by making the general resources 
of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate 
safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct 
maladjustments in balance of payments without resorting to 
measures disruptive of national or international prosperity.46
As defined by the Articles of Agreement, the IMF was primarily
concerned with helping countries experiencing balance of
payments disequilibrium.
If the maladjustment is considered temporary, countries
could borrow from the IMF to finance the deficits. If the
balance of payments discrepancy is pervasive and fundamental,
the IMF usually recommends exchange rate adjustments. Either
way, the borrowing countries were (are) expected to observe
45For a detailed review of the convergence of functions between 
the IMF and the World Bank, see Anne O. Krueger, “Whither the World Bank 
and the IMF," Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 36 (December 1998), 
pp. 1983-2020.
46Cited in Raymond F. Miksell. "Appraising IMF Conditionality: Too 
Loose, Too Tight, or Just Right?" in John Williamson, ed. IMF 
Conditionality (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 
1983 ) , p. 48 .’
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some specific criteria set by the IMF. In recognition of the 
fact that lending and repayments are normally framed within 
three to five years, "Fund support is more to obtain quick 
foreign exchange to finance imports than to reform the 
underlying policy stance."47 In other words, the IMF was 
primarily concerned with short-term macroeconomic 
stabilization than long-term structural transformation in the 
economies of the borrowing countries.
On the other hand, suggestive of its name (International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development), the World Bank was 
established as a project lending institution. Up until the 
late 1970s, and specifically before the publication of the 
Berg report, the World Bank was concerned with the provision 
of "long-term finance for productive projects, initially 
primarily for reconstruction purposes."48 In the performance 
of its traditional functions, funds advanced by the World Bank 
for the financing of infrastructural projects in developing 
countries were not subject to specific performance criteria, 
as it was in the case of the IMF. The Bank was therefore 
concerned more with long-term growth, and development 
prospects than with short-term macroeconomic equilibrium.
When the World Bank published its 1981 Accelerated 
Developmenc, and the need for long-term "institution" of 
stabilization and adjustment programs (SAPs) in SSA came to 
the fore, policy collaboration between the two lending
47Anne O. Krueger, "Whither the World'Bank and the IMF?” p. 1986.
48Ibid.
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institutions became increasingly important- Indeed, policy 
convergence was inevitable because, while short-term 
macroeconomic imbalances could undermine the prospects of 
long-term growth and development, short-term macroeconomic 
equilibrium is a reliable snapshot of consistent growth and 
development. In this case, short-term macroeconomic 
equilibrium, and long-term growth are inextricably interwoven.
As a result of the complex relationship between short­
term macroeconomic objectives, and long-term growth 
perspectives, there was a "marriage of convenience" between 
the IMF and the World Bank on the alter of SAPs. As rightly 
pointed out by Anne 0. Krueger,
the Fund was moving toward domains that had earlier been 
almost exclusively the Bank’s while the Bank, in moving 
toward program lending, was moving to incorporate some of 
the traditional concerns of the Fund.49
Therefore, within the framework of SAPs,
there is little to distinguish betv/een the assistance programs 
for structural adjustment provided by the two institutions from 
the standpoint of either the conditions they are designed to 
correct or the underlying perception of requirements for 
ad j us tment. - 0
Indeed, as it was in the case of SSA, the World Bank lending 
under SA.Ps was originally predicated upon the existence of 
macroeconomic stabilisation programs that were supported by 
the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF)-51 As a result,
49Ibid., p. 1989.
50Raymond F. Miskell, "Appraising IMF Conditionality," pp. 49-50.
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the fusion of the macroeconomic stabilization efforts of the 
IMF, ana the policy-based lending approach of the World Bank 
led to what is referred to as SAPs.
With the fusion of hitherto divergent approaches of the 
IMF and the World Bank, the link between SAPs and SALs became 
easily discernible. Simply put, SALs are non-project lending 
in support of policy and institution-al changes prescribed 
under SAPs. They are quick disbursing- loans to distressed 
economies undergoing SAPs. To receive SALs, the borrowing 
country must already have in place, "an IMF stabilization 
program. 1,52 This requirement is to ensure the smooth 
coordination of the World Bank and IIMF's policy 
conditionalities associated with the disbursement of funds.
The cross-conditionality between the IMF and the World 
Bank, in effect, establishes a mono-causal link between SAPs 
and SALs. The link here is that, SALs will be disbursed under 
the condition that the recipient countries adopt some 
specified neoliberal policy reforms uinder SAPs. It is in this 
respect that policy-based lending (PBL) has been used to 
describe the functional link between SAPs and SALs.5- What
5lSee Ernest Stem, “World Bank Financing of Structural 
Adjustment," in John Williamson, ed., IMF Conditionality, pp. 87-107.
52Paul Mosley, Jane Harrigan, and Joinn Toye, Aid and Power: The 
World Bank and Policy-based Lending-, Vol. 1, Analysis and Policy 
Proposals (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 37 .
53For a further review of policy-based lending as a functional 
link between SAPs and SALs, see W. Oliver IMorrissey, "Bilateral Aid to 
Africa and Structural Adjustment Loans: Conflict or Consistency," in 
Chris Milner and A.J. Rayner, eds. , Policy- Adjustment in Africa: Case- 
Studies in Economic Development, Vol. 1 drew York: St. Martin’s Press,
1992), pp. 133-147.
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then is the meaning of conditionality, and how does it help to
enforce the process of incorporation?
Conditionality: The Meaning of an Enforcement Strategy
The relationship between the disbursement of SALs and the 
adoption, and implementation of some specified neoliberal 
policy reforms is captured by the concept of conditionality. 
Although, chis relationship is defined by the concept of 
conditionality, the exact nature of the link between resource 
transfers (from the IMF and the World Bank) and policy change 
(on the part of SSA) is a highly contested issue. To some 
extent, the exact nature of the relationship could be gleaned 
from the underlying premise of the economic model of pure 
conditionality.
In its simplified form, this model is based on the
presumption that there is lack of investment and therefore,
restricted economic growth and development in SSA. This is 
because, interventionist policies of the government do not 
create the needed macroeconomic environment to entice external 
flows of investment. By tying financial resources to the 
performance of specific neoliberal policies, conditionality is 
expected to enhance the viability of loans, and also help 
install a macroeconomic framework attractive to direct foreign 
investment. Improved foreign investment will then catalyze 
growth, leading to long-term, sustainable development.54
54The work of Jeffrey Sachs, as published by the World Bank, 
encapsulates the economic model of pure conditionality. See the World 
Bank, Efficient Debt Reduction (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1989c).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
162
Extrapolating from the underlying logic of the pure 
conditionality model, the relationship between the release of 
SALs and the implementation of specified neoliberal policies 
could be viewed as reinforcement .5- The rationale here is 
that, the transfer of conditionality-based funds give positive 
incentives to countries in SSA to implement policy changes to 
which they are already committed under the IMF's Structural 
Adjustment Facility (SAF).
The relationship could also be viewed as imposition.56 
The implication here is that powerful donors (in the stature 
of the IMF and the World Bank) capitalize on financial 
transfers to force neoliberal policy changes on otherwise
unwilling, but equally vulnerable governments in SSA. On the 
other hand, "buy-and-sell" economists are compelled to view 
this same relationship as that of purchase.51 That is to say, 
donors "buy" reforms that governments in SSA would not have
taken had it not been for the "price" paid by donors in terms
of financial transfers in the form of SALs.
In spite of the varying interpretations, the role of 
conditionality in enforcing the process of incorporation is
55Conditionality as "reinforcement" characterizes the position of 
the World Bank as presented by two of its senior officials. See Vittorio 
Cobo and Stanley Fischer, "Adjustment Programs and Bank Support: 
Rationale and Main Results," (Unpublished Manuscript, August 1990).
56The "imposition" perspective provides a favored analytical tool 
to those who comment on the developmental crisis in Africa vis-a-vis the 
IMF and the World Bank. See Margaret Hanson and James J. Hentz, 
"Neocolonialism and Neoliberalism in South Africa and Zambia," Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 114 (November 3, 1999), pp. 479-502.
57For the "purchase" argument, see Paul Mosley, Conditionality as 
Bargaining Process: Structural Adjustment Lending, 1980-1986 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1987).
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very clear. The principle of conditionality ensures that, the 
graduated releases of SALs by the IMF and the World Bank are 
made contingent upon the adoption, and observance of a 
standard neoliberal policy package underlying SAPs. It is 
pertinent to note that most countries in SSA adopted SAPs in 
the first place ostensibly because of the associated financial 
attraction in the form of SALs. Therefore, conditioning the 
release of such funds on the implementation of neoliberal 
policies constitutes a powerful process of incorporating the 
economies of SSA into the ideological framework of a 
globalizing world economy.
If we are to view conditionality as "a side condition 
designed to ensure the execution of a contract, ”58 and if we 
are also to consider a contract as "a promise by one party to 
do something now in exchange for a promise by the other party 
to do something else in the future, "59 then, conditionality is 
not novel in international finance. What is spectacular, 
however, is the constricting manner by which the IMF and the 
World Bank use conditionality as a threat strategy to 
incorporate SSA into the ideological policy framework of 
globalization.
The compulsion underlying the threat strategy is well 
satirized by Julius Nyerere, the late President of Tanzania, 
with his observation that:
The IMF has an ideology of political and social development which
58Mosley et al. , Aid and Power, p. 65'.
59Ibid.
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ic is trying to impose on poor countries irrespective of their 
own clearly stated policies. And when we reject IMF conditions we 
hear the threatening whisper: Without accepting our conditions 
you will not get any money, and you will get no other money.1,60
Enhanced by the cross-conditionality between the IMF and the
World Bank, these institutions are able to suspend the
disbursement of SALs to specific countries in SSA if the
recommended neoliberai policies are not implemented.61 Viewed
from this perspective, conditionality could be considered as a
bargaining chip by which an all powerful IMF and the World
Bank seek to impose an a priori neoliberal policy package on
an unsuspecting, but financially-strapped SSA. It is in this
f
respect that Mosley et al. argue that,
it is the power-relationship between donor and recipient, rather 
than the severity of the economic "disease" from which a country 
is suffering, which principally determines the nature of the 
prescription offered as part of a conditionality package.-
Extrapolating from the essence of the above assertion, the
economic "disease" of SSA during the early 1980s (as outlined
in the first section of this Chapter) unusually tilted the
lever of power to the "dictatorial" advantage of the IMF and
the World Bank.
60This is contained in his speech delivered in 19 80 entitled, "No 
To IMF Meddling" as cited in T. Hayter and C. Watson, Aid: Rhetoric and 
Reality (London: Pluto Press, 1985), pp. 50-51.
61 For a review of how the IMF and the World Bank manipulate the 
release of SALs, see G.K. Helleiner, “The IMF, The World Bank and 
Africa's Adjustment and External Debt Problems: An Unofficial View," 
World Development, Vol. 20, No. 6 (1992), pp. 779-792.
6-Mosley et al. Aid and Power, p. 96.
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As a result of the debilitating economic conditions, most 
governments in SSA were powerless to resist the temptations of 
SALs that were laced with neoliberal policy conditionalities. 
In the paralyzed circumstances of SSA., and in a situation in 
which the post-independence, state-assisted development 
pattern runs counter to the new development orthodoxy of 
neoliberalism, the process of incorporation was not difficult 
to be enforced in the context of the sub-region.
Conditionality: The Psychology of an Enforcement Process
To re-state, the IMF and the World Bank incorporated SSA 
into the ideological policy framework of globalization by 
conditioning the delivery of SALs to the adoption, and 
implementation of neoliberal policies under SAPs. Revealingly, 
this conditioning process involves an unintended experiment 
(on the part of the IMF and the World Bank) , and a learning 
pattern (on the part of SSA) that borders on behavior 
modification. The institution of the underlying, enforcement 
mechanism of the process of incorporation through the lever of 
conditionalities is analogous to a quintessential 
psychological pattern of an operant conditioning.63
In a typical operant conditioning experiment, a hungry 
rat is placed in a special box fixed with a lever. The
63Operant conditioning is a learning procedure in which, the 
probability that an organism will emit a response is increased or 
decreased by the subsequent delivery of reinforcement or punishment. 
Pioneered by B.F. Skinner, operant condition or, instrumental learning 
involves the institution of voluntary responses from subjects through 
graduated deliveries of reinforcement by the experimenter. See L.A. 
Lefton, Psychology (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1994), Ch. 4.
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experimenter intends to condition the rat to learn how to 
press the lever through the gradual delivery of food pellets 
anytime the rat gets near the lever until the rat eventually 
presses the lever. Sooner than later, the rat learns the 
association between "pressing the lever" and the "delivery of 
food pellets." As a result of this conditioned association, 
the rat, in anticipation of the delivery of food pellets, 
continues to press the lever even when the experimenter has 
achieved its purpose (teaching the rat how to press the lever) 
and therefore, has no inclination to deliver more food 
pellets.
For the sake of an analytic comparison, substitute the 
"rat" for SSA, "hunger” for the paralyzing economic conditions 
in SSA in the early 1980s, "food pellets" for SALs, "lever 
pressing" for the adoption, and implementation of neoliberal 
policy package under SAPs, and the "experimenter" for the 
IMF/World Bank. With these substitutions, the powerful 
psychological mechanism underlying the process of 
incorporation becomes clearer.
With declining growth rates in all major economic 
indicators (Table 4.1), with deteriorating debt conditions 
(Table 4.2), and with demanding debt service ratios (Table 
4.3), SSA. was really "hungry" in the early 1980s. The sub- 
region was therefore in an extreme psychological state of 
readiness to comply with any form of assistance that is 
regimented on the implementation of neoliberal policies, if 
nothing at all, just for the sake of survival. In recognition
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of Che face chac Che exiscencial realicy of SSA was ac scake, 
Che IMF and che World Bank had a very conforming experimencal 
subj e c c .
In chis conforming framework, condicioning Che delivery 
of SALs co Che implemencacion of neoliberal policies 
associaced wich SAPs became a simpliseic paradigm of behavior 
modificaCion. The independenC variable is Che graduaCed 
delivery of SALs. The dependenc variable is Che sequencial 
implemencacion of neoliberal policies. Unlike in regular 
experimencs, chis paradigm did noc require Che painsCaking 
concrol of exCraneous variables because, che main experimencal 
subjecc (SSA) was Che very definicion of che mosc needed 
background variable; "hunger." On che ocher hand, Che IMF and 
Che World Bank, under che pressure of Che G-7, were consumed 
wich Che need Co proselytize Che new orChodoxy of 
neoliberalism.
As a resulc of che ironic fic becween che needs of SSA, 
and Che mocivacions of che IMF and che World Bank, enforcing 
Che process of che sub-regions' incorporaCion inco Che logic 
of globalism assumed a Cypical psychological process of 
behavior modificacion, wich Che implemencacion of neoliberal 
policy conditionalities as che expecced behavior. IC is 
parcially in respecc of such underlying behavior modificacion 
processes of condicionalicy chac G.K. Helleiner argues ChaC, 
in Africa,
the need for conditionality is no longer argued primarily on the 
basis of the need for ensured repayment... The new emphasis upon 
broad policy-based conditionality on development assistance
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evidently stems from the international consensus that domestic 
adjustment and development policies in the recipient countries 
have been seriously at fault and that African governments require 
not only external advice but also heavy pressure before they will 
adopt appropriate policies .64
While the "heavy pressure" is exerted through the theatrics of 
conditionality, the "appropriate policies" in this case refer 
to the standard package of neoliberal policies associated with 
SAPs .
Some writers go beyond the dynamics of conditionality to
dilate on the hidden agenda of the enforcement process. With
its insistence on free trade, marketization, and
liberalization, Cheryl Payer for instance believes that
conditionality is purposefully framed to pry open the
recipient countries' economies to the operational demands of
international capital.65 Granting this assertion to be true,
then, conditionality, as an enforcement mechanism, subverts
the economic sovereignty of SSA by incorporating the sub-
region into the ideological framework of globalization.
Indeed, as rightly noted in a slip-of-the-tongue testimony by
a former executive director for Canada at the World Bank,
macropolicy advice incorporated in the SALs touches the very core 
of the development policy process . . . The rate and manner of 
growth and related societal objectives of the recipient countries 
are the very stuff of that elusive concept called sovereignty.66
64G.K. Helleiner, "The IMF, The World Bank and Africa’s Adjustment 
and External Debt Problems: An Unofficial View," pp. 783-784 (italics 
added).
6- See Cheryl Payer, The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), especially, Ch. 2.
66Cited in Walden Bello et al., Dark Victory, p. 28.
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The implication here is that, with the provision of the 
process within which SSA's incorporation into the 
developmental context of neoliberalism is enforced, 
conditionality tends to undermine the economic sovereignty of 
the sub-region.
To avoid the psychological pain, the financial 
starvation, the economic disruption, and at times, the 
political upheaval associated with the withdrawal of SALs, SSA 
is compelled to operate within the limits set by the 
neoliberal policy conditionalities. In this restrictive 
framework, the sub-region is precluded from the advancement of 
nationalistic development agendas that deviate from the logic 
of neoiiberalism.
The irony here is that, neoliberal policies are more in 
tune with the demands of a globalizing world economy. As it 
will be elaborated in the next Chapter (V) , they are less 
responsive to the idiosyncratic developmental requirements of 
SSA.67 In this case, the demands of a globalizing world 
economy are enforced in the context of SSA. through the 
neoliberal conditionalities associated with the disbursement 
of SALs.
CASE STUDIES AND EVIDENCE OF INCORPORATION
The examination of SSA's incorporation into the 
neoliberal ideological framework associated with globalization 
will not be complete unless it is buttressed with some
67This assertion is one of the central theses of Claude Ake in his 
Democracy and Development in Africa.
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specific case studies, and supported by other ava_ilable 
evidence. A cursory overview of the path of incor-poration in 
Ghana, Zambia, and Kenya will suffice in this case. It is 
instructive to note that the underlying ideologic-al 
inclinations of Ghana and Zambia before the incep~tion of SAPs 
were, to some extent, antagonistic to the neolibe ral policy 
demands. On the other hand, the economic orientat.ion of Kenya 
was characterized by some rudimentary forms of th._e neoliberal 
policy requirements.
These countries are chosen to demonstrate th at the 
process of incorporation assumes a powerful, unil.at.eral path 
irrespective of the differences in the initial idleological 
pretensions of states in the sub-region. The case studies 
highlight the convoluted, and at times, approach- avoidance 
path of incorporation that involves three discern ible stages 
of contemplation (C), acceptance (A), and defense (D).
Contemplation in the sense that leaders in t_he sub-region 
were aware of the plausible diminution of economise 
sovereignty, and policy-autonomy reducing implications of 
SAPs. As a result, in almost all countries in the- sub-region, 
there was an initial period of hesitation as to wzhether the 
neoiiberal policy package should be either accepteed or 
rejected. Through the dint of the "no alternative " 
rationalization that is boosted by the precarious economic 
conditions, acceptance of the program normally folllows a 
"fruitless" period of contemplation.
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In recognition of che face than policy changes wrought by 
neoliberal policy conditionalities differentially impact on 
separate economic interests in the society, defense of the 
program becomes an inevitable undertaking. Contemplation (C) , 
acceptance (A) , and defense (D) then characterizes the path of 
SSA’s incorporation into the neoliberal context of development 
as demonstrated below.
Ghana, 1982-1988
There is no other country in SSA where the C-A-D format
of incorporation was more explicit than in the case of Ghana.
At the zenith of Ghana's economic crisis, junior ranks of the
army led by Fit. Lt. Jerry J. Rawlings launched a military 
coup on 31st December 1981, ostensibly, to embark upon a 
populist, anti-imperialist "revolutionary" agenda.68 A 
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) under the 
leadership of Rawlings was established as the vanguard of the 
"revolution." Operating within the orgy of anti-imperialist 
rhetorics, grassroots "revolutionary" committees were 
established throughout Ghana. Popular mobilization efforts 
were also encouraged. Self-reliance became the new buzz-word 
of development. And the attack on the exploitative nature of 
the international system, as the main justification for the 
adoption of an endogenous process of development, was very 
incendiary. Indeed, between 1981 and the first quarter of
68For a comprehensive review of the causes of the coup, and the 
implementation of the initial anti-imperialist agenda, see Zaya Yeebo, 
Ghana, The Struggle for Popular Power: Rawlings, Savior or Demagogue 
(London: Beacon Books, 1991) .
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1983, Ghana seemed co be on che path of no return coward che 
kingdom of anti-imperiaiisc, revolutionary development.
By che last quarter of 1983, some events had compelled
che PNDC's lackluster campaign to take a dramatic turn. Severe
droughts, pervasive bush fires, and the repatriation of more 
than a million Ghanaians from Nigeria compounded Ghana’s 
economic crisis. Financially strapped, and unable to fulfill 
the people-centered objectives as promised, the PNDC
government recognized its need to go to the IMF and the World
Bank.
With its initial anti-imperialist rhetorics, the decision
to enter into rapport with the Bretton Woods institutions in
order to be anointed with neoliberal policies took an
unusually long period of contemplation. The pain of
contemplation is best captured in a poetic outpour by Kwesi
Botchwey, then Ghana’s Finance Minister. He laments;
We were faced with two options... we had to maneuver our way 
around the naivetes of leftism, which has a sort of disdain for 
any talk of financial discipline, which seeks refuge in some vague 
concept of structuralism in which everything doable is possible... 
moreover we had co find a way between this naivete and the 
crudities and rigidities of monetarism which behaves as if once 
you set the monetary incentives everybody will do the right thing 
and the market will be perfect.®9
69Cited in Thomas M. Callaghy, “Political Passions and Economic 
Interests: Economic Reforms and Political Structure in Africa,” in T.M. 
Callaghy and John Ravenhili, eds. , Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's 
Economic Decline (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p., 469. 
It is instructive to note that, quite apart from the official 
contemplation, Kwesi Botchwey had his own cognitive dissonance to 
resolve because, during his studies in the United States, he wrote a 
Ph.D. dissertation criticizing international monopoly capital I
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So endemic was che concencious debace between che continuation 
wich populism and che accepcance cf che IMF a n d  che World 
Bank’s neoliberal policies chac ic caused a spolit within che 
ruling PNDC government.70 However, che contemplation was 
eventually resolved, giving way co che acceptance phase.
Wich the assurance of monetary incentives and che 
possibility of long-term growth accing as pull_ factors, and 
with che serious economic crisis acting as the push factor,
Che PNDC had moved to embrace the long awaitirag arms of the 
IMF and the World Bank by che last quarter of 1983 . Txeating 
Ghana like a prodigal child who has eventually' decided to deal 
with the pains of adulthood, the Bretton Woods institutions 
were particularly enthusiastic about Ghana's newly found 
wisdom.71 Armed with the disciplinarian tools o f  
neoliberalism, the IMF and the World Bank did not however 
compromise on the strict adherence to neoliberral policy 
conditionalities for the subsequent releases o f  SALs.
As carefully examined by John Toye, some of the initial 
conditionlities in the context of Ghana included; devaluation 
in order to enhance the production and export of cocoa, 
restructuring of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Boaard in order to 
encourage private sector initiatives in the cocoa business, 
removal of subsidies and price controls, cost recovery and the 
removal of government subsidies in health and education, trade
70See Zaya Yeebo, Ghana., The Struggle for Popular Power.
71For a review of the "romantic" relationship between Ghana and 
the Bretton Woods institutions, see Jeffrey Herbst, Tfhe Politics of 
Reform in Ghana, 1982-1991 (Berkeley: University of C-alifomia Press,
1993), Ch. 7.
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and financial liberalization, public expenditure programming, 
privatization (divestiture) of public enterprises, and banking 
reforms.72
Against the backdrop of these policy conditionalities, 
Ghana was baptized into the path of incorporation in August 
1983 when the IMF granted Ghana Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 
of 3 59 million, and the World Bank also advanced US$ 65 
million.73 After Ghana’s initial symbolic acceptance of the 
global market discipline, there was no turning back.
Converting the vigor of radicalism to the meticulous execution 
of the neoliberal agenda, Ghana continued to receive 
increasing disbursement of SALs from both the IMF and the 
World Bank.
By 1986, Ghana had received US$ 1 billion in additional 
assistance from these two institutions.74 By 1987, in 
recognition of its sweeping neoliberal reforms, Ghana has 
emerged as the third largest recipient of World Bank credits 
after India and China, with per capita external assistance 
twice the average of Africa.7:> If we are to refresh our memory 
to the realization that the size of SALs disbursed by the
72See John Toye, "World Bank Policy-Conditioned Loans: How Did 
They Work in Ghana in the 1980s?” in Chris Milner and A.J. Rayner, e ds. , 
Policy Adjustment in Africa: Case Studies in Economic Development, Vol.
1 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), pp. 81-97.
73See Ghana News, Vol. 12, No. 8 (August 1993) , p. 8
74Jeffrey Herbst, The Politics of Reform in Ghana, p. 119.
75Miles Kahler, "International Financial Institutions and the 
Politics of Adjustment, ’ in Joan M. Nelson, ed. , Fragile Coalitions.- The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
175
Bretton Woods institutions is coterminous with the depth of 
neoliberai policy reforms, then, by 1938, Ghana was the most 
incorporated country in SSA.
As a reflection of the depth of Ghana's incorporation
into the logic of the global market discipline, the country 
has been isolated by the World Bank76 as the most faithful 
pupil of neoliberal reforms in Africa. However, Ghana's 
meteoric rise to the stardom of international adjustment was a 
precarious achievement that depended on continued defense on 
the domestic front. Paralleling the idea that charity begins 
at home, the defensive brush began to operate within the upper 
echelons of the governing council. By the end of 1983,
Rawlings had purged all anti-reform members of the ruling PNDC 
government and replaced them with conservatives sympathetic to 
the neoliberai agenda.77
As a result of the implementation of conditionalities
such as devaluation, the removal of subsidies, and public
expenditure prioritization that took the form of the 
retrenchment of government workers, urban workers were the 
first to organize against the neoliberai reforms. Branding the 
leaders of the Trade Union Congress (TUC) as "infantile 
leftists" whose ideas are inimical to progress, most of them 
were arrested and detained by the PNDC government.78 Also,
Politics of Economic Adjustment (Washington, DC: Overseas Development 
Council, 1989), p. 156.
76See the World Bank, Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and 
the Road Ahead.
77See Zaya Yeebo, Ghana, The Struggle for Popular Power.
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when university students demonstrated in 1983 to register 
their protest against the possibility of increased tuition due 
to the'removal of subsidies on education, the government 
responded by closing all universities in Ghana.79
In the course of defending the implementation of the 
neoliberai agenda, the Ghanaian government ended up alienating 
its previous allies such as labor and student groups who were 
at the forefront of the earlier radical, anti-imperialist 
agenda. New coalitions were then built with members of the 
business community who were the main beneficiaries of 
marketization and the associated liberalization measures. With 
the realignment of its support base, the PNDC government, 
between 1982 and 1988, set the tempo for Ghana's continuing 
incorporation into the logic of globalism. In other words, 
there was no turning back from the adoption and implementation 
of neoliberai economic reforms.
Zambia, 1983-1993
The former President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, had a 
very ambivalent relationship with the Bretton Woods 
institutions. As an elder African statesman well known with 
his brand of socialism called "humanism, " Kenneth Kaunda and 
his United National Independence Party (UNIP) saw the IMF and
7SSee Jeffrey Herbst, The Politics of Reform in Ghana, Ch. 4.
79The current writer was a student at the University of Ghana, 
Legon in 1983 when all uni versifies in Ghana were closed for nearly one 
year.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
177
the World Bank as agents of neocolonialism.80 In spite of its 
ideological stance, Zambia was not insulated from the general 
economic decline that affected SSA in the early 1980s. With 
falling GDP growth rates, declining export revenues, mounting 
debt arrears, and increasing foreign exchange shortage, Zambia 
was a typical African country in crisis by 1983.81
Constrained by its anti-neocoloniaiist pretensions but 
equally haunted by the need for external finance, entering 
into an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank was only a 
matter of "how," not "when." And the contemplation on the 
question of "how" assumed a frustrating approach-avoidance 
cycle. Seeking refuge in a "no alternative" argument, Zambia 
accepted the standard package of neoliberai policy 
conditionality and entered into a funds-for-policy-change 
agreement with the IMF from 1983 to 1987.82
Still contemplating, Zambia suspended formal talks with 
the donors from 1987-1988, reinflated the national currency, 
reintroduced subsidies on essential items, and adopted a home­
grown New Economic Recovery Plan (NERP) . However, while the 
local press continued to eulogize the "divorce" between the 
IMF and the government as a sign of commitment toward the 
course of an independent Africa, President Kaunda was coping
80See Margaret Hanson and James J. Hentz, "Neocolonialism and 
Neoliberalism in South Africa and Zambia."
Slsee Matthew Martin, "Neither Phoenix nor Icarus: Negotiating 
Economic Reform in Ghana and Zambia, 1983-1992," in Thomas M. Callaghy 
and John Ravenhill, eds., Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic 
Decline (Nw York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 135.
82Ibid., p. 131.
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with the fallout from breaking with the IMF. To his utter 
surprise,
disbursements of multilateral credits were suspended, and 
bilateral aid dried up as allocated projects were brought 
to a close and no new funding emerged.8-*
Reeling under the pangs of financial starvation, Zambia 
decided to resume talks again with the IMF in 1989. To re­
start the clock of neoliberai indoctrination, the IMF treated 
Zambia as a fresh-starter. Zambia was compelled to sign in 
1990, a "Policy Framework Paper (PFP) , required for any 
severely indebted country wanting to use the Extended 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)” administered by the 
IMF.84 President Kaunda did not survive the completion of 
agreement under the PFP.
In the general elections held in November 1991, the 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) led by Frederick 
Chiluba assumed the reign of government. Chiluba's government 
moved to an unqualified acceptance of the implementation of 
neoliberalism under the guidance of the Bretton Woods 
institutions. The introduction of a manifesto presented by the 
MMD, and approved by the cabinet stated among other things 
that the
MMD believes that economic prosperity for all can best be created 
by free men and women through free enterprise; by economic and 
social justice involving all the productive resources..., and by 
liberalizing industry, trade and commerce, with the Government
8-*Margaret Hanson and James J. Hentz, “Neocolonialism and 
Neoliberalism in South Africa and Zambia," p. 485.
84Ibid., p. 487.
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only creating an enabling environment whereby economic growth 
must follow as it has done all the world's successful countries-S-
The contents of the MMD’s manifesto were apparently similar to
an executive summary of the World Bank's 1981 Berg report.
Also, the underlying spirit was reflective of the ideological
wisdom of neoliberalism. As a result of the congenial
perspective of the new Zambian government, agreement was
quickly reached with the IMF. The commitment of President
Frederick Chiluba to neoliberai reforms was
signified by the government's swift implementation of key 
policies that the previous government had backed away from, 
specifically the removal of price subsidies on maize meal 
and petroleum and the nearly complete liberalization of 
foreign exchange.86
With the IMF and the World Bank satisfied with the neoliberai
reforms of the new government, almost US$ 1 billion in
external assistance has been advanced to Zambia annually since
the beginning of 1991.87 President Chiluba, in effect, ended
the approach-avoidance cycle of the contemplative stage. This
is not to suggest that his unqualified acceptance of the
means, and the process of Zambia's incorporation into the new
ideological agenda was without some challenges.
Campaigning under the banner of economic reforms during
the 1991 November elections, the MMD exaggerated the
expectations of the people concerning the benefits associated
85Cited in Ibid., p. 488.
86Ibid., p. 487.
87Ibid., p. 488.
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wich market!cation and liberalization. when che MMD assumed 
power and was confronted with policy conditionalities that 
included the removal of subsidies on essential items, the 
people felt betrayed. The government found it particularly 
difficult to justify the abandonment of some elementary forms 
of redistribution with growth as it was under former President 
Kaunda’s brand of socialism.
Disillusionment and disappointment spread through the 
Zambian society as a result of the widening gap between 
promises of neoliberai reforms and increasing hardships felt 
by the people. The Zambia military thought it had a historical 
duty to fraternize with the grievances of the public. As a 
pre-emptive defense to an alleged coup plot, the government 
responded by imposing a "state of emergency” in 1993 .88 This 
enabled the state to use extra-constitutional means to clamp 
down on opposition to the leadership of President Chiluba and 
his neoliberai reforms. Reforms lingered on against the 
background of widening neoliberai policy conditionalities.
In the final analysis, during the incubating period from 
1933 to 1993, Zambia had prepared itself to be incorporated 
into the emerging development orthodoxy of neoliberalism. As 
Margaret Hanson and James J. Hentz conclude after their 
comprehensive study of Zambia, "there is no turning back on 
significant macroeconomic reforms of monetary and trade 
liberalization."89 It is instructive to note that, though,
88Ibid., p. 490.
89Ibid., p. 491.
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Zambia’s preparation for che global markec discipline cook a 
series of cwisc and cums, che underlying C-A-D formac of 
incorporacion was nevercheless discernible.
Kenya, 1980-1989
Unlike Ghana and Zambia, Kenya was noc inicially 
characcerized by a moribund ideology chac scood in direcc 
cpposice co che kind of neoliberai reforms professed by che 
Breccon Woods inscicucions. Instead, since 1S65, Kenya has 
been promocing "an economic straCegy that anticipated many of 
the key ingredients in contemporary adjustment programs, 
including private ownership of the country’s most productive 
economic assets..."90 As a result of import-substituting 
industrialization, manufacturing was a thriving sector of the 
Kenyan economy. Kenya was even exporting manufacturing 
products to its neighboring countries.91 It seemed as if the 
Bretton Woods institutions had a responsive framework for 
their neoliberai experiment.
Yet, writing on the relationship between Kenya and the 
Wbrld Bank, Paul Mosley argues that "few country lending 
experiences have given the Bank so much cause for 
frustration."92 The irony here could be explained. The World
90Michael F. Lofchie, “Trading Places: Economic Policy in Kenya 
and Tanzania," in Thomas M. Callaghy and John Ravenhill, eds., Hemmed 
In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), p. 401.
91 See Steven Langdon, "Industrial Dependence and Export 
Manufacturing in Kenya," in John Ravenhill, ed. , Africa in Economic 
Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 181-212.
92Paul Mosley, "How to Confront the World Ban}; and Get Away With 
It: A Case Study of Kenya, 1980-87,“ in Chris Milner and A.J. Rayner,
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Bank's neoliberai policy conditionalities were inimical co the 
interests of large-scale farmers and. other domestic 
industrialists who were operating behind the protective wralls 
of the government. Simply put, because the basis of Kenya’s 
success was not based on the tenets of laissez-faire 
economics, particularly threatening were the demands for 
liberalization and marketization. It is within this 
conflicting prism that the C-A-D format of incorporation, in 
the circumstances of Kenya, could be examined.
Unlike Ghana and Zambia, the post-independence Kenyan 
economy experienced a substantial level of growth in 
comparison with other developing countries. Average real GDP 
growth rates increased from 5.9 percent between 1960-69 to 10 
percent between 1970-1975. Between the same time intervals, 
investment as a ratio of GDP increased from 20.5 percent to 
23.2 percent.93 In spite of these positive indicators, the 
economic downturn that was to give the IMF and the World Bank 
the opportunity to embark upon their neoliberai experiment in 
the context of Kenya was not long in coming.
As a result of a sharp fall in the price of coffee, and a 
doubling in the price of imported oil, the Kenyan economy 
slipped into severe crisis beginning from the late 1970s. 
Exports began to decline from the early 1930s, "private sector 
investment began to dwindle and inflation rose to over 2 0
eds . , Policy Adjustment in Africa :Case-Studies in Economic Development 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 99.
93See Paul Mosley, "How to Confront the World Bank and Get Away 
With It,” Table 6.1, p. 100.
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percent in 19S2."94 The privace-sector led. development tbiat 
was flourishing behind the protective walls provided by the 
state came under a very severe strain. The only reprieve was 
the availability of "iow-interest programme finance: precisely 
the function which the World Bank’s Structural Adjustmen_t 
Lending programme was intended to fulfill.”95
Submitting to a standard package of neoliberai poliicies 
in order to secure the much needed finance was a frustrating 
decision that involved a great deal of contemplation on the 
part of the Kenyan government. The Kenyan government was-: 
central in the management of the national economy.96 It set 
and controlled exchange and interest rates, protected domestic 
industries through the manipulation of tariffs and trade 
licensing, and also fixed and regulated the prices and 
marketing of agricultural commodities. In the perf ormancte of 
these roles, the government was not only able to extracts 
rents but also, exercise a great deal of political leverrage.
In this case, unlike in the cases of Ghana and Zamtoia, 
the contemplation by the Kenyan government was not so much 
about the loss of autonomy in the implementation of antL- 
imperialistic development agenda. It was about the loss of 
rents and power in submitting to market forces underlyimg the 
neoliberai policy conditionalities. As in the cases of Ghana 
and Zambia, however, the Kenyan government was compelle<3 by
94Ibid., p . 103.
95Ibid.
96See Michael F. Lofchie, “Trading Places: Economic Policy -in 
Kenya and Tanzania," pp. 401-402.
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che "no alternative" persuasion to enter into regimented 
policy-based agreements with, the IMF and the World Bank in 
1S80 .
When Kenya eventually accepted to be subjected to the 
global market discipline, negotiations between the government 
and the Bretton wToods institutions led to "at least 10 policy- 
based loans”97 from 1930 to 1989. In view of the fact that the 
involvement of the government in the economy was very 
pervasive, incorporating Kenya into the logic of global market 
forces demanded the institution of unusually broad-based 
neoliberai policy conditionalities. Some of the 
conditionalities include: devaluation; removal of controls on
interest rates; prioritization of public expenditure; 
elimination of import licensing; rationalization of the tariff 
system; removal of price controls; and removal of controls on 
external capital accounts.98
In their far-reaching implications, the implementation of 
these neoliberai policy requirements meant the subjugation of 
the rent-seeking position of the Kenyan government to market 
forces. It also meant the neutralization of the privileged 
positions of large scale farmers and other domestic, private 
industrialists. These groups were nurtured by the patronizing, 
interventionist policies of the state, rather than groomed by
97Ibid., p. 414.
98For a comprehensive list of agreements with the IMF and the 
World Bank and the associated neoliberai conditionalities, see Paul 
Mosley, "Hov; to Confront the World Bank and Get Away With It," pp. 104- 
106, and pp. 110-112.
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che dictates of international market forces. As a result of 
the political clout of domestic, established interests, the 
governments' defense of the exposure of Kenya to the 
globalizing economy meant the resolution of a very frustrating 
dilemma. As Howard P. Lehman puts it, the Kenyan government 
was
caught directly in the cross-fire between international financial 
interests pressing for an open, trade regime and domestic 
manufacturing interests seeking continued protection of 
ISI (import substituting firms) ."
In order to defend its position by way of resolving the
dilemma between international demands and domestic concerns,
the Kenyan government pursued a hard-nosed bargaining strategy
with the IMF and the World Bank. The rationale of the unusual
bargaining approach was to reconcile the demands of the
Bretton Woods institutions with domestic political interests.
It is in respect to such a bargaining style that Paul Mosley
admits that Kenya gave the World Bank so much frustration, and
also chose to entitle his article, "How to Confront the World
Bank and Get Away With It."100
One should not read too much into Mosley's title and
conclude that the government wanted (or was eventually able)
to resist the incorporation of the Kenyan economy into the
logic of the global market discipline. Certainly, that was not
the case. Rather than exposing the economy to the sudden
"Howard P. Lehman, Indebted Development: Strategic Bargaining and 
Economic Adjustment in the Third World (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1S93), p. 73.
100Paul Mosley, op. cit.
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"shock" of global market forces, what the Kenyan government 
insisted on in its deliberations with the IMF and the World 
Bank was a gradual sequencing of neoliberai policy 
conditionalities.
Ostensibly, gradual sequencing was intended to 
systematically sensitize established domestic interests to the 
inevitabilities of a globalizing economy. Indeed, this 
approach paid off in the sense that the Kenyan government was 
able "to placate the demands of the international financial 
community," while protecting "the established interests of the 
governing coalition. ”101 In this case, the Kenyan government 
was able to prepare its economy to be incorporated into the 
neoliberai context of development without serious political 
convulsions (as in the case of Ghana) , and without frustrating 
oscillations (as in the case of Zambia) .
The World Bank's Interim Assessment On Incorporation: Notes On
Some Evidence
In a self-congratulatory mood, the World Bank, in its 
Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead, 
presents an interim assessment on the incorporation of SSA 
into the ideological framework of neoliberalism. The World 
Bank defines SSA as "WTorld Bank borrowers south of the 
Sahara."102 This definition comprises all the 45 countries in 
SSA. In this vein, if we are to take note that borrowing is
10'Howard P. Leyman, Indebted Development, pp. 11-IQ.
102The World Bank, Adjustment in Africa, p. xviii.
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conducted within the framework of conditionalities, then, this 
definition is by itself, an indication of the expansive nature 
of SSA’s acquiescence to the neoliberal experiment.
On the basis of this definition, the World Bank draws a 
balance sheet on the extent of the sub-regions ’ incorporation 
into the logic of global market forces. Focusing on 2 9 
countries in SSA that were undergoing adjustment between 1987 
and 1991, the World Bank asserts that many "African countries 
are moving in the right direction with their macroeconomic, 
agricultural, and trade policies..."103 To demonstrate that it 
has been able to purchase far-reaching neoliberal reforms in 
SSA as a result of increasing transfer of conditionality 
loans, the World Bank conjectures that "Africa was receiving 
almost $20 per capita in net transfers, four times the amount 
going to poor countries elsewhere."104
In the assessment of specific policies, the World Bank 
was particularly enthusiastic with the extent of progress made 
on the liberalization of trade. The World Bank sets the 
measuring rod that "evidence on import liberalization is 
progress in eliminating nontariff barriers (NTBs),"105 and 
admits in the context of SSA that, "progress has been made in 
reducing the number of goods requiring prior approval for 
import.”106 With improvement on the distributive mechanisms of
103Ibid., P- 9 .
104Ibid., P • 28 .
105 Ibid., P- 70 .
106Ibid., P- 71.
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Che market through the removal of price controls, SSA was
given a positive nod. with the assessment that "most countries
have removed almost all price controls, keeping them for only
a few strategic goods."107
As already noted, privatization of state-owned
enterprises is one of the crystal policies of neoliberal
conditionalities. In its evaluation, the World Bank expresses
optimism on the efforts so far made in the sub-region. The
World Bank writes;
... privatization efforts appear to have been moderately 
successful. Almost all countries have managed to halt the 
increase in public enterprises, and several have begun to reduce 
the number. Throughout the region, reform has led to the 
privatization of hundreds of public enterprises...108
The privatization efforts are accentuated by some progress in
the liberalization of finance. On this, the World Bank notes
that,
the rationalization and liberalization of interest rates, among 
the most common features of adjustment programs, have been 
somewhat successful in easing financial repression. Interest 
rates were fully liberalized in Burundi, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, and Zambia.109
In its evaluation, the World Bank sounded bullish with the
interim evidence on the successful institution of neoliberal
conditionalities, and concludes that adjustment "is an
107Ibid., p. 90.
108Ibid. , p. 103.
109Ibid., p. 114.
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essential step to getting on a poverty-reducing growth 
path. "110
The adoption and implementation of neoiiberal policy 
conditionalities, as examined in this Chapter, provide the 
means, and the process through which SSA is incorporated into 
the emerging global economic order. With the World Bank’s 
optimistic assessment on the evidence of neoliberal 
conditionalities, what remains to be examined is whether SSA 
is benefiting from its incorporation into the ideological 
framework of globalization.
110Ibid., p. 219.
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CHAPTER V
IN SEARCH OF A PARADOX: INCORPORATION AND MARGINALIZATION
We have identified neoliberalism as the main ideological 
counterpart of globalization that defines the new political 
economy of development (Chapter III) . We have also established 
the incorporation (IC) of SSA within the ideological framework 
of this new political economy of development (Chapter IV) . We 
are now in a position to examine our third research question, 
that is; To what extent does the paradox of incorporation and 
marginalization manifests itself in the context of SSA? In 
the examination of this question, this Chapter re-visits our 
specified theoretical function in order to examine the issues 
relating to the marginalization (M) of SSA. As stated in 
Chapter I, our theoretical function takes the form of the 
following equation:
M  = IC - g(IT)
where, marginalization (M) equals incorporation (IC) without 
the gains associated with integration (g[IT]). The gains of 
integration (g[IT]) are the conventional benefits associated 
with the adoption, and implementation of neoliberal policies. 
As a useful theoretical guide, this equation is predicated 
upon the conventionally neglected distinction between 
incorporat ion(IC) and integration (IT).
To highlight on this distinction, the first section of 
the Chapter examines the conventional gains associated with 
neoliberal policies with the intention of demonstrating that
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incorporation is not the same as integration. With the g(!T) 
part of the equation identified, the second section then 
examines the meaning and dimensions of marginalization on the 
bases of some macroeconomic indicators pertaining to SSA. On 
the basis of our theoretical function, the third section 
accounts for the competing explanations on the marginalization 
of SSA.. The Chapter concludes with the examination of a 
subsidiary question: Is the marginalization of SSA. reversible?
INCORPORATION IS NOT THE SAME AS INTEGRATION
To demonstrate that incorporation is not the same as 
integration is to demarcate the globalization terrain into its 
superstructural and substructural components. While the former 
refers to the ideological and ideational aspects of 
globalization, the latter constitutes its substantive, 
measurable outcomes. Incorporation relates to the former, 
while integration relates to the latter. As analyzed in 
Chapter IV, incorporation describes the "conditionalized" 
subscription (or compliance) to the neoiiberal ideology that 
underpins the globalization process. Incorporation therefore 
finds meaning within the ideological, and the supers tructural 
realm of globalization.
Integration on the other hand is definable on the basis 
of measurable economic outcomes associated with a regions' 
incorporation into the defining ideology of globalization. 
These measurable economic outcomes are the conventional 
benefits associated with the adoption, and implementation of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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neoliberal policies. Without doubt, the benefits associated 
with neoliberal policies provide a belabored research milieu 
for neoclassical economists.
Jose A. Ocampo stipulates that trade liberalization 
enhances better allocation of resources, facilitates higher 
rate of technical progress, and improves access to 
international markets.1 This view is seconded by Dean DeRosa 
of the IMF’s Research Department.2 He argues that 
protectionism hinders exports, and as a result, reduce the 
production possibility frontiers of SSA. The admonition here 
is that, SSA stands to gain from liberalization of trade and 
finance. A.J. Yeats, A. Amjadi, U. Reincke, and F. Ng, a 
conglomeration of World Bank economists, glorify the benefits 
of neoliberal policies with an underlying apocalyptic threat.3 
They argue that globalization improves the opportunities for 
trade liberalization and that, countries risk marginalization 
if they are unable to open their economies and participate in 
international trade.
Commenting on its multiplier effects. F. Ng and A. Yeats 
insist to the point of doctrinaire premonition that neoliberal 
policies under SAPs promote growth and development because, 
open economies attract foreign direct investment into regions
lSee Jose A. Ocampo, "New Developments in Trade Theory and LDCs,” 
■Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 22 (1986) , pp. 129-170.
-See Dean DeRosa, “Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa Hinders 
Exports,” Finance and Development, (September 1991), pp. 42-45.
3See Alexander J. Yeats, Azita Amjadi, Ulrich Reincke, and Francis 
Ng, "What Caused Sub-Saharan Africa's Marginalization in World Trade?"
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undertaking reforms.4 In their view, which is also shared by
the World Bank,- trade and financial liberalization have
positive multiplier effects on growth, foreign direct
investment, diversification of exports, and the effective
management of external debts.
As if to emphasize the point that these multiplier
effects are relevant to the primary developmental concerns of
SSA, Barber Conable, in his September 1987 address to the
Board of Governors of the World Bank, stated:
In Sub-Saharan Africa our goals are to help meet the current 
crisis by organizing major programs in the severely debt- 
distressed countries, to see the productive capacity of African 
economies rebuilt, and to help ensure that the welfare and food 
security of Africa’s millions of poor people are protected in the 
process of adjustment and recovery.6
The assumption here is that, neoliberal policies will benefit
SSA. by improving the productive capacity of the sub-region, by
maximizing average welfare, and by alleviating poverty. These
conventional benefits associated with the implementation of
neoliberal policies are the measurable outcomes that
constitute the gains of integration (g[IT]).
4See Francis Ng and Alexander Yeats, "Open Economies Work Better! 
Did Africa's Protectionist Policies Cause its Marginalization in World 
Trade?“
-For instance, see the World Bank, Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, 
Results, And The Road Ahead (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1994a) , and 
the World Bank, Trends in Developing Economies (New York: The World 
Bank, 1994b).
6Cited in Stephen K. Commins, “Facing Africa’s Development 
Challenges," in Stephen K. Commins, ed., Africa's Development Challenges 
and the World Bank: Hard Questions, Costly Choices (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1988), p. 14.
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It is pertinent to note that a region could be 
incorporated (that is subscribe to the neoliberal policy 
framework of globalization) but at the same time, perform 
poorly on the measurable outcomes of integration. In this 
case, incorporation, as specified in our theoretical model, is 
not necessarily the same as integration. To conflate the 
essence of the two cerms is to inadvertently lock the crucial 
window that permits a meaningful analysis on marginalization 
in the context of SSA. By design or by default, the World 
Bank, in its evaluations on SSA in the current global context, 
commit this conceptual error.
The World Bank conflates incorporation with integration. 
It therefore substitutes the ideological link with the global 
economy, and most importantly, the subscription to neoliberal 
policies for measurable outcomes of integration. The 
conflation of incorporation and integration mirrors 
significantly in the World Bank’s report, Global Economic 
Prospects and the Developing World.1 In this report, the Bank 
argues that all developing countries, including SSA stand to 
gain from integrating into the emerging global economy. On the 
bases of these conceptual conflagrations, the World Bank, in 
its traditional defensive use of figures, provide statistics 
to show the level of SSA's integration into the global 
economy.
7See the World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing 
Countries.
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Table 5 .1
SSA-Integration with the Global Economy
1987 1997
Trade as % of PPPa GDP 15.6 17 .8
Trade in Goods as % of GDP 67 .6 94 .4
Gross Private Capital Flows as % of PPP GDP 2.5 5.6
Gross FDIb as % of PPP GDP 0 .4 1.0
Source: Adapted, from the World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1999 
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1S99), p. 326.
a. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) means the indicators involved
are weighted in national currency then converted into international 
dollars.
b. Foreign Direct Investment.
As indicated in Table 5.1 above, total trade as a percentage 
of GDP increased from 15.5 in 1987 to 17.8 in 1997. Trade in 
goods alone as a percentage of GDP increased from 57.6 in 1987 
to 94.4 in 1997. A.lso, gross private capital flows as a 
percentage of GDP rose from 2.5 in 1987 to 5.6 in 1997. Within 
the same time interval, gross FDI as percentage of GDP 
increased from 0.4 to 1.0.
Enamored by the paltry increases in trade, private 
capital flows, and foreign direct investment as presented in 
Table 5.1 above, the World Bank concludes insensitively that 
SSA is performing well on the course of integration, and that, 
the sub-region is already benefiting from its incorporation 
into the "globalizing" world economy. In recognition of the 
fact that the World Bank equates incorporation with
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integration, ana correspondingly assumes an automatic link 
between incorporation and the measurable gains of integration, 
the presumption that SSA is on the right path is subterfuge to 
real facts.
This is so because, if we conceptually disentangle 
incorporation from integration, and disaggregate the 
aggregated indicators on integration (as in Table 5.1 above) 
into its component parts (as it will be done in the next 
section), the facts on SSA’s marginalization, emerge to the 
fore. In this case, the aggregated indicators on integration 
appear as statistical personae, a mask, or a convenient 
euphemism that hides the painful reality of SSA’s 
marginalization within the emerging global system.
That is to say, incorporation is not the same as 
integration. Incorporation constitutes the subscription to the 
neoliberal ideological framework of globalization. It is the 
identification with the policy framework of the emerging 
global market discipline. Integration on the other hand is the 
substantive, measurable results attainable through the 
identification with the underlying policy tenets of globalism. 
These measurable results, as already indicated, are the 
conventional benefits associated with the implementation of 
neoliberal policies. In recognition of the fact that an 
"incorporated region" does not automatically assume all the 
conventional gains, inter-changing the two terms amounts to a 
serious conceptual block on the analysis of marginalization, 
especially in the context of SSA.
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MARGINALIZATION: THE FACTS, THE MEANINGS, AND DIMENSIONS
On che basis of the distinction made between 
incorporation and integration, to verify our theoretical 
specification (M = IC - g[lT]) is to demonstrate that the 
conventional benefits associated with neoliberalism are not 
applicable to SSA.. Operating within the conventional benefits 
of neoliberalism, what actually pertains in SSA will be 
indicated (and explained) by some selected macroeconomic data 
of the sub-region. After that, the meanings and dimensions of 
marginalization will be operationalized to reflect the gap 
between the presumed benefits of neoliberalism and what 
actually exists in SSA.
Marginalization: The Facts
To recall, the conventional gains associated with the 
subscription to neoliberal policies include: increased
international trade through access to international markets; 
diversification of exports; increasing foreign direct 
investment; growth that bears on the maximization of average 
welfare; and the effective management of external debts. The 
nagging question at this point is: Are these conventional 
benefits realizable in the context of SSA? Available 
indicators do not paint optimistic trends.
SSA’s subscription to the idea of export and import 
liberalization is yet to instigate the much needed increased 
international trade and access to international markets. This
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is so because, seiecced indicators on international trade 
point to declining trends.
As indicated in Table 5.2 below, with. 1987 as the base
year of 100, SSA’s Export Unit Values decreased from 12 8 in
1980 to 107 in 1997, while the Import Unit Values increased
from 92 in 1980 to 111 in 1997 . with decreasing export values
and increasing import values, SSA needed more exports to 
obtain the same unit of imports. This partially explains the 
deteriorating trend in the sub-region's Terms of Trade, which 
declined from 139 in 1980 to 97 in 1997 (Table 5.2).
As a result of worsening terms of trade, SSA is the only 
sub-region with a persistent declining trend in the average 
annual percentage change in real trade to GDP ratios.8 The 
unfortunate scenario here is that, though, SSA has the highest 
percentage ratio of exports to GDP9 in comparison with other 
developing regions in the world, the sub-region has been 
marginalized from world trade. As shown in Table 5.2, the 
value of SSA's Total Commodity Trade as a percentage of Total 
World Trade declined from 4.3 in 1985 to 1.8 in 1995, while 
the value of its Manufactured Exports as a percentage of Total 
World Manufactured Exports decreased from 5.2 in 1986 to 3.0 
in 1995.
In addition to these declining trends. Taxes on 
International Trade as a percentage of Total Revenue increased
8See the UNDP, Human Development Report, 1997, pp. 84-85.
9This ratio measures the extent at which economies are open to the 
outside world in terms of trade. See Kidane Mengisteab, Globalization 
and Autocentricity in Africa's Development in the 21st Century, Table 
3.2., p. 76.
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Table 5.2
SSA-Selected Indicators on International Trade, 1980-1997
1980 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Percentage Share of Total 
World Trade (Value)
Total Commodity Trade 4.3 3.4 4.4 4.3 3.2 5.3 2.5 3.0 2.0 1.8
Manufactured Exports - 5.2 4.2 3.6 4.7 3.5 3.5 3.2 4.7 3.3 3.0 -
Terms of Tradea 
(1987 = 100)
Export Unit Values 128 98 98 111 105 105 102 102 108 112 107
Import Unit Values 92 - 99 99 101 96 94 90 93 93 100 111
Terms of Trade 139 - 99 99 101 96 94 90 93 93 100 97
Percentaae of Total Revenue 
Taxes on International 
Trade and Transactions _ 10.1 12.7 10.7 10.3 11.1 10.8 12.2 14.3 15.4 14.1
Sources: Adapted from, the United Nations, International Trade Statistics Yearbook, Vol. 2, and the World 
Bank, African Development Indicators, 1998/99. 
a. The figures are rounded to one decimal place.
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from 10.1 in 1388 to 14.1 in 1997 (Table 5.2). This means that 
it is becoming increasingly costly for SSA to engage in 
international trade. As a summary, TabUe 5.2 indicates that 
SSA has not only been marginalized from world trade but also, 
it has been compelled to engage in int emational trade on 
deteriorating terms, and with increasing transaction costs.
The gains associated with international! trade, and improved 
access to international markets are yetz to be realized in the 
context of the sub-region.
With regard to the much touted ga ins associated with the 
diversification of exports, the scenario in SSA rather paints 
an increasing concentration on the export of few primary 
commodities.10 The sub-region is yet to diversify its economy 
toward the production and export of manufactured goods.
As indicated in Table 5.3 below, the a_nnual percentage growth
in the production and export of manufa ctured goods declined 
from 26.8 in 1980 to 10.4 in 1996. The decline in the export 
of manufactured goods, that signifies sl process of de­
industrialization, is compensated for hoy an increasing 
production and export of primary commocdities. In average
terms, cocoa, coffee, and cotton still form more than 60
percent of SSA1 s total exports.11 The production and export of 
these primary commodities, as measured by thousands of metric
10See Belinda Coote, The Trade Trap: Po verty and the Global 
Commodity Markets (Oxford: Oxfam Publication, 1996).
11Ibid., p . 6.
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Table 5.3
SSA-Selected Indicators on Diversification of Exports, 1980-1996
1980 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
In Thousands o£ Metric Tons
Cocoa 863 1115 1081 1356 1346 1365 1186 1467 1288 1337 1839
Coffee 807 931 803 881 1018 820 840 828 738 763 949
Cotton 404 604 568 708 592 564 570 582 619 611 642
Annual Percent.aae Growth
Manufactured Goods Exports 26.8 12.3 8.9 0.7 4.1 5.2 1.5 6.8 5.8 4.3 10 .4
Manufactured Goods Imports 14.6 19.6 -2.6 -2.6 0.2 -10.3 -5.0 4.9 5.9 18.1 15.4
Source: Adapted from the World Bank, African Development Indicators, 1998/99.
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cons, have been increasing since 1980 (Table 5.3). In chis 
case, SSA is reverting co Che performance of its traditional 
role as exporter of primary products.
Regrettably, the paltry increases in Net Foreign Direct 
Investment, and Net Private Capital Flows do not help the 
diversification efforts in the sub-region. As shown in Table
5.4 below, the Net Foreign Direct Investment in SSA increased 
from USS 0.9 billion in 1990 to US$ 2.6 billion in 1996. As a 
percentage of GNP, this ratio increased in the same time 
interval from 0.3 to 0.8. Within the same time interval. Net 
Private Capital Flows rose from USS 0.3 billion to USS 11.8 
billion.
Quite apart from the fact that SSA has been marginalized 
from the global flow of investment and private capital in 
comparison with East Asia and the Pacific (Table 5.4), the 
main function of these flows tend to deepen the dependency of 
SSA on primary products. That is to say, the multiplier 
effects of these investments tend to negate the 
industrialization efforts of the sub-region.
As disappointingly stated by the World Bank, in "Sub- 
Saharan Africa foreign direct investment is confined largely 
to natural resource sectors in a few countries."12 In other 
words, instead of the gains of export diversification, foreign 
direct investment, in the context of SSA, deepens the pain.
I2The World Bank, Global Development Finance, Vol. 1: Analysis and 
Summary Tables, p. 28
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Table 5.4:
SSA-Foreign Direct Investment and Net Private Capital Flows Compared with East Asia and the Pacific, 
1990-1996
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Net Foreign Direct Investment 
(Billions of U.S. Dollars) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
East Asia and the Pacific
0.9 1.6 0.8 1.6 3.1 2.2 2.6
10.2 12.7 20.9 38.1 44.1 51.8 61.1
Net Foreign Direct Investment 
(Percentage of ONP) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
East Asia and the Pacific
0.3
1.6
0.6
1.8
0.3
2.6
0.6
4.5
1.2
4.4
0.8
4.2
0.8
4.2
Net Private Capital Flows 
(Billions of U.S. Dollars) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
East Asia and the Pacific
0.3 0.8 -0.3 -0.5 5.2 9.1 11.8
19.3 20.8 36.9 62.4 71.0 84.1 108.7
Source: Adapted from the World Bank, Global Development Finance, Vol. 1: Analysis and Summary Tables.
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and. uncertainty associated with the export of primary 
products.
Quite apart from the negative effects of foreign direct 
investment, there are substantial decreases in the net flows, 
and net transfers from multilateral institutions, including 
the IMF. Net flows represent all disbursement of loans less 
all repayments of principal loans. Net transfers are net flows 
less interest payments.
In current prices. Long and Short Term net flows to SSA 
decreased from USS S615 million in 1980 to USS 2672 million in 
1996, while Long-Term Loans alone decreased from USS 8615 
million to USS 866 million in the same time period (see Table
5.5 below). The revelation here is that, SSA has been 
receiving declining financial net flows from the multilateral 
financial institutions since 1980.
On the other hand, Long and Short Term net transfers 
declined from USS 5104 million in 1980 to USS -2568 million in 
1996, while Long-Term net transfers decreased from USS 6133 
million in 1980 to USS -3979 million in 1996. The meaning of 
the negative signs is that, since 1996, SSA has been a net 
transferor of financial resources to the World Bank and the 
IMF. In terms of net transfers, SSA gives more than it gets 
from these institutions.
If we are to cast the reverse flow of resources within 
our conditionality experiment (as explained in Chapter IV) , 
the intentions of the Bretton Woods institutions become very 
clear.
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Table 5.5
SSA-Indicators on Net Flows and Net Transfers, 1980-1996
1980 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Net Flows in
Millions of U.S. Dollars
(Current Prices)
Long and Short Term Loans,
including IMF 8615 9917 7125 7075 7160 4104 5320 5932 7352 7469 2672
Long-Term Loans,
including the IMF 8615 6131 5725 6312 4853 4562 4139 5679 4799 4557 866
Net transfers in 
Millions of U.S. Dollars 
(Current Prices)
Long and Short Term Loans,
including IMF 5104 6208 2413 2516 1847 -1156 726 2563 2822 2500 -2568
Long-Term Loans
including IMF 6133 2953 1668 2375 255 -96 103 2837 678 33 -3979
Source: Adapted from the World Bank, African Economic Indicators, 1998/99.
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The World. Bank and the IMF are operating either as cost- 
conscious experimenters, or cunning manipulators who after 
conditioning an expected behavior (implementation of 
neoliberal reforms) fail to deliver the promised rewards 
(increasing disbursement of reform loans). However, behaving 
like the rat in the operant experiment that continues to press 
the lever even when the experimenter stops delivering the food 
pellets, SSA is still on the path of reforms in expectation of 
increasing loans from the World Bank and the IMF. The 
psychological implication here is that, SSA is financially 
marginalized within a neoliberal policy trap.
Financially "hemmed in" within the confines of 
neoliberalism, SSA cannot even count on its own, internally 
generated investment funds. As a percentage of GDP, the 
Gross National Savings declined from 20.3 in 1S80 to 8.4 in 
1997, while Gross Public Investment decreased from 7.2 in 1988 
to 5.8 in 19 97. On the other hand, Gross Domestic Savings, as 
a percentage of GDP, declined from 24.6 in 1980 to 11.6 in 
1997, while Gross Domestic Investment fell from 23.1 to 18.3 
within the same time period (see Table 5.6 below) . Compelled 
to deal with deteriorating terms of trade (see Table 5.2) 
associated with the continuing export of primary products (see 
Table 5.3), and confronted with reverse transfer of resources 
(see Table 5.5), SSA is deeply incapacitated in the generation 
of substantial investment funds (Table 5.6) .
The offshoots of these marginalization trends thwart the 
efforts of SSA on its journey toward the kingdom of welfare-
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Table 5.6
SSA-Indicators on National and Domestic Savings and Investment, 1980-1997
1980 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Percentaae of GDP
Gross National Savings 20.3 12.2 12.2 10.3 8.6 4.7 5.4 7.8 7.3 9.9 8.4
Gross Public Investment - 7.2 7.1 6.7 6.1 6.4 5.8 5.7 5.5 5.5 5.8
Gross Domestic Savings 24.6 15.6 16.0 14.9 12 .5 8.2 9.2 11.4 10.6 13.5 11.6
Gross Domestic Investment 23.1 18.9 18.3 17.0 17 .6 16.6 17.5 19.1 19.7 18.7 18.3
Source: Adapted from the World Bank, African Development Indicators, 1998/99.
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maximizing growth, as promised within the universal istic 
presumptions of neoliberalism. As indicated in Table 5.6, the 
annual percentage change in GDP growth declined from 3.3 in 
1980 to 3.5 in 1997. In average terms, this is not a 
spectacular decline since Table 5.7 below indicates that there 
were appreciable growths in 1995 and 1996. In a broader 
macroeconomic perspective however, there seems to be growth 
without the type of development that translates into the 
improvement of average welfare.
As an appropriate surrogate for the measurement of 
average welfare, GNP per capita decreased from USS 639 in 1980 
to USS 503 in 1997 (see Table 5.7). The decline in average 
welfare is accentuated by the fact that, neoliberal policy 
demands such as the removal of subsidies on essential 
services, and the effects of devaluation precipitate increase 
in cost of living. As shown in Table 5.7, an increasing cost 
of living is reflected by the rise in the Consumer Price index 
(with 1987 as base year of 100) from 40 in 1980 to 305 in 
1997. With declining GNP per capita, and with rising cost of 
living, the average person in SSA is yet to benefit from the 
sub-regions' incorporation into the ideological framework of 
globalization (this issue awaits a more detailed analysis in 
Chapter VI) .
The compendium effect of growth without development, 
worsening terms of trade, declining share of total world 
trade, de-industrialization, and rejuvenation of primary 
exports is a deteriorating debt position of SSA. As indicated
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Table 5.7
SSA-Indi.cato.rs on GDP Growth Rates, GNP Per Capita, and Inflation, 1980-1997
1980 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Percent Annual Change 
GDP Growth 3.8 4.0 3.0 1.3 1.2 -1.1 0.6 1.7 4.1 5.1 3.5
U.S. Dollars 
GNP Per Capita 639 536 537 522 517 520 502 485 488 503 503
Inflation
(1987=100)
Food Price Index 
Consumer Price Indexa
40 100 112 124 138 161 190 203 232 262 289
43 112 122 138 157 186 203 231 253 277 305
a. The figures are rounded to one decimal place.
Source: Adapted from the World Bank, African Development Indicators, 1998/99.
2
0
9
2 1 0
in Table 5.7, SSA’s Total Debt Stock rose from USS 13 0.1 
billion in 1990 to USS 223.2 billion in 1999. Servicing such 
debts imposes severe strain on the sub-regions' economy. For 
instance. Total Debt Stock as a percentage of Total Expo-rts 
increased from 91.7 in 1980 to 236.9 in 1996. This means , by 
1996, the total debts of SSA were twice the value of its 
exports (see Table 5.8 below) . The lesson here is that, the 
deterioration of the indebted position of SSA seems to b»e 
positively related to its incorporation into the global market 
discipline.
Major macroeconomic indicators presented above show- that 
SSA is performing poorly on the measurable outcomes of 
integration, irrespective of the fact that the sub-regio:n has 
been incorporated into the ideological framework of 
globalization. This, in essence, captures the paradox reslating 
to SSA's incorporation into the logic of globalism, and its 
concurrent denial of the gains associated with integrati on. In 
relation to the sub-region's worsening debt position, time 
negative impact of this paradox is devastating because, the 
sub-region has to operate within the framework of what tHoward 
P. Lehman refers to as "indebted development."13
13As explained by H.P. Lehman, "indebted development" involwes the 
"process and policy outcomes of economic adjustment and debt management 
strategies for Third World states who must interact at both level:s of 
analysis..." See Howard P. Lehman, Indebted Development: Strategic c 
Bargaining and Economic Adjustment in the Third World, p. 2.
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Table 5.8 
SSA-Summary Debt Data, Selected Years, 1980-1999
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Total Debt Stock (US$ bn.) 180.1 187.3 187.4 197.3 212.8 226.8 229.3 222.1 221.3 228.2
Ratio of External Debt to GDP 61.6 62.8 62.1 65.7 71.4 62.0 56.2
1980 1990 1995 1996
In Percentaae Ratios
EDT/XGS 91.7 226.6 241.7 236.9
EDT/GNP 30.6 71.1 81.3 72.6
INT/XGS 6.2 9.1 5.5 5.6
Kev
EDT/XGS = Total Debt Stock as Percentage of Total Exports
EDT/GNP = Total Debt Stock as Percentage o£ GNP
INT/XGS = Total Interest Payment as Percentage of Total Exports
Sources: Adapted from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook,
October, 1998 (Washington, DC: IMF, Publication Services, 1998), and the World Bank,
Global Development Finance, Vol. 1: Analysis and Summary Tables.
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Marginalization of SSA: Meanings and Dimensions
The deteriorating macroeconomic indicators as delineated 
above serve as the basis for the various meanings and 
dimensions of the marginalization of SSA. As rightly pointed 
out by James H. Mitteiman, the meaning of marginalization 
could best be understood in relation to the specific positions 
of regions within the emerging Global Division of Labor and 
Power (hereafter referred to as GDLP) .14 If economic strength 
is an index of political power, and political influence the 
determinative factor in the hierarchical organization of 
regions within the emerging GDLP, then, the worsening economic 
indicators place SSA at the bottom of the race. At this 
juncture, a specified definition of marginalization is in 
order.
Marginalization is an epithet for describing SSA's
diminishing influence, and increasing irrelevance in the
emerging GDLP. SSA’s diminishing influence, and increasing
irrelevance is explained by the fact that, though, the sub-
region has been incorporated into the neoliberal ideological
framework, it is yet to benefit from the gains of integration.
In comparative terms, marginalization refers to the
economic regression of Africa relative to other regions of 
the world and the diminishing importance of Africa to the 
global economy, particularly to the industrialized countries.1-5
14See James H- Mitteiman, The Globalization Syndrome: 
Transformation and Resistance.
'-Claude Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa, p. 113.
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The economic regression of SSA, as indicated by the worsening
macroeconomic trends, reduces the importance and relevance of
the sub-region within the emerging global system. To make a
point, but at the risk of an exaggeration, SSA is increasingly
relegated to the footnotes of the globalizing world. The
relegated position of SSA is best captured in an assessment by
the New York Times. It writes,
Africa's share of world trade ... is now closer to 2 percent.
That is so marginal it is almost as if the continent has curled 
up and disappeared from the map of international shipping lanes 
and airline routes that rope together Europe, North America and 
the booming Far East. Direct foreign investment in Africa is so 
paltry it is not even measured in the latest World Bank study.16
That is to say, in terms of trade and investment, SSA is
virtually non-existent in the calculations of the
industrialized countries. Such diminutive position of the sub-
region affects its relative power position in the
international system.
By extension, and specifically in connection with the
distribution of power and its influence, marginalization is
"the relative or absolute lack of power to influence a defined
social entity while being a recipient of the exercise of power
by other parts of the entity."17 In other words, SSA cannot
drastically change the policy orientation of SAPs, but will as
a result of its powerlessness, continue to play by the rules
I6Cited in Kidane Mengisteab, Globalization and Autocentricity In 
Africa's Davslopment in the 21st Century, p. 156.
17Adebayo Adedeji, "Introduction, Marginalization and Marginality: 
Context, Issues and Viewpoints," in Adebayo Adedeji, ed., Africa Within 
the World: Beyond Dispossession and Dependence (London: Zed Books,
1993a), p. 1.
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of the neoliberal game, notwithstanding the fact that the 
measurable outcomes are disappointingly negative.
Two dimensions of marginalization could be deduced from 
the characterizations above; external, and internal. External 
marginalization captures the nondescript relationship between 
the sub-region as a whole, and Che global economic system as a 
unit. It reflects the subordinated position of SSA within the 
hierarchical (Darwinian) arrangement of the international 
system. Internal marginalization on the other hand signifies 
how the people of SSA are unwittingly made to bear the burden 
of poverty that is a derivative of the sub-region’s external 
marginalization.
According to the 19 9 5 Oxfam Poverty Report, 48 percent of 
the population in SSA were living in poverty in 1990. This 
ratio is expected to increase to 50 percent by the end of the 
year 2000.13 It is in this respect that Adebayo Adedeji argues 
that, in terms of "the prevalence of poverty . . . sub-Saharan 
Africa is the world's most marginal region."19 Poverty and 
destitution undermine the external marginalization of SSA. As 
a result, the two dimensions of the sub-region’s 
marginalization are self-reinforcing.
I3See K. Watkins, The Oxfam Poverty Report (Oxford: Oxfam, 1995) ,
p. 4.
19Adebayo Adedeji, "Introduction, Marginalization and Marginality: 
Context, Issues and Viewpoints," p. 3.
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ACCOUNTING FOR THE PARADOX OF INCORPORATION AND 
MARGINALIZATION
What has been, done so far is to isolate the various 
components of our specified theoretical function (M = IC - 
g[IT]) chat indicates that, marginalization (M) equals 
incorporation (IC) without the gains of integration (g[IT]). 
The identification of the various terms of the model is a 
descriptive guide to the explanation of the paradox of 
incorporation and marginalization. It is pertinent to note 
however that while the facts, and evidence on the 
marginalization of SSA invokes less contention, there is a
considerable degree of disagreement in accounting for the
marginalization of the sub-region. For the sake of conceptual 
clarity, and especially to vindicate our specified theoretical 
function, the competing explanations will be demarcated into 
two basic strands: the orthodox, and the unorthodox views.
The Orthodox View: Insufficient Reform Thesis
The orthodox accounts reflect the traditional positions 
of the World Bank, the IMF, and their neoliberal apostles who 
operate from within the internal validating assumptions of 
neoclassical economics. In spite of some fine shades of
differential emphasis, the orthodox view accounts for the
marginalization of SSA from the perspective that the sub- 
region has not gone far enough with liberalization, 
devaluation, and marketization. In this case, insufficient 
neoliberal reforms, rather than unresponsive neoliberal 
policies explain the marginalization of the sub-region.
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Two World Bank economises, Francis Ng and Alexander 
Yeats, argue that protectionist policies are the main 
explanatory causes of Africa's marginalization in world 
trade.20 According to the authors, protectionist policies 
prevent Africa from developing new export products. As a 
result, Africa is compelled to rely on the export of primary 
commodities that are "of declining relative importance in 
international trade."21 Ng and Yeats conclude their study with 
an emphatic statement that there is "little support for the 
proposition that external protection caused Africa’s 
marginalization in global trade."22 The implication here is 
that SSA’s own internal protectionist policies are to be 
blamed for the economic retrogression of the sub-region.
In another context, a group of World Bank experts, Yeats 
et al. contend that anti-competitive domestic policies, rather 
than external trade barriers account for SSA’s shrinking share 
of world exports.23 These authors admit that "exports from 
sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 3.1 percent of world exports 
in 1995, but by 1990 its share had fallen to 1.2 percent... 
implying annual trade loss of 465 billion in current 
prices.”24 In accounting for this loss, the authors claim that
20See Francis Ng and Alexander Yeats, "Open economies Work Better! 
Did Africa's Protectionist Policies Cause Its Marginalization in World 
Trade? ’
21Ibid., p. 893.
22Ibid., p. 901.
23See Alexander J. Yeats et a l ., "What Caused Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
Marginalization in World Trade?”
24Ibid., p . 38 .
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SSA's marginalization, is due to the fact that the sub-region
has not done much on trade liberalization. In their expert
recommendation, they warn;
If sub-Saharan Africa is to reverse the unfavorable export trends 
of the past two decades, it must quickly adopt appropriate trade 
and structural adjustment policies to change its international 
competitiveness and permit its exporters to capitalize on 
opportunities in foreign markets.-
Reading between the lines, these policy experts are certainly 
re-echoing the fundamental logic of increased exports through 
the policy of massive devaluations. In the logic of the 
neoclassical model, devaluations facilitate exports by 
reducing the existence of anti-export bias through the re­
alignment of price ratios between exports and imports. In the 
view of Yeats et al. , the continuing existence of such anti­
export bias accounts for the marginalization of the sub-region 
in world trade.
Two officials of the IMF's Research Department, Dean 
DeRosa and Joshua Greene, also support the devaluation 
argument.26 The authors ridicule the much touted assertion 
that concurrent devaluations undertaken by exporters of 
primary products will lead to a downward trend in export 
prices and reduced economic welfare. Contrary, the authors 
insist that "exports in Sub-Saharan Africa may well rise 
following devaluations by a number of countries"27 because,
25ibid., p . 41.
26See Dean DeRosa and Joshua Greene, "Will Concemporaneous 
Devaluations Hurt Exports from Sub-Saharan Africa?" Finance and 
Development, (March 1991), pp. 32-34.
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"simultaneous devaluations by a number of African countries 
are unlikely to reduce world commodity prices sufficiently to 
reduce their total export earnings.”28 The conjecture here is 
that, SSA has been marginalized because specific neoliberal 
policies that are intended to boost exports and increase the 
availability of foreign exchange have not been fully 
exhaus ted.
It has also been the contention of the World Bank that,
" the need to increase exports was ... to improve growth and 
the balance of payments, " and that, "an overvalued currency 
has been the primary obstacle to exports, with devaluation a 
major part of the cure."29 The assumption here is that, there 
is more than a probabilistic relationship between devaluation, 
increased exports, increasing foreign exchange, and the 
efficient management of external debts. What the World Bank is 
subiiminally suggesting is that, SSA’s approach-avoidance 
attitude toward devaluation negatively impacts on most of the 
worsening indicators that index the marginalization of the 
sub-region.
On the assumption that import liberalization has positive 
multiplier effects on the value and volume of exports. Dean 
DeRosa admonishes that, "if sub-Saharan African countries had 
opted for open economic policies, they would have unleashed a 
strong supply-side response from domestic producers."30 The
27Ibid., p . 32.
28Ibid., p . 34.
29The World Bank, Adjustment in Africa, p. 75.
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contention here is that, SSA has not gone far enough with the 
marketization process to expose the economy to international 
competitiveness. As a result, domestic producers are denied 
the entrepreneurial incentives to produce more for the export 
market, hence, the marginalization of SSA from international 
export markets. In other words, it is not that SSA has been 
marginalized from the world trading system but that, the sub- 
region has marginalized itself from the opportunities inherent 
in the international trading system.
The insufficient reform thesis also accounts for the 
marginalization of SSA with regard to the flow of foreign 
direct investment. On the premise that financial repression 
inhibits direct foreign investment, the standard argument 
rests on the lack of the minimum threshold of financial 
liberalization.31 The underlying assumption of this argument 
is that, external investment inflows are directly related to 
the level of open financial systems. This is so because, 
financial liberalization, and the adoption of favorable 
investment codes creates incentives for the increasing flow of 
foreign direct investment. On this note, SSA has been 
marginalized from direct foreign investment flows and all the 
associated benefits because, the financial systems of the sub- 
region have not been liberalized enough.
3<3Dean DeRosa, "Protectionism in sub-Saharan Africa hinders 
Exports, " p . 42.
31For a comprehensive review of the financial repression argument 
on the marginalization of SSA, see Diery Seek and Yasim H. El Nil, 
"Financial Liberalization in Africa," World Development, Vol. 21, No. 11 
(1993), pp. 1867-1881.
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The underlying tenets of the orthodox explanation are not 
far fetched. According to the orthodox position, neoliberal 
policies that define the current development framework are 
technically neutral in their application, and non- 
discriminative in their effects. If faithfully adopted and 
implemented, the substantive, measurable economic outcomes 
will be the same in all contexts. In other words, under all 
circumstances, and in all contexts, there will be no 
discrepancy between the internal validating assumptions, and 
the external results of neoliberal policies.
In this case, SSA has been marginalized not because 
neoliberal policies are externally irrelevant in the context 
of the sub-region. Rather, SSA has been marginalized because, 
the implementation of neoliberal policies has not gone beyond 
the much needed critical threshold. This minimum threshold is 
needed to facilitate the sanctimonious determinism of market 
forces in the realization of the measurable gains of 
integration. The vindication of the orthodox view7 in the light 
of our theoretical function awaits the consideration of the 
unorthodox view.
The Unorthodox View: Unresponsive Neoliberal Reforms
In accounting for the marginalization of SSA, the 
unorthodox view also operates within the interstices of 
neoliberalism but, figuratively turns the insufficient reform 
thesis on its head. According to the unorthodox position, 
contextually unresponsive neoliberal policies, rather than
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insufficient: reforms explain the marginalization of the sub- 
region. Therefore, the unorthodox view, as a matter of 
principle, rejects the universalistic, redemptive connotations 
of the neoliberal model.
As previously alluded to, Alexander j. Yeats et al - , and 
Francis Ng and Alexander Yeats claim that internal 
protectionist policies hinder the promotion of export led 
growth, and thus deepen the marginalization of SSA from global 
trade. Adebayo Adedeji, an African statesman, and a respected 
guru of the unorthodox view, reject the internal protectionist 
argument.32 In his view, from the onset of colonization, 
through the establishment of neocolonial relationships, to the 
current orthodoxy of neoliberalism, SSA’s economy has been 
predicated upon the export of primary commodities. However, 
with regard to exports, and contrary to the orthodox 
assertion, "the international environment has been hostile to 
Sub-Saharan Africa.”33
Hostile in the sense that, the development of synthetic 
materials and other substitutes undermine the international 
demand for SSA’s primary commodities. This assertion holds 
even when devaluation reduces the external price of the sub­
region’s products.34 On the other hand, as Belinda Coote
32See Adebayo Adedeji, ’Introduction, Marginalization and 
Marginality.” op. cit., and Adebayo Adedeji, "The Case for Remaking 
Africa," in D. Rimmer, ed. , Action in Africa. (London: The Royal 
Institute, 1993b), pp. 43-57.
33Adebayo Adedeji, "The Case for Remaking Africa, “ in D. Rimmer, 
ed., Action in Africa (London: The Royal Institute, 1993), p. 51.
34See Kidane Mengisteab, "Devaluation: The Response of Exports and 
Imports," pp. 106-125.
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painstakingly explains in tine circumstances of some selected 
African countries, if SSA attempts to add value to its primary 
products by processing them, the sub-region runs into stiff 
tariff barriers imposed by the industrialized countries of the 
North.3- In retrospect, formidable external impediments more 
than internal protectionist schemes obstruct SSA from 
participating fully, and beneficially in the international, 
manufactured trading system.
In the face of the external impediments to the export of 
SSA's manufactured products, the neoliberal invocation of an 
export led growth transmute into the re-vamping of raw 
material exports. Rejuvenating the export of primary 
commodities precipitate the marginalization of SSA because it 
takes the sub-region "back to the future" in its traditional 
role as a raw material producing enclave.36
With the re-incarnation of its unenviable traditional 
position, SSA is relegated to the lowest level of what James 
H. Mitteiman refers to as the emerging global division of 
labor and power (GDLP) . In this case, the idea that the 
promotion of markets and economic liberalization will 
encourage free trade with equal benefits to all participants 
is a highly misplaced faith with an unintended consequence. It
35See Belinda Coote, The Trade Trap.
36See Thomas M. Callaghy and John Ravenhill, "How Hemmed In? 
Lessons and Prospects of Africa’s Responses to Decline,” in T.M. 
Callaghy and J. Ravenhill, eds. , Hammed In: Responses to Africa's 
Economic Decline, pp. 520-563.
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serves to incorporate, but marginalize SSA from the emerging 
global order.
Devaluation, as already indicated, is also a darling tool
in the explanatory analysis of the orthodox thesis. The
admonition is that, SSA has been very recalcitrant in its
application of devaluation as a policy instrument for the
promotion of exports, and in attracting foreign direct
investment. To be fair and precise, most countries in SSA have
implemented across the board devaluations. Even the World
Bank, an incorrigible apostle of this policy, has acknowledged
the possible destabilization effects of devaluation on the
economy of the sub-region. In a comment on the magnitude of
Ghana’s devaluation, the Bank states;
Sudden large changes in prices may themselves hinder adjustment 
as in Ghana where industrial firms had great difficulty 
financing the working capital requirements of a ten-fold 
devaluation in 1983 .37
The concern of the World Bank in this instance partially
supports the unorthodox position. That is to say, it is not
that SSA has been marginalized because it has not been
following the prescribed neoliberal policy conditionalities.
Rather, it has been marginalized because neoliberal policy
instruments, such as devaluation, are not producing the
anticipated results.
That neoliberal policies are not producing the desired
results is concurred by Sebastian Edwards with his observation
37The World Bank, Adjustment Lending: An Evaluation of Ten Years 
of Experience (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1988), p. 51.
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that, "nominal devaluations in Africa are fully translated 
into higher domestic inflation without reducing the anti­
export bias."38 Also, as a result of "elasticity pessimism" 
associated with SSA’s primary exports, even Anne Krueger, an 
influential free trade advocate, sounds bearish on 
devaluation. She insists that, "domestic inflation is 
triggered by devaluation," and as a result, precludes "any 
change in the real price of foreign exchange.”39 With 
domestic inflation (see Table 5.7), and without substantial 
changes in the real price of foreign exchange, the power of 
devaluation in the promotion of exports remains in the virtual 
realm of the neoliberal model.
Quite apart from the fact that devaluation in the context 
of SSA does not necessarily promote exports, the effects of 
this policy also contribute to a process of de­
industrialization (refer Table 5.3). In his examination of why 
British industries are quitting Africa, Brain Scudder isolates 
devaluation and the liberalization of import controls as the 
main culprits.40 Devaluation increases the price of imports 
and as a result, raises the operational costs of industries 
with high import components. Liberalization, on the other
38Sebastian Edwards, “Openness, Trade Liberalization, and Growth 
in Developing Countries," p. 1370.
39Anne O. Krueger, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: 
Liberalization Attempts and Consequences (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger 
Publishers, 1978), p. 5.
40See Brian Scudder, "Why the British are Quitting Africa, " Africa 
Business, No. 199 (May 1995), pp. 16-19.
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hand, floods the local market with foreign substitutes and 
thereby, discourage local industrial investments.
The product of these two basic policies of neoliberaiism 
is not only forcing governments to abandon industries, it is 
also driving British investors out of Africa at an alarming 
rate. As at 1989, there were 90 British companies operating in 
English Speaking Africa (ESA). By the middle of 1994, over 
half of these companies had disinvested, or preparing to 
disinvest from this region.41 In the face of this 
disinvestment fever, liberalization of the financial system, 
and the enactment of favorable investment codes that are 
intended to attract foreign investments degenerate into self- 
defeating, neoiiberal rituals with repugnant consequences. The 
case of Ghana exemplifies such an unresponsive neoliberal 
thes is .
In 1985, Ghana adopted a new Investment Code with 
guarantees against nationalization, and with provisions for 
unrestricted transfer of dividends and charges for technology 
transfers. According to The Economist Intelligence Unit Report 
on Ghana, this Investment Code is one of the most liberal 
investment documents in Africa.42 Disappointingly however, the 
pattern of investment after the promulgation of the Code is 
not the type that could precipitate a diversified industrial 
system. There has been negligible foreign interest other than
41Figures are cited in ibid.
4-See The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Report on Ghana, 1989- 
90, p. 37.
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in the financing of gold extraction and timber logging, which 
are basically primary products.
Foreign investment in the extractive, primary sector has 
been so intense that, by 1992, gold has taken over cocoa as 
the leading foreign exchange earner for Ghana.43 This type of 
foreign investment seemed inimical to Ghana’s 
industrialization efforts when the then Finance Secretary 
reprimanded that:
Investors should choose the most efficient technologies available, 
but it is clear that to prevent an intensification of the enclave 
nature of mining operations, we need to encourage the processing 
of some of the mineral products locally and stimulate the growth 
of mining service activities supplying inputs into the sector.44
In as much as Che Secretary would have preferred
diversification of industrial investments, the above
supplication that reflects his country’s marginalization from
the boom of global industrialization is very nostalgic. But,
from the necliberal framework within which his government
operates, the supplication is illegitimate.
Incorporated into the policy interstices of
globalization, foreign investors in SSA act purely on the
distributive (in)justice of price signals, rather than on
moralistic, or nostalgic compulsions of state directives. The
irony here is that, an Investment Code that was intended to
assist an industrial diversification plan rather turns to
43See West Africa, No. 3968 (October 1993), p. 1810.
44Cited in The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Report on Ghana, 
1991, p. 16.
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deepen the pain of Ghana’s reliance on the export of primary 
commodities. In this particular instance, liberalization of 
Ghana's investment regime has not been responsive with regard 
to the anticipated results. The deepening of the extractive, 
enclave sector was not what the government expected to gain 
with its "over-liberalized" Investment Code.
According to the unorthodox thesis, it is within the deep 
recesses of such unresponsive neoliberal policies that the 
marginalization of SSA assumes its dynamic form. In other 
words, the marginalization of SSA is a direct function of the 
sub-region's incorporation into the contextually unresponsive 
neoliberal framework that is associated with the developmental 
paradigm of globalization. The crucial question that emerges 
at this point is: To what extent do the two competing
explanations on the marginalization of SSA fare in the light 
of our specified theoretical function?
A LITMUS TEST OF COMPETING EXPLANATIONS
The insufficient reform thesis, an account preferred by 
the Bretton Woods institutions, claims that SSA has been 
marginalized because the sub-region has not gone far enough 
with neoiiberal reforms. This means SSA has not been 
incorporated enough. By implication, this explanation relates 
incorporation (IC) as a function of the gains of integration 
(g[lT]). In its notational form, IC = g[lT]. In other words, 
there is a direct, automatic link between the depth of 
incorporation (IC) and the attainable level of the gains of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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integration (g[!T]). As incorporation (IC) deepens, the gains 
of integration (g[IT]) also increases.
If we are to accept the orthodox explanation, then, we 
must also concede that there are no intervening variables 
between incorporation and the attainment of the gains of 
integration. In this case, marginalization (M) emerges as an 
inverse function of incorporation (1/IC), in the sense that, 
marginalization decreases (or increases) with increasing (or 
decreasing) incorporation. Granting this assertion to be true, 
then, marginalization could not be equal to incorporation 
without the gains of integration as presented in our 
theoretical function as;
M = IC - g(!T)
However, implied in our function is the assumption that there 
are some intervening variables that limit the ability of SSA 
to maximize the measurable outcomes of integration. This is in 
spite of the fact that the sub-region has been incorporated 
into the ideological framework of globalization.
In this case, the identification of some intervening 
factors that limit the maximization of the gains of 
integration in the context of SSA will be useful at three 
levels. First, it will vindicate our theoretical function. 
Second, it will shake, and then bury the orthodox presumption 
that the means (that is, incorporation through the 
implementation of neoliberal policies), in an unmediated 
matrix, justify the ends (that is, the attainment of the gains 
of integration) . Third, it will enable us to reappraise the
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unorthodox explanation in light of our specified theoretical 
function.
The unfortunate fact that unexamined adoption of 
neoliberal policies both incorporates, and marginalizes SSA 
within the global trade and investment regime is accentuated 
by some factors that operate to the disadvantage of the sub- 
region in the international system. G.K. Helieiner has 
cautioned analysts that the operations of international market 
forces "are clearly not ethically rooted.”4- It is therefore 
improper to make pragmatic assertions about the operation of 
international market forces on the basis of distributive 
justice that hinges on moral premises.
While mindful of Helieiner's precautionary note, one 
cannot on the other hand lose sight of one basic unchanging 
constant. That is, a historically conditioned component of an 
unequal international exchange system,46 that works to the 
detriment of SSA, cannot be rectified merely by strategically 
uninformed liberalization of trade, and investment on the part 
of the sub-region. Take note that trade and foreign direct 
investment epitomize the major "push" and "pull" factors that 
determine the degree to which regions could maximize their 
economic outcomes of integration. Regrettably however, there 
are some factors that detract from the ability of SSA to
46G.K. Helieiner, International Economic Disorder: Essays in 
North-South Relations (London: The Macmillan Press, 1980), p. 25, 
italics in original.
46For a comprehensive review of the unequal international exchange 
system that undermines the trading prospects of less developed 
countries, see M. Brown Barratt, Fair Trade: Reform and Realities in the 
International Trading' System (London: Zed Books, 1993) .
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maximize the gains associated with foreign trade, and foreign
direct investment.
It cannot be denied that trade and foreign direct
investment provide an essential stimulus to the maximization
of the gains of integration. However, as rightly pointed out
by Benjamin J. Cohen,
The strength of the trade stimulus depends on the net volume of 
demand which foreign buyers bring to the export sector. The 
strength of the investment stimulus depends on the net volume of 
capital which foreign investors bring to the investment sector.47
In the context of SSA, there are some factors that limit both
the volume and impact of trade and investment. For instance,
the net volume of demand that foreign buyers bring to the
export sector depends on the income elasticity of demand for
SSA.'s primary products. Simply put, income elasticity of
demand represents the percentage change of quantity demanded
in response to percentage change in income. In other words,
how much will the foreign demand for SSA's exports increase
as a result of an increase in the income of foreign buyers.
If this ratio is positive, then, a rise in the income of
foreign buyers will translate into rising demand for SSA’s
exports. If the ratio is negative, then, a rise in the income
of foreign buyers will lead to declining demand for SSA's
exports. Regrettably, the income elasticity of demand for
SSA.'s primary products is less than one.48 This means that,
47Benjamin J. Cohen, The Question of Imperialism: The Political 
Economy of Dominance and Dependence, p. 170.
48See Kidane Mengisteab, "Devaluation: The Response of Exports and 
Imports," p. 117.
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increasing income in the advanced countries does not 
necessarily translate into a greater than proportional rise in 
demand for exports from SSA. Accounting for such an 
unfortunate scenario inadvertently demands a reappraisal of 
the unorthodox accounts on the marginalization of SSA from the 
international trading system.
Implied in the unorthodox accounts is the contention that 
the demand for SSA’s primary products is influenced by the 
trend of industrial production in the advanced countries. 
Indeed, as already noted, technological improvements in the 
production of synthetic materials and other substitutes 
undermine the demand for raw materials and other primary 
products from SSA. Compounding this loss is the deteriorating 
trend in the sub-region's terms of trade (refer Table 5.2).
Blinded by its unbridled faith in the orthodox accounts 
on the marginalization of SSA, and paradoxically oblivious to 
the gap between textbook models49 and what pertains in the 
real world, the World Bank argues that unfavorable terms of 
trade is "not decisive in Africa’s stagnation and decline."50 
In its characteristic theatrical use of statistics, the World 
Bank argues,
If an annual income loss of 1 percentage point from declining
terms of trade reduces the annual growth rate by no more than
49Take note that the World 3ank has described the policies it 
imposed on SSA during the early 1980s as "textbook” policies because 
they took little accounts of local social, and economic conditions. See 
the World Bank, Adjustment Lending-: An Evaluation of Ten Years of 
Experience, p. 66.
50The World Bank, Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the 
Road Ahead, p. 27.
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0.8 percentage points, then the falling terms of trade can account 
for no more than 10 percent of the reduction in growth rates 
between the early 1370s and the mid-1980s.-1
Inherent in this unorthodox account is an unfortunate
implication that SSA's declining terms of trade is a "given"
in the international exchange system that the sub-region must
learn to live with because, it does not lead to a spectacular
reduction in growth rates. This assessment is far from right.
As a result of the low income elasticity of demand, and
especially due to declining terms of trade, devaluation, as a
neoliberal policy requirement, does not lead to increased
exports. Instead, the decline in export prices as a result of
devaluation constitutes an unintended transfer of financial
gains to the importing countries. This is so because, with the
decline in export prices, the importing countries are in a
position to buy the same volume of raw materials, if they
choose to, with smaller expenditures. In this case, the role
of SSA as a raw material exporter constitutes an "original
sin" that condemns the sub-region to a disadvantageous
position in terms of the operation of international market
forces.
To further appreciate some of the neglected intervening 
factors, take note that neoclassical theories on international 
trade do not incorporate transportation costs to their models. 
But in the real world of international exchange, 
transportation costs could be additive to, or substractive
51Ibid.
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from the gains of trade. After analyzing data on some selected 
countries in SSA, Yeats ec al. , in this instance, 
apologetically assert that,
A large share of sub-Saharan Africa’s foreign exchange earnings, 
which might otherwise be used for productive investment, are being 
used to pay for international transport services . . . Overall the 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa generally are at an important 
transport cost disadvantage relative to competitors. One-half the 
nominal vessel freight rates are more than 2 percentage points 
above those paid by other exporters of the same goods, and a 
larger adverse margin occurs for air freight than for vessel 
shipments
Paradoxically, in their explanation of the marginalization of 
SSA from world trade, the authors do not explain how the 
perennial, adverse transportation costs as elaborated above, 
could be rectified by the mere deepening of neoliberal 
policies. Writing in a different context, Alexander J. Yeats 
again argues that other institutional factors also prevent SSA 
from achieving the optimum terms for their imports. He 
elaborates,
An example of institutional arrangements at the national level 
which may adversely influence African import prices is the 
practice of tying bilateral aid, so that recipients must use 
the funds to buy goods produced in the donor country. Because 
they are in a sense “captive importers," the African countries may 
not be offered prices that would prevail in international markets 
more generally . . - Such overpricing could of course, be used as a 
means of transporting profits and capital out of Africa.33
5-Yeats et al . , “What Caused Sub-Saharan Africa's Marginalization 
in World Trade?“ p . 40.
53Alexander J. Yeats, "Do African Countries Pay More for Imports? 
Yes,” The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1990) , pp. 12-13.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 3 4
Granting that the apologetic assertions of Yeats et al., and 
A . J . Yeats are formidable, then, as indicated in Table 5.2, 
SSA’s Export Unit Values have been deflated by excessive 
international transaction costs, while its Import Unit Values 
have been Inflated by overpricing of imports.
Deflation of export prices, and inflation of import 
prices precipitate marginalization because, it precludes the 
sub-region from achieving the benefits that are attainable 
within the circumference of the international trading system. 
Either way, SSA is denied the much needed foreign exchange 
that accrues from international trade, hence, the declining 
ability of SSA. to rely on national savings and investment 
(refer Table 5.6) . It has been the insistence of the World 
Bank that SSA must continue to open its region to 
international trade.54
On this reguest, and in recognition of the detracting 
intervening variables as adumbrated above, one might be 
tempted to ponder whether the international trading system is 
also opened to the sub-region. That this is not the case is 
explained by the fact that, SSA has adopted the necessary 
trade liberalization policies that would have even made Adam 
Smith blush! Yet, the sub-region has been marginalized from 
all the measurable benefits of international trade.
For instance, according to the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the conclusion of the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariff (GATT) was expected to raise overall global
54See the World Bank, Adjustment in Africa, p. 25.
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income from US$ 212 billion co US$ 510 billion between 1995 to 
the year 2001. During this period, SSA stands to lose about 
US$ 1.2 billion.5- Therefore, with regard to international 
trade, and contrary to what the orthodox accounts would like 
us to admit, there is no direct automatic link between trade 
liberalization and its associated benefits. This is equally 
true in connection with foreign direct investment.
It is instructive to note that the strength of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), as a stimulus to development, depends 
on two factors. First, it depends on the net volume of capital 
that foreign investors bring to the investment sector. Second, 
its multiplier effects depend upon the extent to which the 
invested funds could generate backward and forward linkages 
within the host economy.
In order to attract substantial net volumes of FDI, most 
countries in SSA have adopted far reaching liberal investment 
regimes. As previously mentioned, the 1985 Ghana’s Investment 
Code is not a typical case in point. For, in an empirical 
study of the investment regimes in Cameroon, Kenya, and the 
then Ivory Coast, Ndiva Kofele-Kale concludes that most 
countries in SSA compete for FDI with over-liberalized 
investment provisions.56 Some of these over-liberalized 
provisions include corporate tax exemptions ranging from five
;>5See the UNDP, Human Development Report, 1997, p. 82.
56See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, "The Political Economy of Foreign Direct 
Investment: A Framework for Analyzing Investment Laws and Regulations in 
Developing Countries,” Law and. Policy in International Business, Vol.
23, Nos. 2-3 (Spring 1992), pp. 619-671.
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to twenty-five years, favorable tax treatment on the 
repatriation of royalties and profits, an import duty 
exemptions
In spite of these favorable provisions, SSA has been 
marginalized from the net flow of FDI in comparison with other 
developing countries (see Table 5.4) . According to a global 
investment report released by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on October 3, 2000, investments
by multinational corporations in Africa represent a meager 1.2 
percent of global FDI flows, and just 5 percent of total FDI
flows into developing countries.-''8
It is in light of such unintended marginalization of some 
regions within the global investment community that Paul 
Bennell argues that, there is a yawning gap between rhetoric 
and reality.59 In other words, the adoption of favorable 
investment regimes, as required within the logic of 
neoliberalism, does not necessarily translate into increasing 
flow of FDI into SSA. Some of the intervening factors that 
explain the gap on FDI in SSA are easily discernible.
Take note that FDI is a preserve of giant multinational 
corporations with huge investment and capital outlays. 
Therefore, to justify operational costs, and especially to
maximize profits, the availability of bigger markets ranks
-7Ibid.
-sSee Africa. News Service (October 4, 2000) .
59See Paul Bennell, "Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Rhetoric 
and Reality, " SAIS Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer-Fall 1997) , 
pp. 127-140.
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high in the investment calculations of giant corporations. It 
is not surprising that, in spite of its on-and-off 
confrontation with the rules of international trade, "China 
continues to be by far the largest recipient of FDI inflows, 
with $ 42 billion in 1996. ”60
Unlike China, SSA does not have the power and the 
audacity to flex its muscles in the face of conventionally 
accepted rules of international trade. And unlike China, the 
sub-region has even instituted liberalized Investment Codes. 
Yet, investments are not forthcoming simply because, 
individual countries in SSA, probably with the exception of 
Nigeria, do not have the minimum market threshold attractive 
to profit-maximising global corporations. The average size of 
the market in SSA is only about US$ 3.5 billion.61 In 
recognition of the fact that smaller markets preclude large- 
scale investments, SSA cannot simply attract increasing 
volumes of net FDI by the mere compensation of its fragmented 
markets with the adoption of competitive liberalized 
Investment Codes.
Quite apart from fragmented markets, the burgeoning size 
of SSA’s total debts is also having its own negative toll on 
the net flow of FDI into the sub-region. As indicated in Table 
5.3, the total debt stock of SSA increased from US$ 180.1 
billion in 1990 to US$ 228 billion in 1999. Psychologically,
60The World Bank. Globa.! Development Finance, Vol. 1: Analysis and 
Summary Tables, p. 29.
6ISee Barnabas Thondlana, "Why Investors Shy of Africa, " African 
Business, No. 208 (March 1996), p. 19.
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SSA’s increasing debt "overhang" acts as a "scarecrow" cc 
would be investors in projects of long-term gestation periods. 
This creeping debt site makes the financial future of SSA 
highly unpredictable. As a result, it has a negative impact on 
the psychology of foreign investors.
The scenario that increasing debts will translate into 
future taxes on corporate profits cannot be ruled out. What 
must be noted here is that, the increasing debt size partially 
reflects the increasing foreign exchange gap between SSA’s 
exports and imports. In this case, there is a self-reinforcing 
cycle of deprivation between international trade and FDI in 
the context of SSA. Apparently, the multiplier effects of the 
paltry volume of FDI that emerges from such vicious cycle of 
deprivation cannot be completely positive.
As the World Bank admits, and is exemplified in the case 
of Ghana, FDI in SSA "is confined largely to natural resource 
sectors . . . ”62 Within the natural resource sector, mining 
operations receive the bulk of FDI. With its concentration in 
the extractive sectors, FDI in SSA has minimal multiplier 
effects on the economy of the sub-region as a whole. This is 
so because most extractive industries tend to be capital, 
rather than labor intensive; employing most sophisticated 
technologies. With technology appropriate to their home 
countries rather than to SSA, these industries remain as 
foreign enclaves and subsequently do not provide the essential 
forward and backward linkages within the economy of the sub-
62The World Bank, Global Development Finance, Vol. 1, p. 28.
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region. These linkages would have contributed to the 
diversification of the productive base of SSA.
Simply put, concentration on extractive undertakings 
provides a weak transmission belt for the development of othe 
auxiliary industries. In this instance, FDI does not 
necessarily precipitate diversification of exports as 
explained within the equilibration logic of neoliberalism. 
That this is not the case is explained by the fact that there 
are some intervening factors that obliterate the link between 
the provision of favorable investment regimes (as required by 
neoliberalism) and the attainment of the benefits associated 
with FDI (which constitute the gains of integration).
SSA has been deprived from the foreign exchange 
associated with international trade. The sub-region has been 
denied of the benefits that come with FDI. It has also been 
marginalized from net flows and net transfers (refer Table 
5.5) . As a result, some countries in SSA have resorted to 
unusual means in the generation of funds. For instance, in 
order to concoct favorable statistics on Ghana's economy to 
the international donor community to get more loans, there is 
an indication that proceeds from privatization of state-owned 
enterprises are used in balancing the budget instead of 
putting them into productive investments.63
In a characteristic one shot sale to support the public 
budget, the government of Ghana floated its shares in the 
Ashanti Goldfields Corporation at the London Stock Exchange.
63See West Africa., No. 4036 (February 1995), p. 221.
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Meanwhile, Ashanti Goldfieids is one of the best performing 
corporations in Ghana.04 In this instance, privatization, as a 
neoliberal policy requirement, is no more a principle toward 
the promotion of industrial efficiency. As a result of the 
increasing foreign exchange gap associated with SSA's 
marginalization, privatization has degenerated into a mode of 
behavior characteristic of governments hard-pressed for hard 
currency.
To recapitulate, our theoretical function is predicated 
upon one crucial assumption. That is, there are some 
unfavorable intervening factors that prevent SSA from 
maximizing the measurable gains of integration. This is the 
main reason why marginalization (M) is equated to 
incorporation (IC) without the gains of integration (g[IT]).
In the realm of international trade and foreign direct 
investments, some of these detracting, intervening factors 
that account for the marginalization of SSA have been 
identified, and explained.
Using the underlying assumption of our theoretical 
function as a litmus test of the competing explanations on the 
marginalization of SSA, the unorthodox accounts, rather than 
the orthodox accounts, have been vindicated. To recall, the 
insufficient reform thesis (the orthodox view) claim that SSA 
has been marginalized because the sub-region has not gone far 
enough with the implementation of neoliberal policies. By 
implication, this view is oblivious to some contextual,
04See West Africa, No. 3968 (October- 1993), p. 1811.
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intervening factors that prevent SSA from maximizing the gains 
of integration. The ecclesiastical implication of the orthodox 
view is: Seek ye first the neoliberal kingdom and all others 
shall be added unto it.
On the other hand, the unresponsive neoliberal reform 
thesis (the unorthodox view) rejects the universalistic, 
redemptive connotations of neoliberal policies associated with 
the emerging global order. According to the unorthodox view, 
there are some intervening factors that limit the 
"responsiveness" of neoliberal policies in the context of SSA. 
As a result of these factors, SSA is hamstrung in maximizing 
the gains of integration, hence, the marginalization of the 
sub-region.
With the identification of some intervening factors in 
the realm of international trade and FDI, the unorthodox 
position on the marginalization of SSA fits our specified 
theoretical function more than the orthodox accounts. Indeed, 
if international trade, and FDI are the main apertures through 
which SSA is entreated to participate in the globalizing 
economy, then, the sub-region will continue to operate from a 
marginalized position. The marginalized position of SSA within 
the merging GDLP portends far reaching devastating 
implications.
The implications of the paradox of incorporation and 
marginalization on development, and poverty alleviating 
efforts of the sub-region are examined in the next Chapter. It 
is however appropriate to conclude this Chapter with the
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examination of a specific question: Is the marginalization of
SSA reversible?
IS MARGINA.LIZA.TION REVERSIBLE?
Is the marginalization of SSA. a reversible process or, a 
permanent feature that will continue to characterize the 
position of the sub-region within the emerging GDLP? As a 
reflection of the contending explanatory accounts delineated 
above, the (ir)reversibility of SSA's marginalization seems to 
be fractured into two simplistic but, diametrically opposing 
tendencies. Though, the explanatory accounts of the 
insufficient reform thesis do not fit our theoretical 
function, it is however appropriate, for comparative purposes, 
to expatiate on its underlying prescriptions.
If we are to explain marginalization of SSA through the 
conceptual optics of the insufficient thesis, then, reversing 
marginalization means a deeper commitment to the universal 
principles of neoliberalism. On the other hand, if we are to 
prognosticate within the prism of the unorthodox accounts, 
then, the only available option is for SSA to strategically 
"de-link" from the universalizing policy presumptions of 
neoliberalism. How feasible are these two competing solutions?
Salvation Through Further Neoliberal Reforms?
Salvation through further neoliberal reforms is 
predicated upon two disputable implications. First, there is 
an implied caveat that all currently developed countries
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reached, their level of advancement on the basis of laissez- 
faire policies as currently suggested under neoliberal 
reforms. Second, there is the added assumption that all 
countries have equal power to influence the international 
system to suit their respective development agendas.
Probably, with the exception of Adam Smith's Britain, 
that all presently advanced nations achieved their level of 
greatness through iaissez-faire capitalism is untenable. Even 
Britain's advocacy for a free trade regime during the middle 
of the 19t:tl Century was contingent upon the country’s 
attainment of an appreciable level of industrial prominence. 
Robert Gilpin for instance contends that, Britain became the 
champion of free trade after its industry had developed behind 
strict protectionist walls.65 In this case, free trade, and 
other laissez-faire incantations become a hypocritical facade 
behind which Britain sought for markets, and glory in distant 
lands. The role of the state in the initial protection of 
British industries, and in the subsequent crusade for free 
trade was the rule, rather than an exception.
Quite apart from Britain's instrumental use of laissez- 
faireism to achieve specific national objectives, the 
developmental experiences of Japan and the Asian NICs (South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hongkong, and Singapore) also undermine the 
monolithic, capitalist development argument. Chalmers Johnson 
argues that Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) was instrumental in the promotion of selected
6;jSee Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International 
Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
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industries in the course of Japan's development.66 Alice 
Amsden also demonstrates the ubiquitous role of the state in 
the development of South Korean industries ,67 Yoshimatsu 
Hidetaka on the other hand argues that the NICs also developed 
a distinct form of capitalism that is "characterized by active 
state intervention in the economy and close state-business 
relations . "6S
Regardless of the available evidence, the current 
neoliberal paradigm within which the orthodox view claims the 
marginalization of SSA is reversible appears oblivious to the 
fact that there is no time-tested unilinear, capitalist path 
of development. Therefore, to insist on the path of unexamined 
neoliberalism brings to the fore, some undisclosed intentions. 
That is, with a playing field established to the advantage of 
the more powerful states, the proselytization of neoliberalism 
degenerates into a powerful ideological instrument. It is the 
process through which the advanced countries gain non­
reciprocal and exploitative access to the markets of less 
developed countries, including SSA. Hyperbolic, but very 
descriptive, Scott Burchill refers to this as the politics of
66See Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth 
of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1982) .
67See Alice H. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late 
Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
68Yoshimatsu Hidetaka, "State-Market Relations in East Asia and 
the Institution-Building in the Asia-Pacific," East Asia, Vol. 18, No. 1 
(Spring 2000), p. 5.
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"free trade imperial ism"69 chat: tends co marginalize 
developing countries, especially SSA.
In retrospect, the assumption that all currently 
developed countries achieved their level of greatness on the 
wheels of neoliberalism is not supported by the available 
evidence. Rather, free trade and other neoliberal incantations 
become the issue only when the envisaged benefits tilt to the
advantage of the more powerful nations. In its marginalized
position, and politico-economic diminutive posture, SSA does 
not posses the economic clout and political leverage not only 
to manipulate, but also participate beneficially in the 
international system of trade and investment.
On a more crucial note, the idea that the marginalization 
of SSA could be reversed through the deepening of unexamined 
neoliberal reforms is at best, conceptually obfuscating, and 
at worst, otiose. In the first place, the assertion that 
reforms have not gone deep enough is to admit, inadvertently,
to some level of the neoliberal dosage. And as the indicators
on the marginalization of SSA show, that discernible level of 
neoliberal reforms does not currently augur positive results. 
Therefore, to deepen neoliberal policies in its present mold 
is to embark on a circuitous experimentation that could only 
result in further destitution, and marginalization of the sub- 
region .
69Scott Burchiil, "Liberal Internationalism,“ in Scott Burchill 
and Andrew Linklater, eds., Theories of International Relations (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 50.
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Second, conceived within the presumption of the 
universalistic attributes of western capitalist development, 
the standard neoliberal policy package under SAPs comes as a 
technical solution to the developmental problems of SSA. And 
as with all technical solutions, there is an inherent tendency 
within the presuppositions of neoliberalism to externalize 
failures, and internalize successes.70 As a result of this 
tendency, the critical threshold point at which neoliberal 
reforms could be "frozen" and evaluated as a failure (which 
will call for program re-examination) or, a success (which 
will indicate the continuation of the program) is very 
evasive.
Beneath this time-saving evasiveness is a quintessential 
neoliberal policy trap. Conspicuous failures along the road 
imply insufficient reforms that must be rectified through 
further reforms; discernible successes mean progress that must 
be defended through the advancement of neoliberal reforms. In 
this case, with the marginalization of SSA, to concede to the 
prescriptions of the insufficient reform thesis is to justify 
the permanent consolidation of the sub-region on the failure 
side of the neoliberal policy trap. And if SSA gets stranded
70The tendency to externalize failures, and internalize success is 
an attempt to preserve the precarious internal validating assumptions of 
the neoclassical model. For instance, the World Bank argues in its 1993 
report on East Asia that, the success of that region was due to "getting 
the basics right" through the promotion of "market friendly 
intervention," and "good governance." See the World Bank, The East Asian 
Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993) . However, with the onset of the 1997/98 financial crisis in 
East Asia, both the IMF and the World Bank, this time, isolated the East 
Asian state-assisted model as the main culprit. See Steve Radelet and 
Jeffrey Sachs, "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, 
Prospects," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1 (1998), 
p p . 1-90.
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within the prison -walls of neoliberalism, there will be no 
escape latches that: could lead to autonomous policy freedom. 
Should this option hold true, the transient hope that the 
marginalization of SSA could be reversed through further 
neoliberal policies will be replaced by permanent despair, 
hopelessness, and powerlessness.
Salvation Through Strategic "De-linking?"
If SSA has been marginalized because the standard 
neoliberal policy package under SAPs is not responsive in the 
context of the sub— region, then, one might be tempted, to fall 
victim to a post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy with the 
prescription for reversing marginalization. That is, the 
marginalization of SSA could be reversed through some form of 
a "strategic de-linking” from the logic of neoliberalism in 
particular, and from the capitalist framework of development 
in general. As a concept of development, and particularly as a 
strategy to reverse the marginalization of SSA, de-linking 
ranges from some form of African socialism,71 through 
autocentricism,72 to popular development approaches.73
7lOn delinking and African socialism. See Samir Amin, Delinking: 
Towards a Polycentric World, and Samir Amin, Maidevelopment.- Anatomy of 
a Failure (London: Zed Books, 1990).
7-On autocentric development, see Kidane Mengisteab, Globalization 
and Autocentricity in Africa's Development in the 21st- Century.
73On popular development approaches, see John Brohman, Popular 
Development: Rethinking the Theory & Practice of Development
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Samir Amin is the chief advocate of the strategy of de­
linking. In his view, "the concept of 'delinking' is in no way 
synonymous with autarky." Rather, it is the
pursuit of a system of rational criteria for economic options 
founded on a law of value on a national basis with, popular 
relevance independent of such criteria of economic rationality 
as flow from the dominance of the capitalist law of value 
operating on a world scale.74
In other words, de-linking is an attempt to pursue a
nationalist development process that is removed from the
dictates, and the logic of the transformation of the world
capitalist system. In this process, positive factors in the
international system are selectively appropriated in support
of domestic development agendas. This is in direct contrast to
the current neoliberal framework in which national development
priorities (granting that they exist) are subjugated to the
imperatives of a globalizing world economy.
In this sense, an autocentric development approach is a
peculiar strand of the strategy of de-linking. A defining
feature of an autocentric strategy "is to base African
economies primarily on social needs and thereby to promote
interna.! dynamics without discarding the benefits of external
dynamics."75 Promoting the internal dynamics of development is
to expand control of the national process of capital
accumulation. Here, development would be geared towards the
74Samir Amin, Delinking’: Towards a Polycentric World, p. 62.
75Kidane Mengisteab, Globalization and Autocentricity, p. 22, 
italics in original.
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satisfaction of social needs, rather than in meeting the 
scheduled demands of an' externally imposed frame of 
development.
In a similar vein, popular development is an epithet for 
the "indigenization of development thinking ...” that involves 
"an intellectual emancipation and a fundamental reassessment 
of the major Western-based development paradigm."76 As the 
various strains of the de-linking strategy fumble to explain, 
and as John Brohman also admits, popular development does "not 
necessarily preclude Western concepts and methods, but entails 
a more realistic view of them as reflecting a specific 
geographical and historical context."77 The underlying import 
of popular development is the need to re-examine ethnocentric 
theories of development in the light of local needs and 
contextual circumstances. Subscription to established 
theories, argues John Brohman, might not be responsive to the 
peculiar developmental needs of less developed regions, 
especially SSA.
The extent at which the marginalization of SSA could be 
reversed through the wisdom and the tenets that are exposed 
under the various strands of the de-linking strategy is very 
limited. In the first place, the "do’s and don’ts” of the de­
linking approaches reflect more of a moral revulsion to the 
universalistic claims of neoliberalism than a concise, 
workable blueprint for reversing the marginalization of SSA..
76John Brohman, Popular Development, p. 337.
77Ibid.
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It is instructive to note that even before neoliberalism 
became an issue, and the marginalization of SSA emerged as the 
issue, some countries in the sub-region had already 
experimented with some form of de-linking.
As already noted in Chapter II, Tanzania under J.
Nyerere, Zambia under K. Kaunda, Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah, 
and to some extent, Nigeria during the 197 0s were periods 
during which de-linking emerged as the spirit of the 
development process. As already alluded to, these 
experimentations did not tackle the fundamental structural 
problems of these countries. The experiments led to increasing 
indebtedness without formidable transformation toward economic 
independence and policy autonomy. Also, instabilities 
associated with the dependence on primary products undermined 
dependable, external sources of development funds.
The strategy of de-linking could not prove effective at a 
time when SSA, at least, had some appreciable degree of 
freedom to operate in a world without a rigid ideological 
development framework during the '60s and the '70s. In the 
current era of globalization, the ideological hegemony of 
neoliberalism has been elevated into an international 
theology. In this case, de-linking, as a strategy for 
reversing the marginalization of SSA, has been deeply 
incapacitated. It is therefore highly debatable whether de­
linking could prove useful in reversing both the external, and 
internal marginalization of the sub-region. That this is the 
case is not far fetched.
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SSA’s highly indebted position (see Table 5.8) denies it 
the needed financial freedom to embark upon an endogenously 
determined development agenda that could possibly help reverse 
the internal marginalization of the sub-region. This is so 
because, as already noted in Chapter IV, the release of SALs 
is contingent upon the adoption of prescribed neoliberal 
policy conditionalities. Lacking its own financial resources 
for development, SSA’s recourse to the funds of the IMF and 
the World Bank will continue to be the rule, rather than an 
exception.
On this note, it would be wishful thinking to presume 
that the Bretton Woods institutions will release substantial 
funds in support of amorphously defined, populist development 
agendas. This is so because, de-linking as a strategy, 
deviates from the logic of neoclassicism but, illegitimately 
appropriates from the spoils of collectivism, and blatantly 
identifies with the passion of redistributive justice. If SSA 
still has its eyes on the financial largesse of the IMF and 
the World Bank in support of some radical marginalization 
reversing agendas, the sub-region will eventually avail itself 
to the painful lesson that the Bretton Woods institutions do 
not, and will in no way finance "socialism" in the sub-region.
There are those who will counteract the recalcitrance of 
the Bretton Woods institutions with a pacifying note that SSA 
could rely on funds from other international private banks or, 
depend on its own internally generated funds. As a result of a 
complex admixture of some factors, funds from these two
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sources cannot provide the much sought for financial 
redemption. As rightly pointed out by Anne 0. Krueger, open 
and liberalized regions that win the World Bank’s seal of 
approval attract other international, private capital flows.78
In other words, international capital trails the path set 
by the IMF and the World Bank. This is especially true in SSA 
where the presence of these institutions is used as an index 
of a favorable investment climate, and their absence, an 
indication of a hostile investment atmosphere. A strategy of 
de-linking that runs counter to neoliberal prescriptions, and 
thus invokes the displeasure of the WTorld Bank will ipso facto 
incur the wrath of the international community.
The sub-region cannot count on internally generated 
financial resources in a situation in which "primary 
commodities account for 80 percent of exports."79 As already 
indicated, the prices of primary commodities are influenced by 
external factors that are beyond the exclusive control of the 
sub-region. As a result, proceeds from exports do not, and 
will not provide a reliable source of investment funds. For 
all practical purposes, embarking on a strategy of de-linking 
in an attempt to reverse the marginalization of SSA will not 
only face monumental external constraints, but also, will be 
financially hamstrung.
In spite of its nationalistic appeal, de-linking as a 
strategy does not address the fact that the debilitating,
78See Anne O. Krueger, "Whither the World Bank,“ Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. 36 (1998), pp. 1983-2020.
79K. Watkins, The Oxfam Poverty Report, p. 116.
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external circumstances that continue to shape the 
marginalization of the sub-region cannot be overcome through 
the sheer force of populist rhetoric. The unfortunate fact is 
that, the development process of SSA is now caught within the 
excruciating pain of the neoliberal policy trap. As a result, 
the marginalization of SSA, as a paradox, is emerging as an 
enduring feature of the globalizing world economy.
Regrettably the enduring feature of SSA's marginalization 
cannot be reversed through an unexamined deepening of 
neoliberal reforms. It can neither be rectified through the 
adoption of some nationalistic, indigenization programs that 
are contemptuous of the reigning logic of neoliberalism, and 
run counter to the imperatives of globalization. As a result 
of the inadequate prescriptions of the orthodox and the 
unorthodox explanations, SSA is now caught within the 
paradoxical logic of neoiiberalism, within which there is no 
redemption, and without which there are no pacifying 
alternatives .
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C H A P T E R  V I  
C O N C LU S IO N S  AN D  P O L IC Y  IM P L IC A T IO N S
The main objective of this dissertation was to examine 
whether neoliberal policies associated with globalization 
concurrently incorporate and marginalize SSA within the 
emerging international economic system. The examination of 
this objective was to enable us isolate the main implications 
of the paradox of incorporation and marginalization on 
development and poverty alleviating efforts of the sub-region.
In recognition of the fact that the objectives set in our 
study demanded a plausibility probe rather than a more 
rigorous testing of stated hypotheses, the appropriate mode of 
analysis was a qualitative-inductive procedure. This procedure 
was predicated upon the methodology of explanation. As 
outlined in Chapter I, designing a plausibility probe that is 
based on the methodology of explanation involves three 
essential stages: specification of a theoretical function, the
undertaking of a case study, and verification of the 
theoretical function on the basis of the case study.
A theoretical function that isolates marginalization (M) 
as incorporation (IC) without the gains of integration (g[lT]) 
was specified. To test, this theoretical function, a case study 
of SSA was conducted. After that, our specified theoretical 
function was verified by drawing upon the issues, and the 
facts delineated in our case study. In order to facilitate the 
methodology of explanation, four specific questions, as stated
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in Chapter I, were isolated for comprehensive examination. The 
first three of these questions that highlight on the main 
terms in cur theoretical function, have been examined in 
Chapters III, IV, and V respectively.
The final question to be addressed relates to the 
implications of incorporation and marginalization on the 
development priorities and poverty alleviation concerns of 
SSA. Therefore, the examination of the implications of 
marginalization is the main subject of our concluding Chapter. 
However, in order to cast the examination of our final 
question in a refreshing perspective, it would be appropriate, 
first, to marshal the main findings in our previous Chapters.
As it was emphasized in Chapter I, discussions on the 
marginalization of SSA would be meaningless unless they are 
conducted within the developmental prism of the sub-region. 
Development that bears on poverty alleviation, in this case, 
serves both as the backdrop and the end-point of our 
discussion of the marginalization of SSA. In this direction, 
the literature was reviewed in Chapter II to indicate that, in 
the context of SSA, the imperatives of globalization and the 
associated neoliberal policy demands signify the rise and fall 
of post-WW II traditional development paradigms.
As amply demonstrated in the final section of Chapter II, 
it is within the new globalization induced, and neoliberalism 
defined framework of development that the paradox of 
incorporation and marginalization, in the context of SSA, 
finds meaning. Therefore, in order to set the relevant
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theoretical framework for the examination of the main 
objective of our study, the links between globalization and 
neoliberalism were examined in Chapter III.
In response to our first question, the underlying 
intention was to demonstrate the extent at which neoliberal 
policies constitute the ideological counterpart of 
globalization. The examination of this issue was very 
important. This is so because, we could not have authenticated 
the incorporation of SSA into the ideational framework of 
globalization without establishing the fact that neoliberalism 
constitutes the ideological handmaiden of globalization.
Indeed, after the essence of globalization was salvaged 
from the raging debate, and its characteristic features 
superimposed on the theoretical precepts and policy demands of 
neoliberalism, the fit between the two became conspicuously 
clear. As a contingent, ideological project, rather than an 
inevitable outcome of market forces, the substantive aspects 
of globalization include the internationalization of finance 
and production, and increasing flow of capital, goods and 
technology. As amply demonstrated, the realization of these 
substantive correlates of globalization would have remained 
frozen on the calculating boards of the World Bank and the IMF 
without their activation made possible through the 
instrumentalities of neoliberal policies.
As explained in Chapter III, the adoption and 
implementation of neoliberal policies serve as a lubricant, a 
greasing process that aids the actualization and spread of the
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substantive aspects of globalization.. In this case , 
globalization, contrary to the inevitability thesis, is a 
contingent process that rides on the proselytization of 
neoliberal policies. Therefore, as the main force ~des frappe 
of the globalization project, the instrumental valuie of 
neoliberal policies parallels that of atomic weapons in the 
prism of WW II, and nuclear deterrence in the calculations of 
the Cold War. In this regard, neoliberal policies, in both 
spirit and content, constitute the ideological armor of the 
globalization project.
In its practical connotation, the ascendancy of 
neoliberalism defines the legitimate framework of “the new 
context of development. In response to our second research 
question. Chapter IV examined the path by which SS^ A. was 
incorporated into the new globalizetion-induced, aznd 
neoliberalism-defined context of development. The underlying 
essence of this examination was to establish the p arameter of 
incorporation (IC) in our theoretical function.
As outlined in Chapter IV, the debilitating economic 
crisis in SSA during the early 1980s provided a ve=ry receptive 
psychological background for the IMF and the World Bank to 
impose a global market discipline on the sub-region. In such a 
conforming framework, the justification of the wiscdom of 
incorporation, the definition of the means of incorporation, 
and the enforcement of the process of incorporation were all 
conducted within the theoretical interstices of neoliberalism.
As demonstrated in the contexts of Ghana, Zambia, and
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Kenya, enforcing the process of incorporation took the form of 
quintessential conditionality experiments. In these 
experiments, the deliveries of funds were made contingent upon 
the adoption, and implementation of some specified neoliberal 
policies. In spite of some initial, frustrating contemplation, 
a greater number of countries in SSA eventually moved to 
accept and defend their incorporation into the orthodoxy of 
the new development framework. So successful was the 
incorporation experiment that, the World Bank, in its 1994 
interim assessment, commended SSA on its efforts toward the
0
adoption, and implementation of neoliberal policies.1
In spite of the World Bank's premature commendation, our 
study adopted a countervailing position that incorporation is 
not an end of itself. It only serves as the means for the 
realization of the conventional benefits associated with the 
adoption, and implementation of neoliberal policies. It was on 
the basis of this qualification that the search for a 
plausible paradox of incorporation and marginalization, in the 
context of SSA, was examined. In effect, the main focus of 
Chapter V was the examination of our third research question.
Conventionally, the World Bank assumes that there is an 
automatic link between incorporation and the attainment of the 
benefits underlying neoliberalism. On the basis of this 
supposition, the World Bank presents some summary indicators 
on SSA's integration into the global economy (see Table 5.1) 
to posit that the sub-region is benefiting from the new
*See the World Bank, Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and 
the Road Ahead.
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contexc of development. However, as demonstrated in Chapter v, 
lost within the labyrinth of the World Bank’s aggregated 
summary data are some macroeconomic indicators that bear on 
the marginalization of SSA within the emerging economic order.
In order to facilitate the examination of the paradox of 
incorporation and marginalization, a conceptual distinction 
was made between incorporation and integration within the 
template of globalization. Incorporation (IC) was employed to 
signify the subscription to the neoliberal, ideological 
counterpart of globalization. Integration [IT] on the other 
hand was used to indicate the substantive, measurable economic 
outcomes from subscription to the ideational aspects of 
globalization. The conventional benefits associated with 
neoliberalism were then equated with the gains of integration 
(g[i t ]).
On the basis of this distinction, we were able to specify 
all the parameters of our theoretical function that served as 
a convenient guide to the explanation of the paradox of 
incorporation (IC) and marginalization (M). Restated, M = IC - 
g(IT). That is, marginalization (M) equals incorporation (IC) 
without the gains of integration (g[IT]). Before accounting 
for the paradox on the basis of our theoretical function, the 
facts, the meanings, and dimensions of SSA’s marginalization 
were identified.
As indicated by the various macroeconomic data presented 
in Chapter V, SSA has been disenfranchised from all the 
relevant, measurable indicators on the gains of integration.
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Contrary to the much touted gains from free trade, the sub- 
region has been marginalized from the international trading 
system. This was indicated by the sub-region's decreasing 
share of total world trade. Compounding this are deteriorating 
terms of trade, and increasing costs of international trade 
and transactions (see Table 5.2).
Also, instead of the anticipated diversification of 
exports, the sub-region is still precariously hooked to the 
export of some selected primary commodities. And with 
precipitous declines in the export of manufactured goods, de­
industrialization has unwittingly replaced diversification of 
exports in the context of the sub-region (see Table 5.3) .
In addition, in comparison with other developing 
countries, SSA has been marginalized from the international 
flow of net foreign direct investment (see Table 5.4). 
Marginalized from the flow of foreign direct investment, the 
sub-region, has by 1996, also become a net transferor of 
financial resources to its long and short term creditors (see 
Table 5.5). As noted in Chapter V, the compendium effect of 
these marginalization trends on the financial position of the 
sub-region has been very devastating. Instead of the effective 
management of the external debts, SSA has been marginalized to 
operate on the fringes of the emerging global order under a 
constraining debt peonage (see Table 5.8).
Interestingly, the facts on the economic regression of 
SSA elicit an appreciable level of consensus even among a 
disparate group of commentators. However, there has been a
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considerable degree of disagreement on the causes of the sub­
region's marginalization. As outlined in Chapter V, the 
unorthodox thesis, an explanation preferred by the Bretton 
Woods institutions, considers marginalization as an "original 
sin" that could be atoned through further incorporation into 
the neoliberal ideological framework of globalization. On the 
other hand, the unorthodox thesis considers the 
marginalization of SSA as a "creation" that deepens with 
increasing incorporation into the ideational imperatives of 
globalization.
Using our specified theoretical function as a litmus test 
for the verification of the competing explanations, the 
accounts of the unorthodox thesis appeared more authentic than 
that of the orthodox explanations. For one thing, if we were 
to accept the explanations of the insufficient reform accounts 
(the orthodox thesis), then, there would have been nothing 
paradoxical about the incorporation and marginalization of 
SSA. This would have been the case because, as an expression 
of an inverse relationship, marginalization would continue to 
decrease with increasing incorporation. As of now, the 
selected macroeconomic data presented in Chapter V does not 
vindicate such an inverse relationship.
Rather than an expression of an inverse relationship, the 
verification based on our theoretical function vindicate the 
underlying tenets of the unorthodox thesis. That is, the 
incorporation and marginalization of SSA captures a 
paradoxical relationship in which the latter is positively
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related, to the former. In other words, contrary to the 
admonitions of neoliberalism and its orthodox defense, the 
marginalization of the sub-region deepens with increasing 
incorporation into the ideological framework of globalization.
If marginalization (M) deepens with increasing 
incorporation, and could therefore be operationally defined as 
incorporation (IC) minus the gains of integration (g[IT]), 
then, there must be some detracting, intervening factors that 
explain the gap between IC and the g(IT) in the context of 
SSA. Indeed, with the isolation of some detracting, 
intervening factors in the sphere of international trade and 
foreign direct investment, we were able to explain the 
underlying dynamics, and the manifestation of the paradox of 
incorporation and marginalization in the context of SSA.
In other words, as demonstrated in Chapter V, there are 
some contextual, intervening factors that disable SSA from 
benefiting from the gains of integration. This is in spite of 
the fact that, to a recognizable degree, the sub-region has 
been incorporated into the ideational framework of 
globalization. Therefore, contrary to the universalizing, 
redemptive effects of neoliberalism as professed by the 
Bretton Woods institutions, incorporation and marginalization 
indicate a prototypical paradoxical relationship in the 
context of SSA. As an expression of a paradoxical 
relationship, an attempt to redress marginalization through 
further unexamined incorporation will amount, technically, to 
a neoliberal policy suicide.
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Therefore, as demonstrated in the final section of 
Chapter V, reversing the marginalization of SSA is not an 
assured certainty within the foreseeable future. This is so 
because, SSA is now caught in a frustrating neoliberal policy 
trap of incorporation without a dependable exit strategy. It 
is within such a neoliberal policy trap that the policy 
implications of marginalization on development and poverty 
alleviating efforts of SSA could best be examined.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
As a developing region that is marginalized within the 
circuitous policy trap of neoliberalism, development and 
poverty alleviating concerns of SSA are deeply impaired. 
Consumed by its unbridled faith in neoliberalism, and 
apparently oblivious to the implications of SSA’s 
marginalization, a recent World Bank report argues that Africa 
can claim the 21st Century.2 Counting on the alleged 
opportunities that are offered by globalization, the Bank 
argues that Africa can claim this Century if it is able "to 
overcome the developmental traps that kept it confined to a 
vicious cycle of underdevelopment ...3
In order to overcome such "developmental traps," the 
Bank, as usual, proposes some prescriptions that do not 
substantially deviate from the contested presumptions of 
neoliberalism. However, largely by design rather than by
-See the World Bank, Can Africa Claim' the 21st Century?
3Ibid., p . x.
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default, the World Bank does not explain how an export 
strategy based on primary commodities could lead to the 
maximization of gains from international trade.
Moreover, the report does not explain why foreign direct 
investments have eluded SSA in spite of the fact that many 
countries in the sub-region have adopted over-liberalized 
investment strategies. In essence, the World 3ank, in its 
report, was still operating under the assumption of a direct 
link between unexamined neoliberal reforms and the gains of 
integration.
However, as demonstrated in our study, SSA has been 
marginalized as a result of the very implementation of such 
unexamined neoliberal policy reforms. And if SSA is still 
"confined to a vicious cycle of underdevelopment,” then, the 
latest World Bank’s offer amounts to serving the sub-region 
with another indigestible neoliberal policy prescriptions.
This time again, SSA is expected to demonstrate good table 
manners. In this case, and in respect of the marginalization 
of the sub-region, the neoliberal policy precriptions are part 
of the problem rather than a solution to the development 
crises.
More importantly, our examination of the marginalization 
of SSA instructs us that, the issue as to whether Africa could 
claim this Century must not be judged in terms of how far the 
region travels on the path of neo liberal ism. It must instead, 
be evaluated substantively in terms of the crystallization of
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a purposeful development pattern that has positive effects on 
the alleviation of poverty.
On the basis of this pedagogical caveat, the World Bank's 
guarded optimism that Africa could claim this Century seems to 
be an unfounded one. This is so because, in the neoliberal 
framework in which SSA has been operating within a 
marginalized circuit for the past two decades, development has 
been de-ideologized, and poverty alleviation has also been 
peripherized. As a result, instead of a triumphant journey,
SSA will be compelled, by the circumstances of its 
marginalization, to make an ill-fated entry into the 21st 
Century.
DE -1DEOLOGIZ AT I ON OF DEVELOPMENT
As noted in Chapter II, the doctrinal assumptions upon 
which post-WW II development theories were based have been 
obliterated as a result of the imperatives of globalization, 
and the policy demands of neoliberalism. To recall, post-WW II 
development paradigms were ideologically state-centric. In 
that framework, autonomous governments in SSA were able to set 
and pursue clearly defined goals of development. An intention 
to develop was therefore transmuted into an ideology of 
development when it was attached to the agency of the state, 
and was considered as an expression of state policy.
In contradistinction to the post-WW II development 
ideology, the current framework insists that development is 
possible in so far as it conforms to the logic of
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neoliberalism, and. is attuned co the dictates of global market 
forces. In this de-ideologized development paradigm, states 
matter in so far as they facilitate the process of 
incorporation through the promotion of market forces, and the 
institution of other liberalization measures.
That is to say, there is the doctrinaire insistence that 
self-regulating, maximizing market in this era of 
globalization may be minimally assisted by the state to 
realize its potential. As a result, the role of the state in a 
de-ideologized development process is limited to the provision 
of a basic macroeconomic framework to enhance that self­
regulating market. As demonstrated in the case of SSA, "notes" 
on how to provide the framework for the operation of global 
market forces are embodied in the neoliberal policy 
conditionalities associated with SAPs.
Therefore, in the fulfillment of these new demands, 
states in SSA have unwittingly become conveyer belts for the 
domestication of rules and regulations that find meaning 
within the imperatives of international market forces. States 
in the sub-region are therefore hamstrung in the performance 
of their previous developmentalist roles. This is so because, 
stripped of its nationalistic content, and therefore 
internationalized, development has been de-ideologized to 
indicate reactions and responses to the challenges and 
opportunities of global market forces. As succinctly expressed 
by Peter w. Preston,
a new general approach Co development [will be] concerned with 
the general structural analysis of the dynamics of the global
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industrial-capitalist system and with elucidation, of the v/ays 
in which particular local groups read and react to the system’ :s 
constraints and opportunities.4
Regrettably, in recognition of the debilitating implicatioms 
of its marginalization, SSA is not well positioned to miniimize 
the constraints, and maximize the opportunities inherent i n  
the globalization-induced, neoliberalism-defined, and de- 
ideologized framework of development. Operating from a 
marginalized position, and bombarded by uncontrollable marlket 
forces, SSA has been precluded from embarking upon a 
purposeful, and an intentional development process.
In its stead, the sub-region is now consumed with the 
management and containment of unanticipated crises associarted 
with its incorporation, and marginalization from the 
international economic system. Such a reactive, and non­
purposeful development posture, is in essence, a response rto 
the new de-ideologized context of international developmentt.
In this new de-ideologized framework of development, poverrty 
alleviation has also been peripherized.
PERIPHERIZATION OF POVERTY ALLEVIATION
Although, the World Bank surmised that Africa could c laim 
the 21st Century, it was also compelled to admit that, Afr.ica 
is not only poor but also, has "the world's highest income 
inequality. . . "5 True to its neoclassical tradition, the Bank 
adds that, "growth that translates into rising consumption is
4Peter W. Preston, Development Theory: An Introduction, p. 315 .
5The World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21st- Century? p. 92.
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... essential for poverty reduction."6 While the World 
Bank’s identification of the extent of poverty in Africa 
cannot be contested, its recommendation that poverty could be 
addressed through unexamined growth is highly contestable.
This is so because, in a de-ideologized development 
framework, growth, as measured by annual percentage change in 
GDP, does not necessarily translate into either improvements 
in average welfare, or to the reduction of poverty, as 
measured by GNP per Capita (see Table 5.7) .
Table 6.1
SSA-Income Poverty, Selected Years, 1987-9 8
People Living on Less Than $1 a Day
1987 1990 1993 1996 1998a
Millions 217 .2 242 .3 273 .3 289 .0 290 .9
Share o f
Pop. (%) 46. 6 47 .7 49 .7 48.5 46.3
Source: Adapted from the World Bank, World Development Report,
2000/2001: Attacking Poverty (Washington, DC: Oxford University 
Press, 2000b), p. 23.
Note: The poverty line is set at US$ 1.08 a day using 1993 as the 
base year for the calculation of purchasing power parity (PPP) . 
a. Preliminary figures.
6Ibid., p. 91.
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As a result, both the absolute size and. the percentage of the 
poor continues to increase in SSA since the middle of the 
1980s. As indicated in Table 6.1 above, the number of poor 
people in SSA. increased from 217 million to 291 million from 
1987 to 1998.
Also, as a reflection of the two dimensions of 
marginalization as demarcated in Chapter V, Table 6.1 shows 
that almost half the population of SSA has been internally 
marginalized. In the face of these worsening trends, the 
presumed automaticity of the link between growth and poverty 
alleviation is a spurious assertion that only finds meaning 
within the logic of trickle down economics.
In the ontological presumptions of neoclassical 
economics, "tricklism" is the standard lever by which the 
benefits of growth "seep" down gradually to improve the 
welfare of the poor. The assumption here is that, growth will 
transmute into jobs and other general economic opportunities 
that will lead to improvements in the standard of living of 
the marginalized people in SSA. In other words, the invisible 
hand of the market forces is equally capable of performing the 
essential redistributive, and poverty alleviating functions 
that were traditionally reserved to the prerogatives of the 
state.
Enamored by this neoclassical logic, the Bret ton Woods 
institutions did not find it necessary to initially embody 
poverty alleviating mechanisms as core concepts of the 
neoliberal reforms that were prescribed to SSA in the early
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1980s. Poverty alleviation, which in the context of SSA was 
(is) an important goal of development was therefore considered 
peripheral to the main economic reform programs. It was not 
until the obnoxious, social effects of SAPs informed the 1987 
publication of UNICEF’s Adjustment with a Human Face7 that 
the World Bank found it expedient to temper adjustment with 
some amorphously defined programs. These programs were 
intended to bear directly on the alleviation of poverty.
Regarded at that time as the most faithful pupil of 
neoliberal reforms, which technically means the country with 
the emerging sinews of the paradox of incorporation and 
marginalization, Ghana was chosen as the first country for 
such targeted programs in SSA. In 1987, the World Bank 
instituted in Ghana’s adjustment framework, a Program of 
Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustments (PAMSCAD) . 
As a contrived appendix to a neoliberal agenda, PAMSCAD was 
not explicitly incorporated as a core component of Ghana's 
reform package.
PAMSCAD remained as a mere appendage, an "add-on, " and an 
afterthought that became necessary when the ill-effects of 
unexamined neoliberal reforms led to economic hardships in 
Ghana. As an adjunct to the main program of neoliberal 
reforms, PAMSCAD could not even mitigate the obnoxious effects 
of adjustment, let alone alleviate the structural poverty in
7See G. Comia, R. Jolly and F. Stewart, Adjustment with a Human 
Face, Volumes 1 and 2, Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
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Ghana.8 in this particular instance, a de-ideologized, 
neoliberal framework of development that demands "safety 
valves" (such as PAMSCAD) to be instituted in order to 
mitigate the associated obnoxious effects unwittingly 
peripherize poverty alleviation.
With the failure of "tricklism, " and with poverty 
alleviation peripherized, the World Bank, from the late 1980s, 
was placed in a very frustrating position. The Bank was 
compelled not only to "think the unthinkable" but also, "do 
the undoable" by defending its position on the alleviation of 
poverty within the infrastructure of neoliberal reforms. This 
defense took the form of the release of reports on why 
neoliberal reform is the surest route to poverty alleviation.
Indeed, the 1990 World Development Report exclusively 
focuses on poverty.9 In this report, the Bank demanded that 
target transfers and safety nets be directed to those who are 
not positioned to benefit from neoliberal reforms. The 
guidelines for the appropriate design of safety net programs 
were provided in a subsequent publication of the World Bank.10 
Another publication. Taking Action to Reduce Poverty in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, details how the problem of poverty could be 
solved within the framework of neoliberal reforms as a 
concerted action between the Bank and governments in the sub-
8See Charles R. Lartey, "Ghana's Transition from 'Revolution' to 
Monetarism: The Issues, The Facts, and Future Options," (M.A Thesis, 
Carleton University, Ottawa, 1996).
9See the World Bank, World Development Report, 1990.
10See the World Bank, Safety Net Programs and Poverty Reduction 
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1997a) .
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region.11 As if the Bank is still haunted by the burden of 
proof, the most recenc report is even subtitled with a 
palliative phrase of Attacking Poverty.12
Ironically, notwithstanding such voluminous treatises, 
poverty alleviation is yet to be placed at the heart of the 
neoliberal reforms in SSA. While the copious reporcs sought to 
dilate on poverty alleviation outside the main framework of 
economic reforms, SSA continues to operate within the 
uncertainties of neoliberalism, with increasing poverty as the 
only probable certainty. That this is the case is not far 
fetched.
As cursorily alluded to in the final section of Chapter 
II, neoliberal policy package under SAPs considers the 
manifestation of poverty as an unanticipated aberrant, a 
pathology that must be tackled outside the main framework of 
economic reforms. In this vein, neoliberal reforms isolate 
poverty alleviation from the logic of economic growth. As the 
various reports by the World Bank indicate, issues relating to 
poverty alleviation are considered in specifically designed, 
and targeted programs. Doctrinally, as a waywai^i child of 
macroeconomic adjustment, the round peg of poverty alleviation 
cannot be fixed into the square hole of neoliberal reforms.
The resultant effect is that, poverty alleviation which 
is of most crucial importance to SSA is considered only in
1!See the World Bank, Taking Action to Reduce Poverty in Sub- 
Saharan Africa (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1997b).
'■See the World Bank, World Development Report, 2000/2001: 
Attacking Poverty (Washington, DC: Oxford University Press, 2000b) .
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some amorphously designed programs that are secondary to the 
main neoliberal reforms. An obvious implication here is that, 
as a result of its external marginalization, SSA does not have 
the funds to seriously embark upon such peripherized poverty 
alleviation programs. With poverty alleviation programs 
peripherized, and therefore made to wither through severe 
financial starvation, it is not surprising that almost half 
the people in SSA. continue to live in poverty (see Table 6.1).
The emerging scenario indicates that, against the 
background of SSA's marginalization, the development process 
has been miniaturized on the alter of global market forces. 
Poverty alleviation has also been displaced from the center 
stage of the new context of development. In recognition of 
these factors, the idea that Africa could claim the 21st 
Century is an unfortunate assertion that glosses over some 
debilitating trends.
CLOSING THOUGHTS
The analysis so far indicates that SSA. has been straddled 
within the paradox of incorporation and marginalization.
Within this framework, development has been reduced to 
sporadic reactions to the uncertainties of global market 
forces. In this paradigm also, poverty alleviation has been 
relegated to the background of macroeconomic adjustment. 
Therefore, to be realistic without necessarily becoming 
neither pessimistic, nor hyperbolic, our exploratory study
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seems to suggest that the globalization syndrome represents a 
false dawn in the context of SSA.
This is plausibly so because, as a result of the 
imperatives of globalization, the rudiments of development 
that bear on poverty alleviation have been pulverized, and 
irretrievably miniaturized on the alter of international 
market forces. It is within such global market forces that,
SSA, through the dynamics of the neoliberal policy crap, will 
continue to be marginalized into a paralyzed, psychological 
state of regressive involution.
In recognition of these trends, and contrary to the World 
Bank’s qualified optimism, Africa could claim the 21st Century 
not on behalf of the poor in Africa but, on behalf of the 
demands, and imperatives of the emerging global market 
discipline. It is within such unenviable feat that the 
constraining effects of the paradox of incorporation and 
marginalization will continue to undermine the hopes and 
aspirations of the sub-region.
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